The Gazette 1967/71

and put right on that occasion, so that on this ground also the defendant was liable. (Taylor v. Kiddey (1968) 118 New L.J. 133). Liability arising from road works In January 1965, the plaintiff fell into a trench dug in the pavement by contractors, the first defendants, who had been laying sewers connect ing houses with the main sewer under the road as agents for a London borough council, the second defendants. The accident occurred at about 5 p.m. when it was dark, and although the first defendants had adequately protected the excava tion with a barrier of oil drums and lamps, lit after dark, some person or persons unknown had demolished the barrier and extinguished the lamps before the plaintiff's accident. The plaintiff claimed damages against both defendants, alleg ing negligence on the part of the contractors or, alternatively, breach of their statutory duty under s. 8 of the Public Utilities Street Works Act 1950. Waller J. held that there was no common law negligence, and that s. 8 of the Act did not create an absolute duty, and dismissed the action. The plaintiff appealed, but the appeal was dismissed. Lord Pearson said that the Judge's finding that there was no negligence should be upheld. Furthermore he pointed out in his judgment that there were numerous express provisions for civil liability none of which made mention of the rights of the private individual. The object of the Act was to regulate relations between the contractor executing the street works and the local authority, and the private individual was not thereby given a cause of action. (Keating v. Elvan Reinforced Concrete Co. Ltd., and Another, Solicitors' Journal [Vol. 112] p. 193). Liability of Occupier/Employer The plaintiff, a cleaner employed by the first defendant to clean his flat, received an electric, shock and severe burns when dusting an electric fire. An electrician had done certain work on the circuit some 10 months before the accident, putt ing in a new switch fuse, but he did not test for polarity. The fire had appeared to be dead but it was in fact live because of reversed polarity at a socket to which it was connected. The plaintiff claimed damages against the first defendant, alleg ing that he was in breach of duty owed to her (i) as employer, and (ii) as occupier of the flat, and from the second defendant, the electrician, alleging negligence in that he had either created the danger or failed to discover its existence. 107

duty in not supplying these implements to free the timber from ice and that, on the balance of probabilities, there would have been no ice had they fulfilled this duty; (iii) That the plaintiff's loss of confidence was attributable to his injuries and that any resulting loss of wages was re coverable as damages. (Osborne v. Port of London Authority (1967) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 572). Confidential relationship of agent with principals 1. Although the relation of agent to principal is normally confidential, the maxim delegatus non potest delegare being based on that confidence, the maxim does not apply where the principal reposes no confidence in the agent; 2. provided the agent personally performs that part which involves any confidential responsibility it is im material that he delegates to another the purely ministerial part; 3. Where an agent gives notice on behalf of a principal it is not necessary to name the principal, it is sufficient if the principal can be identified; 4. in a notice, the date on which the notice is to operate need not be specified provided it is possible for the recipient to ascer tain it; 5. where a formula is used which involves reference to some other document and some question of law arises on the interpretation of that document, relative to ascertaining the date on which the notice is to operate, that is not necessarily fatal to the validity of the notice. (Allam & Co. v. Europa Poster Services (1968) 112 S.J. 86). [Ed.—this case has already been reported in the February 1968 issue of the Gazette (Vol. 61 No. 8 p. 77). However, in view of the succinctness with which the case is reported in Current Law (1968) 2. C.L. par. 314 we considered it worth reprinting]. Un-roadworthy motor car The plaintiff bought a car from the defendant garage proprietor and later took it to him for a routine 3,000-mile service. Two months after the service, one of the front wheels came off and the plaintiff was injured; the cause of the trouble was that the bolts were loose. On the plaintiff's action for damages, held (i) that it was to be inferred that the bolts were loose when the car was sold and accordingly the defendant was liable on an express warranty that the car was in tip-top condition when it was sold; and (ii) (Russell L.J. dissenting) that since the 3,000-mile service voucher prescribed the checking of steering and brakes, the defect should have been detected