The Gazette 1967/71

Court of Appeal, Civil Division (Lord Denning M.R., Harnian and Salmon L.J.)]. Crime: Intent to Avoid Payment of Fare: Whether still in Process of Travelling The respondent was charged under Byelaw No. 8 (1) of the London Transport Board that he, with intent that the Board should be defrauded, tendered to an authorised person money on behalf of another person with intent to enable the per– son on whose behalf the money was tendered to travel on the railway without having previously paid her fare. The actions alleged took place when the respondent and a woman companion had arrived at the wayout barrier of an under– ground station. The magistrate considered that on a proper construction of the wording of the byelaw the offence could be committed only before the person on whose behalf the money was ten– dered had travelled, and he therefore dismissed the information. On appeal by the prosecutor the court held that so long as a person is in the pro– cess of arriving at the exit from the arrival plat– form that person is still travelling and the case would be remitted with a direction to convict. [Murphy v Verati (1967), 1 WLR 641; (1967) 1 AER 861. Queen's Bench Division, Divisional Court (Lord Parker C.J., Winn L.J. and Willis J.)]- Evidence: Admission at First Trial The jury had been unable to agree at the appellant's first trial on a charge of receiving stolen property, but at the retrial he was convic– ted. At the second trial the prosecution called as a witness a police officer who had been present at the first trial to testify that the appellant had then admitted that he had possession of the goods. During the cross-examination it was elicited that at the first trial the appellant had explained how he came into possession of the goods and stated that he did not know they were stolen. The appellant appealed against conviction on the grounds that the judge was wrong to allow the officer's evidence because first, it was inad– missible or, even if it was admissible, it was in the circumstances of the case unfair as the appellant had not given evidence, and second, because, if the admission as to possession was taken to be true (the appellant having given no evidence to deny it), then also his explanation must be taken to be true. It was held that the officer's evidence, though novel, was admissible and not unfair in the gen– eral circumstances of the administration of justice; the judge had directed the jury to consider both admission and explanation, but as the appellant

had not given evidence to verify the explanation or deny the admission, it was natural that the jury should attach more weight to the latter. Appeal dismissed. [R. v McGregor (1967) 3 WLR 274; (1967) 2 AER 267. Court of Appeal, Criminal Division (Lord Parker C.J., Diplock L.J. and Ashworth J-)]. Fatal Accident: Settlement to be Approved by the Court The deceased was killed in an accident due to negligence and breach of statutory duty by the respondent company. In August 1965 a settle– ment was agreed "subject to the approval of the court" on behalf of the deceased's widow and infant son in respect of damages under the Law- Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 and the Fatal Accidents Acts. An originating sum– mons was taken out on 13th October 1965 for an order that the agreed terms of the settlement be approved and in November the summons was heard and approved by the master. On 25th Oc– tober the appellant had remarried, but at the November hearing none of those present were aware of this. Before the order was drawn up the appellant's solicitors became aware of her remar– riage and informed the respondents who had the order set aside. On appeal it was held that the agreement in August was shown by the nature of its condition not to be intended to have legal effect. By virtue of R.S.C. (Rev.) 1962 Ord. 80, r. 11, the validity of the agreement for settlement, as it included a claim for a person under disability, depended upon its being approved by the court and as approval had been obtained under a misappre– hension the master was right to set aside the order. [Dietz v Lenning Chemicals Ltd. (1967) 2 AER 282. House of Lords (Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Pearce, Lord Wil- berforce and Lord Pearson)]. Libel: Qualified Privilege: Malice A was introduced by W to B as a trustworthy businessman. It was agreed that B should hold some air-frames selected by A with a view to their possible sale by A, who had extensive contacts for such spare parts. A did not, however, bind himself to buy or to find a buyer, and in fact no buyer was found. Meanwhile the value of the equipment held by B fell and in anger he wrote a letter to W which contained the words "I fear that A is not conversant with normal business ethics", and asked W to pass the contents of the letter on to A. In a libel action brought by A, the defendant B pleaded, inter alia, qualified privilege. 42