The Gazette 1952-1955

County Clare Law Society. A t the Annual General Meeting of the Society, the following officers and Committee were elected for 1954-55: President, I. M. Ploulihan; Vice-Presi­ dent, M. J. MacMahon; Hon. Secretary, James Lynch; Hon. Treasurer, Bryan MacMahon; Com­ mittee : John Casey, M. J. Walsh, T. F. O’Reilly, T. A. Lynch. ISSUE OF SUBPOENAS ON THE HEARING OF CIRCUIT APPEALS. B y the High Court (Appeals from Circuit Court) Rules, 1954 (S. I. No. 3 of 1955) the rules o f the High Court and Supreme Court made on 10th November, 1937 are amended by the insertion in Order II thereof o f the following additional rules : 12. A subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum at the High Court on Circuit may be sued out either in the Central Office or in the office o f the County Registrar of the County in which the case was heard. 13. Where a subpoena is sued out in the office of the County Registrar under the immediately preceding rule, the order o f subpoena shall issue out of that office and be sealed with the seal of the Circuit Court for the county in which the case was heard, and be signed by the County Registrar; and every subpoena so issued, sealed, and signed shall have the same force and effect as if it had been issued out of the Central Office. Counsel’s fees in the Circuit Court. B y the Circuit Court Rules, 1955 (S.I. No. 1/1955) scales of counsel’s fees as between party and party are prescribed for proceedings in the Circuit Court, in district Court appeals proceedings under the Workmen’s Compensation Acts and Malicious Injury applications. The rules may be purchased at the Government Publication Office, Dublin, price 3d. DECISIONS OF PROFESSIONAL INTEREST. (1) Negligence action against solicitor : Right to jury. T h e decision o f the Supreme Court in Deignan v' Greene, although it merely followed well established authorities, is one of interest to the solicitors’ profession. The question at issue was the plaintiff’s

right to a jury in an action against a solicitor for alleged negligence in his professional conduct. The defendant was solicitor for a vendor o f a publichouse, and the plaintiff came to him as an intending pur­ chaser, and signed in his office a contract to buy the premises. At some stage in the transaction—• whether before or after the contract was signed was disputed—the plaintiff raised the question of getting a loan to enable him to complete the purchase, and asked the solicitor to act for him as well as for the vendor. A few days after the contract had been signed by both parties, the plaintiff repudiated it, on the ground that the sale had been conditional on the solicitor procuring for him a loan, which had not been got. Subsequently, the vendor obtained a decree for specific performance, and, on Mr. Deignan making the case that he was unable to complete, the matter was compromised by the payment of a substantial sum by Mr. Deignan as damages to the vendor. Mr. Deignan then instituted the present action for damages against the solicitor, alleging that he had been negligent as his solicitor in failing to insert a clause in the contract making it conditional on a loan being procured, and that he had failed to advise him as to the consequence of signing the contract, and been negligent in not obtaining a loan for him. Notice of trial with a jury was refused in the Central Office, whereupon the plaintiff applied to the High Court (Murnaghan J.) for an order directing that such notice should be accepted. This application was dismissed by Murnaghan J. and the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court. At the hearing, counsel for the plaintiff admitted that it was well established that an action by a client against his solicitor for pro­ fessional negligence was essentially an action for breach o f contract, in respect of which the plaintiff would have no right to a jury. Reference was made to the leading Irish case on this question, Liston v. Munster and Leinster Bank. Ltd., (1940) I.R. 77 and to Somers v. Erskine, (1943) I.R. 348. Counsel contended, however, that an undertaking to procure a loan was no part of a solicitor’s normal duty and that negligence in carrying out such an undertaking was a to rt: alternatively, he submitted that even if the plaintiff had no right to a jury, this was a case where the Court, in its discretion, should direct that the trial should be by a jury, having regard to the fact that the issue was one between a layman and an officer of the Court. The Supreme Court, unanimously dismissing the appeal with costs, rejected both these contentions. Kingsmill Moore J. (with whom the Chief Justice and Lavery J. concurred) said that in his view, the case was one more suitable for trial by a judge without a jury. O’Daly J. (with whom Maguire J. concurred) said

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