The Gazette 1964/67

covered from other sources defects which were liable to make her title worthless, unless the vendor disclosed defects of which he knew or ought to have known. The vendor was entitled to compensation for use and occupation of the flat, but could not rely on the purchaser's re maining in possession as affirming the contract as he had not pleaded this and the purchaser had had no opportunity to explain the reason for her remaining in possession. (Becker v Partbidge (1966) 2 All E.R. 266). Damage for Breach of Option An option to purchase land was granted by the defendant to the plaintiff, to be exercised as soon as reasonably possible after the plaintiff should have obtained planning permission and modification of a tree-preservation order to enable him to carry out development. The defendant, in breach of the option agreement, sold the land to a third party shortly after the plaintiff had already obtained agreement in principle to plan ning permission and modification of the tree- preservation order. Should the damages recover- ably by the plaintiff be assessed by reference to the profits the plaintiff would have made by carrying out his porposed development? Elwes J., applying Diamond v Compbell-Jones (1961) Ch. 22 decided in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant knew the plaintiff intended to develop the land for profit, and therefore special circumstances were established which entitled the plaintiff to have damages assessed by reference to the profits which both parties contemplated he would make. (Cottrill v Steyning and Littlehampton Build The defendants, who were civilian drivers for the Territorial Army, appealed against their con victions, under S. 1 (1) of the Road Traffic Act 1960, in the case of Ball, of causing death by dangerous driving, and in the case of Loughlin, of aiding and abetting that offence. On the oc casion on which the offences were comitted Ball was at the controls of a Ferret scout car. Because a driver's vision is restricted to the rear and at the sides while driving a vehicle of this type, an observer, standing in the turret, gives directions to the driver by intercom. The defendant, Loughlin, was acting as observer on the occasion which gave rise to the offences charged. Ball, the driver, halted the scout car at a cross-roads, coming out of a minor road into a major road, and Loughlin 34 ing Society (1966) 2 All E.R. 295). Dangerous Driving — Absolute Offence

Contract—Injunction against Procuring Breach The main contractors for the building of a large power station employed the plaintiff com pany as sub-contractors to erect the brickworks on a "labour only" basis, i.e., they were to supply the labour for the work and the main contractors the materials. The defendants were three officers of a trade union which strongly objected to this form of contract, although it was authorised (subject to safeguards) by National Working Rule 8 of the National Joint Council, and this rule, being agreed by a majority on both sides, became binding on the industry. The union threatened the main contractors on May 18, 1965, union mem bers would be advised not work on the site, and there was an official stoppage of work as from that day. After unsuccessful discussions the union officials further threatened to withdraw all brick layers employed by the main contractors, declared the job "black" and picketed the entrance gates. Many men left their work without proper notice. The plaintiffs appealed against refusal of an inter locutory injunction restraining the defendants from attempting to bring about the termination of the "labour only" contract. Held by the Court of Appeal that "labour only" contract was not a "contract of employment," so that the defendants were not protected from lia bility by the Trade Disputes Act 1906, s. 3. There was no defence that the defendants were ignorant of the precise terms of that contract. An injunction was granted to the plaintiffs. (Emerald Construction Co. Ltd. v Lowthian and Others (1966) 1 All E.R. 1013). Vendor and Purchaser A contract for sale of a sub-underlease (wrongly described as an underlease) provided that "the vendor's title which has been accepted by the purchaser shall commence with an underlease dated December 28, 1963, and the purchaser shall raise no requisition or objection thereon." Com pletion was fixed for December 23, 1964, but the purchaser took possession on October 26, the purchase-money being deposited in the joint names ol the vendor and purchaser. On October 28 the purchaser's solicitors were informed by the re- versioner on the underlease of breaches of coven ants to pay rent, not to underlet without consent, and not to make unauthorised alterations. Could the purchaser rescind? The Court of Appeal held that in the circum stances the purchaser could rescind the contract. The special condition restricting objections was not a bar to rescission where the purchaser dis­