The Gazette 1958-61

Restrictive Trade Practices—"Evidence. During the course of a hearing, where the Phenol Producers' Association were seeking to justify their price restriction policy under s. 21 (i) (b) of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, one of the witnesses, called by the registrar, said that he was buying phenol at prices below those fixed by the association. The registrar sought to exclude this evidence on the ground that the witness should not be questioned about his contract which was a confidential trade document and should not be shown to his trade competitors nor should its contents be made known to them. It was directed that "The normal method of giving evidence is by oral testi mony. In some instances, as a matter of discretion, we shall direct that the answer of the witness should be written down where it seems to us proper to do so. But there is no advantage to be obtained by that course in the present case with this witness and, therefore, if it is sought to adduce evidence about the actual price he has paid for his phenol, he must give that evidence like any other witness by oral testimony, and he will be subject to cross-examina tion on it in the same way as any other witness. It may be that in all the circumstances it will not be sought to elicit from this witness the actual price he has paid for his phenol" : Re Phenol Producers' Agreement (Practice Note) (1960) L.R. 2. R.P. 49, R.P. Ct. Trade Dispute—Picketing—Liability of Executive. (Trade Unions Act, 1939 (Leeward Islands No. 16 of 1939), s. 2 as amended). Pickets employed by executives of a trade union are not the servants of the executives, so as to make them (the executives) vicariously liable for torts committed by the pickets. The owners of a drug store in Antigua dismissed a trade union member employed there as a clerk without giving reasons. The executive committee of the trade union resolved that H., the general secretary, should take steps to picket the drug store. H. and J., another member of the executive commit tee, engaged pickets including S. J. and S. and other pickets caused an actionable nuisance. In an action by the owners f&r damages and for an injunction restraining the watching and besetting of the drug store, the executive committee, H., J. and S. were defendants. The trial judge awarded an injunction and damages of £80 against all the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed on the ground that there was no trade dispute, as (a) the dismissed clerk was not a "workman" within the meaning of s. 2 of the Leeward Islands Trade Union Act, 1939 and (b) the only dispute was between the plaintiffs and the union, no other members of which were employed at the 73

negligence and breach of statutory duty, the jury answered ten out of the eleven questions left to them but disagreed on the eleventh, despite further directions being given by the trial judge on this question. On return to court the foreman informed the judge that the jury could not agree and the judge discharged the jury. After the parties and counsel had left the court the Issue Paper, which was unsigned, was handed to the judge. Two days later when counsel appeared before him the judge gave judgment for the defendants based on the findings of the jury. On a motion by the plaintiff for a new trial the Supreme Court of Eire held that the verdict of the jury must be given in open court and must be accepted by the judge and recorded in due course by the certificate of the proper officer countersigned by the judge. The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered. Injunction granted to Attorney-General. Per Pearce L.J. : It is now firmly established that where an individual or public body persistently breaks the law, and where there is no person or sufficient sanction to prevent the breaches, these courts in an action by the Attorney-General may lend their aid to secure obedience to the law. They may do so whether the breaches be an invasion of public rights of property or merely an invasion of the community's general right to have the laws of the land obeyed: Att.-Gen. v. Harris, (1960) 3. All E.R. 207. Misconduct—Costs. (R.S.C., Ord. 65, r.n). It is not a proper ground on which to deprive a solicitor of his costs that he may have acted unprofessionally in obtaining evidence. The solicitor to a petitioner in a divorce suit interviewed the husband and obtained from him a statement admitting adultery. The trial judge disapproved of this practice, and while giving judgment for the petitioning wife refused to allow the solicitor's costs of obtaining the statement. The wife and the solicitor both appealed. Held, (i) that there was no general principle as to the propriety of such conduct, and that on the facts of the present case the solicitor was not guilty of misconduct; (2) that it was no part of the judge's function to say whether the solicitor has acted improperly or not; the only ground on which a solicitor can be deprived of his costs is where his misconduct has caused costs to be thrown away, whether the order is made under R.S.C., Ord. 65, r.n, or under the inherent juris diction of the court: Davies v. Davies (1960) I.W.L.R. 1004; 104 S.J. 745; (1960) 3 All E.R. 248, C.A.