The Gazette 1964/67

instructed him to proceed as the road was clear. A motor-cyclist who was approaching collided with the scout car and was killed. It was held (C.C.A. : Lord Parker, C.J., Fenton Atkinson and James J. : June 15, 1966) that the appeals should be dismissed since the offence was an absolute offence. A driver could not escape liability, even though he was completely blameless, or delegate any part of his responsibility to a third person. The only possible defence where a driver could establish that he had been deprived of control of a vehicle by reason of some sudden affliction of his person (e.g. an epileptic fit) or some defect in the car suddenly manifesting itself without blame on his part. The expression "all the circumstances" in the Act of 1960 referred to circumstances arising outside a vehicle and not pertaining to the driver himself. (R. v Ball, R. v Loughlin. The Times 16, 1966). Negligence—Vicarious Liability The respondent was one of a party of boys returning to Glasgow from a summer camp with luggage. He was being transported in a lorry be longing to the appellants, and driven by one of their servants, when the lorry was involved in an accident and the respondent sustained serious injuries. The Court of Session held that the ap pellants were vicariously liable for the negligence of their driver. The appellants appealed on the ground that the driver was acting outside the scope of his employment with them, in that at the time of the accident he was driving along a road he would not have been had he followed the instruction they had given him; that instruction was to transport the boys and their baggage to Glasgow which meant by implication by the short est route to Glasgow. The driver had in fact made a considerable detour at the request of his passengers and for purposes of theirs. It was held (H.L. : Lord Reid, Lord Guest, Lord Pearce, Lord Upjohn and Lord Pearson; June 22, 1966) that the transport of the boys and their baggage to their destination was the dominant purpose of the journey which the ser vant was, qua servant, required by his employers, the appellants, to carry out, and it remained the dominant purpose of the journey even though the passengers had been transported deviously. Had the lorry been empty, or had what it carried been of little importance, so substantial a deviation might well have constituted a "frolic of his (the driver's) own," but the presence of the passengers meant that the deviation was not undertaken by the driver for his own purposes alone. In spite

of that deviation, the appellants remained liable for their driver's negligence. (A. & W. Hemphill Ltd. v Williams, The Times, June 23, 1966). Contract—Third Party Rights The appellant, a widow suing personally and as administratrix of her late husband, appealed from the decision of the Vice-Chancellor of the Chancery Court of the County Palatine of Lan caster that she was not entitled to enforce a promise made to her late husband by the re spondent, her husband's nephew, and incorporated in an agreement in writing between them, to the effect that in part consideration for the handing over to him of the husband's coal merchant's business, the nephew would, as from the hus band's death, pay to his widow an annuity of £5 a week for life out of the business. It was held (C.A. : Lord Denning M.R., Danck- werts and Salmon L.JJ.; June 22, 1966) that by virtue of S. 5 (6) of the Law of Property Act, 1925 where by a person was entitled "to take an immediate or other interest in land or other pro perty .... although he may not be named as a party to the conveyance or other instrument," the widow was entitled to claim the benefit of the agreement by the nephew to pay her an annuity, even though she was not herself a party to the agreement. The general rule that "no third person can sue or be sued on a contract to which he was not a party" was a rule of procedure going to the form of remedy but not to the underlying right. When a contract was made for the benefit of a third person who had a legitimate interest to enforce it, it could be enforced by that their person. (Beswick v Beswick, The- Times, June 23, 1966). Private prosecutor may bring prosecution for an indictable offence in the District Court. 1. The complainant, Jeremiah Crean, issued a summons in November, 1964 charging the de fendant Patrick Ennis with fradulent conversion of the sum of £312-10-0 received for the com plainant as sole proprietor of Savoy Motors Ltd., Rutland Place, Dublin. The said summons was returnable before District Justice Farrell on 23rd December 1964. 2. After argument, the District Justice ruled, that notwithstanding Section 9 (1) of the Criminal Justice (Admininsttion) Act 1924, which provides that all criminal charges prosecuted upon indict ment shall l)e prosecuted at the suit of the 35