The Gazette 1967/71

O'Connor J. the electrician tested for polarity, the reversed polarity would have been discovered and the accident would never have happened. Accordingly the plaintiff was entitled to succeed against the second defen dant. The first defendant was not guilty of negligence in his choice of independent contrac tors to do the electrical work. As to his liability for the electrician's negligence as occupier of premises his only obligation to the invitor was an obligation imposed by law to take reasonable care, he could not be said to be liable to the plaintiff as occupier of the premises. His Lordship con cluded that the first defendant had taken reason able care that persons coming to his flat would be safe from injury from electricity and that he was not in breach of any duty owed to such persons, be they visitors or servants. If the first defendant had attempted to do the work himself and had made a mistake he would have had no answer to an allegation that it was negligent to have tried to do it himself. It could not be good law that the occupier of a flat could not install an electrical circuit without underwriting the work of the specialist contractors which he had no means of checking, should it have been negligently done and cause injury to a domestic servant. The claim against the first defendant failed. There would be judg ment for £3,081 against the second defendant. (Cook v. Broderip and Another, Solicitors Journal [Vol. 112] p. 193). Solicitors' responsibility for delay On 13th April 1961 the plaintiff was injured when a diecasting machine exploded in his employers' factory. He instructed solicitors in July. In Sep tember they wrote a letter of claim. In March 1964 they issued writs against the employers and suppliers and manufacturers of the machine, all of whom entered appearances in April. Early in 1965 the plaintiff's solicitors asked to inspect the machine but the employers' reply was that they wished first to see the statement of claim. The statement of claim was not delivered until June 1967. It was suggested that a notice of Intention to proceed was not necessary. The Defendants did not agree but gave instructions for defences to be delivered. Before that was done, they applied to have the action dismissed for want of prosecution and the Registrar set aside the statement of claim and dismissed the action for want of prosecution. An appeal was made to the judge on December 14th 1964 and affirmed the order. The plaintiff appealed on the grounds, inter alia, that the de fendants, by accepting service of the statement of said that, had

claim, had acquiesced in the delay, and that, when they applied to strike out, the time for delivering their defences had expired. Lord Denning M.R. said that, since the judge's decision, the Court of Appeal had given judg ment in three cases; and his lordship hoped that the principles on which the court acted would now become understood. It was plain that in those cases and in the present one the long and inexcusable delay by the plaintiff's solicitors was prejudical to the -defendants and also to the plaintiff who should have got his compensation if he was entitled to it. The long delay had not only done injustice to him but would cause grave injustice to one or other of the defendants trying to investigate the cause of the accident at this stage. The only point which could be argued was that, owing to the letters written after the state ment of claim was delivered, there was something in the nature of waiver or acquiescence. But those letters, written before there had been time to consider the implications, could not be regarded as waiver or acquiescence such as to disable the defendants from applying for dismissal for want of prosecution. The appeal should be dismissed. In a concurring judgment Danckwerts L.J. stated that the conduct of the case by the plain tiff's solicitors amounted to an abuse of the pro cess of the court. Edmund Davies L.J. also con curring stated that there was no suggestion that the plaintiff had caused or contributed to the enormous and unexplained delay, and it was a grave step to shut him out from relief for all time. (Cresswell v. P.O. Sage & Co. Ltd. and Others The taxpayer employed an accountant to make out his income tax return for him. He had com plete faith in the accountant and signed the return without examining it. Nothing had been suppressed from the accountant, who had all the relevant books from which to make out the return. The profits of the taxpayer's business were substantially understated in the return, and the Crown claimed that it was entitled to be paid the loss of tax which had resulted. The Crown's claim was based on the proviso to s. 47 (1) of the Income Tax Act 1952 which states that: "Where any form of fraud or wilful default has been committed by or on behalf of any person in connection with or in relation to income tax . . . additional assessments may, for the purpose of making good to the Crown any loss of tax attributable to the fraud or wilful default, be ... made at. any time". The taxpayer contended that 108 Solicitors' Journal (Vol. 112) p. 173). Income Tax—Accountant's Default