The Gazette 1967/71

It was held : 1. Such a communication would, if normally made, be made on an occasion of qualified privi– lege and even though the letter from B to W was not sent to discharge any duty or to further any common interest, the occasion remained one of qualified privilege. 2. However, as B had been actuated by malice and the words complained of were defamatory, the plaintiff was entitled to damages for libel. [Angel v Bushell and Co. Ltd. and Anon. (1967) 2 WLR 976; (1967 1 AER 1018. Queen's Bench Division (Milmo J.)]. Definition of "Owner" in Town Planning In 1963 the appellant twice applied for plan– ning permission to use farm land for storage of cars. The applications were refused and an appeal to the Minister dismissed. Two years later the local planning authority served an enforcement notice requiring discontinuance of use for car storage. In 1966 seven informations were preferred for contravention of the notice. In the applica– tions for planning permission the appellant had certified that he was the owner in fee simple but in fact his wife was the landowner. The appellant contended that the enforcement notice was a nullity as it had not been served on his wife. The appeal against conviction was allowed and it was held that the justices' inference was unjusti– fied that had the land been let at a rack-rent the appellant would have been entitled to receive it as agent or trustee for his wife. Control of the business by the husband was no ground for infer– ring that the wife would have appointed him her rent collector if she had vacated occupation and let at a rack-rent. Per curiam : It is illogical that a person served with an enforcement notice can defy it with im– punity merely because of failure to serve some other person; the attention of Parliament should be drawn to this weakness in enforcement pro– cedure. [Courtney-Southan v Crawley Urban District Council (1967) 3 WL R57; (1967) 2 AER 246. Queen's Bench Division (Winn L.J., Ashwarth and Widgery J.) ]. Estate Duty: Exemption by Reason of Purchase A testator granted an annuity to his widow on condition that within three months she agreed to hold one-half of her own estate (as at his death) for herself for life and thereafter upon similar trusts to those affecting the husband's residuary estate. The widow subsequently gave notice that she complied with the condition and received the annuity. On her death she bequeathed one-half of

her estate on the trusts affecting her late hus– band's residuary estate. Held : (Upholding Buckley J.) one moiety of the wife's estate passed by reason of purchase only within the exemption in S. 3 of the Finance Act 1894 but (reversing Buckley J.) that S. 44 of the Finance Act 1940 (as amended by the Finance Act 1950) had the result that the annuity was not to be treated as consideration and therefore the transaction fell to be treated as a gift. Section 2 (1) (c) of the Finance Act 1894 still applied and duty became payable since it could not be said that Lady Harmsworth was entirely excluded from any benefit. [Re Harmsworth deceased. Barclays Bank Limited v I.R.C. (1967) 3 WLR 152; (1967) 2 AER 249. Court of Appeal (Lord Denning M.R., Harman L.J., and Salmon L.J.)]. CORRESPONDENCE Solicitors' Costs Dear Sir, We would like to draw your attention to the position regarding the taxation of solicitors' costs on a party-and-party basis in High Court pro– ceedings, and in particular in actions for damages. Our experience in practice, in which we handle a large number of cases on behalf of plaintiffs is, that in fact, although the cost of maintaining an office has increased by at least 300 per cent since we ourselves started in practice in 1955, yet it is the practice of the taxing masters of the High Court to allow the same instructions fees, or in– deed, somewhat lower instructions fees than were being allowed in 1955. This can easily be established by examining bills of costs which we have in our possession, and which we are sure other members of the profession have also in their possession going back for a number of years. It must also be borne in mind, that over this period the state have found it necessary to increase by almost 600 per cent, the court fees in order to cover the cost of administering the court offices which take care of this type of litigation. We feel that matters have now got to the stage where some representations must be made to the appropriate authority to enable solicitors, such as ourselves who engage to a great extent in general practice involving High Court litigation, to obtain reasonable instructions fees in High Court pro– ceedings. It is in our opinion, most unfair that virtually all items of outlay which in most cases a solicitor has to carry for perhaps one or two years in cases of this nature, should be so substantially increased 43