The Gazette 1994
GAZETTE
AUGUST/SEPTEMBER
1994
them by the 1935 Act. (2) The executive could agree to indemnify the local authority against the cost of observing the requirements of the 1935 Act, but such an agreement could not in any way limit or reduce the statutory obligations of local authorities or the minister. Thus budgetary and financial constraints could not afford an answer to those pro- ceedings. If the executive wished to limit or reduce such obligations it would have to seek the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Oireach- tas. (3) S. 31 of the Civil Bill Courts (Ireland) Act 1851 as adapted did not apply to the present Circuit Court. It had been impliedly repealed, first of all by the creation of the Circuit Court un- der the Courts of Justice Act 1924, and subsequently by the Courts (Estab- lishment and Constitution) Act 1961. Thus the orders purporting to adapt s. 31 and the order of 23 June 1992 pur- porting to delete Drogheda as a Circuit Court venue were of no effect. In any event these orders had not been made to regulate the sittings of the Circuit Court but to provide a defence to the present proceedings and for that reason they were void. (4) The events preced- ing the order of the President of the Circuit Court suggested that the only reason for the omission of Drogheda from the list of towns where the Circuit Court was to sit was the service of the dangerous buildings notice in respect of the Drogheda courthouse. (5) The county council were obliged under s. 3 of the 1935 Act to provide suitable ac- commodation as directed by the minis- ter. They were not bound to maintain the same courthouse building and were entitled to abandon an old or dilapi- dated building provided that they made available suitable alternative ac- commodation for the sittings of the Cir- cuit Court. Reported at [1994] 1 ILRM 334 David Manning v. John R. Shackleton and Cork County Council (notice party): High Court (Barron J) 1 April 1993 Judicial Review - Reasons for decision - Fair procedures - Arbitration - Compul- sory purchase order made in respect of ap- plicant's lands - Question of assessing ap- propriate compensation - Property arbitra- tor appointed - Whether obligation on arbi- trator to provide a breakdown of the reasons for his award - Whether question of costs should be remitted to arbitrator - Acquisi- tion of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919 , ss. 3(3), 5(1) and 6(1) - Arbitra- tion Act 1954, s. 36
Facts The applicant owned lands at Barryscourt, Co. Cork, a portion of which became the subject matter of a compulsory purchase order made by Cork County Council in 1986. The re- spondent was appointed to arbitrate the measure of compensation to which the applicant was to be entitled. Cork County Council then made an uncondi- tional offer of £175,000, exclusive of costs, in full and final settlement of the applicant's claim. The offer also in- cluded an undertaking to carry out cer- tain accommodation works and further such undertakings were given by Cork County Council during the course of the arbitration hearing. On 12 Decem- ber 1991 the respondent made an award of £156,280. As the award did not ex- ceed the offer which had already been made, the applicant was ordered to pay the costs from the date of the offer. The applicant's solicitors subsequently wrote to the respondent requesting that he furnish the applicant with a written judgment setting out his findings of fact and of law as well as a breakdown of the content of the award. The respondent replied by letter that he was not re- quired to give a written considered judgment. By order dated 27 July 1992, the applicant was given leave to seek judicial review of the respondent's award. Held by Barron J in refusing the relief sought in respect of the giving of rea- sons and remitting the matter to the respondent for the determination of is- sues pertaining to the award of costs: (1) The giving of reasons by a person or body required to act judicially may be compelled by the High Court when such reasons are necessary to determine whether such a power has been validly exercised. It is not an essential obliga- tion and arises only when required to prevent an injustice or to ensure that not only has justice been done but is seen to have been done. However, the appli- cant had not indicated how he was likely to suffer prejudice or injustice as a result of the failure to state reasons. (2) If the applicant had wished to ensure that, contrary to the normal practice, the respondent should give reasons for his award, he should have made a submis- sion to that effect at the outset of the hearing. By allowing the hearing to con- tinue and by failing to seek reasons from the respondent to be inserted in the award, he accepted the normal prac- tice. (3) The applicant had to be taken to know how the award was broken up between the heads of claim. So far as these amounts were dependent upon fact, the award was final and binding upon him. So far as there may have been legal issues which the respondent had
determined, the applicant could have brought these before the High Court by asking the respondent to make his re- port in the form of a special case under s. 6(1) of the Acquisition of Land (As- sessment of Compensation) Act 1919, but he had not done so. The applicant had likewise waived his right under s. 3(3) of the 1919 Act to require the re- spondent to specify the amount awarded in respect of any particular matter. (4) In relation to the issue of costs it appeared that the amount of compensation which was awarded might have been affected by the nature of the undertakings given by the notice party. It would not be possible to say whether the award was more or less than the unconditional offer until there was a determination as to the amount, if any, which the respondent deducted from the compensation by reason of the undertakings which were given in the unconditional offer and were added at the hearing. Accordingly the matter should be remitted to the respondent for a determination of these issues. In any event this was a ground for remit- ting a matter to an arbitrator under s. 36 of the Arbitration Act 1954. Reported at [1994] 1 ILRM 346 Local Government - Planning and Devel- opment - Works carried out outside bound- ary line on map attached to permission - Application for extension to planning per- mission refused - Whether refusal based on misinterpretation of statute - Whether un- authorised development - Local Govern- ment (Planning and Development) Act 1963, s. 26(10) - Local Government (Plan- ning and Development) Act 1982, s. 4 Facts The applicant, a property devel- opment company, was granted outline planning permission for a large hous- ing development of more than 500 houses at Newtownmountkennedy in Co. Wicklow and subsequently was granted three planning permissions in relation thereto. The applicant having built a small number of the houses car- ried out substantial works 'pursuant to such permission' involving, inter alia, the installation of a sewage treatment plant and sludge drying beds, and the securing of water and electricity sup- plies. Although it was common knowl- edge that substantial works had been carried out, these works were per- formed outside the red line boundary Garden Village Construction Co. Ltd v. Wicklow County Council: High Court (Geoghegan J) 1 October 1993
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