The Gazette 1958-61

property and was ordered to stop by a police constable. Instead of doing so S. accelerated and the constable jumped on the car. S. drove fast and made the car swerve violently so that the constable fell off and was killed beneath an oncoming car. S. pleaded, inter alia, that he had no intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm but he was convicted of capital murder. The Court of Criminal Appeal allowed his appeal and substituted a verdict of manslaughter and a sentence of 10 years' imprison ment. The House of Lords, allowing the pro secution's appeal held (i) that S.'s actual intention was not material, since as a reasonable responsible man he must be taken to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his acts ; (2) there was no justification for drawing a distinction between harm "certain" to result and harm "likely" to result; (3) the words "grievous bodily harm" bear their ordinary meaning of "really serious" harm ; (4) s. 1 (i) of the Homicide Act, 1957 has not abolished malice constituted by a proved intention to inflict grievous bodily harm : Director of Public Prose cutions v. Smith (1960) 3 W.L.R-546 ; 104 S.J. 683 ; (1960) 3 All E.R.i6i, H.L. ; 'reversing decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal sub. nom. R. v. Smith (1960) 6 C.L. 77. Note: This decision has been severely criticised by Academic lawyers. Alimony—Wife receiving National Assistance (Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 (14 Geo.6. c.25), s. 19 (i)). The Court has a wide and unfettered discretion to do what it thinks just in awarding alimony, and will not fetter that discretion by laying down any general principle that national assistance benefit received by a wife must be taken into account in awarding alimony. An order for alimony pendente life at the weekly rate of £2 55., was made in the district registry in favour of a petitioning wife. The order was affirmed on appeal by Marshall J. and the husband now appealed to the Court of Appeal on the ground that the wife was in receipt of national assistance benefit and that this should have been taken into account. Held, that there was no general principle or rule of practice to the effect that national assistance benefit must be taken into account, although it would be wrong to remove it from the area of the judge's discretion: Slater v. Slater (1960) 3 All E.R. 217, C.A. Evidence—Statement by witness on previous occasion. Evidence of a witness's previous statements is not in general admissible to support the evidence given by him in the box, though there is an exception where his evidence is challenged as being a recent invention. 7*

The appellant, Dr. F., was charged with infamous conduct in a professional respect in committing adultery with a named patient. The Disciplinary Committee of the General Medical Council found the charge made out and decided that Dr. F.'s name shall be erased from the Register of Medical Practitioners. The main evidence against Dr. F. consisted of statements made by him to one of the witnesses. On appeal to the Privy Council it was argued on his behalf that these statements ought not to have been admitted and that, in any event, they were capable of an innocent interpretation. Dr. F. tendered evidence that at a date before the hearing by the General Medical Council he had made a statement to a friend denying the alleged adultery. Held, dismissing the appeal, that the main evidence of statements made by Dr. F. was admissible, and that the Privy Council was free to form its own view of their significance ; but that Dr. F.'s statement to a friend denying the alleged adultery amounted to no more than the previous assertion of the appellant's story told at the hearing and was inadmissible : Fox v. General Medical Council (1960) I.W.L.R. 1017 ; 104 S.J. 725 ; (1960) 3 All E.R. 225, P.C. Covenant—Payment of School Fees. If trustees receive payments applicable for the benefit of a child and use it in paying a school bill for which the child's parent is legally liable, or if they put the payments at the disposal of the parent and he uses it to discharge such a bill, the payment in question does not thereby lose its character as income of the child and become income of the parent. I.C.I, covenanted to pay to trustees £27,000 less tax per annum for seven years for the maintenance, education or benefit of named children of certain employees. The trustees paid into the bank account of one such child the sum of £140 odd less tax and the child's father directed the child's bankers to apply this sum in paying school bills. Neither the child nor his parent gave any consideration to I.C.I. for the covenant. The child's bankers claimed a repayment of the tax deducted by the trustees. The claim was not allowed by the inspector, and an appeal to the General Commissioners failed. On appeal by way of case stated, held that the appeal should be allowed. The payments made by I.C.I. were in the nature of annual payments from which I.C.I, could deduct tax, and the income was the income of the child, not the father : Barclays Bank v. Naylor (1960) 3 All E.R. 173. Cross J. Verdict ofJury—to be given in open Court (Eire}. In Long v. Saorstat & Continental Steamship Co. (No. 2) (1953) 94 I.L.T.R. 130, in an action for