The Gazette 1983

SEPTEMBER

GAZETTE

result of violent criminal conduct chosen in lieu of what would fall directly or indirectly within the ordinary scope of political activity, the offence would necessarily be classified as a political offence or an offence con- nected with a political offence. The judicial authorities on the scope of such offences have in many respects been rendered obsolete by the fact that modern terrorist violence, whether undertaken by military or paramilitary organisatidns, or by individuals or groups of individuals is often the anti- thesis of what could reasonably be regarded as political, either in itself or in its connections." In the present case, the Court held that the offence was not a political offence, or an offence connected with a political offence. The question depended "on whether (the) particular circumstances showed that the person charged was at the relevant time engaged either directly or indirectly, in what reasonable, civilised people would regard as political activity". 2. McGlinchey claimed that if he was removed to Northern Ireland, he would be prosecuted for political offences or offences connected there- with. He referred to the fact that charges had been brought against another man for refusal to give infor- mation concerning McGlinchey's activities and involvement in various firearms offences, and in another murder offence. The Court rejected this part of his claim. No evidence had been adduced in respect of these offences to show that they arose either directly or indirectly out of political activity. The Court was not prepared to assume that because of the existence of widespread violence organised by paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland that any charge associated with terrorist activities should be regarded as concerning a political offence. The Court continued "The excusing per se of murder, and, of offences involving violence and the infliction of human suffering done by, or at the behest of, self-ordained arbiters, is the very anti- thesis of the ordinances of Christianity and civilisation and of the basic requirements of political activity." 3. The appellant, therefore, failed to discharge the onus on him. The appeal was therefore dismissed. McGlinchey v. Wren. Supreme Court (per O'Higgins C.J., Henchy J., Griffin J.) Judgement of O'Higgins C.J., Nem. Diss, 7th December 1982 — unreported. Michael Staines

PLANNING — Local Government (Planning and Development) Acts 1963-1976 — Failure of Planning Authority to give notice of decision — Liability of Planning Authority in negligence. The Plaintiff lodged an application with the Defendants for planning permission for a development consisting of 18 dwellinghouses on a site at Rosleven, Co. Clare on 6 October 1978. On 13 October 1978 particulars of the proposed public lighting for the development were furnished to the Defendant. On 29 November 1978 the application was amended by excluding one site but this did not affect the application with regard to the remaining sites. The Defendants did not issue any notification of decision either to grant or to refuse permission until 28 February 1979 when they issued a notification of decision to grant per- mission. The Court held that the date of the application was 6 October 1978 and that the two month period within which the Plaintiff should have been given notice by the planning authority of their decision, expired on 6 December 1978 and that the Plaintiff was entitled to a declaration for a decision to grant permission which should be regarded as having been given on the last day of the period of two months from 6 October 1978 and to a declaration that the purported notification of a decision to grant permission subject to certain condi- tions dated 28 February 1979 was null and void. The Court further held that the pro- visions of Sub Section 9 of Section 26 of the 1963 Act being mandatory, a right to damages accrued to the PlaintifTin respect of any loss which the Plaintiff suffered as a result of failure of the Defendant to make the decision on the application within the prescribed period. The Court considered that insufficient evidence of the amount of the loss had been adduced by the Plaintiff and awarded the nominal sum of £500 damages. Thomas G. O'Neill v. Clare County Council. The High court (per McWilliam J.) 18 May 1982 — unreported. John F. Buckley ROAD TRAFFIC — V a l i d i t y of D i s t r i c t Co u rt Summonses following Submission by Defendant to Jurisdiction of Court. On 13 July 1979 the Director of Public Prosecutions took out two Summonses in the District Court against the Defendant. The first charged him with refusing on 2 June 1979 to provide a specimen of his breath, contrary to Section 12(2) of the Road Traffic (Amendment) Act, 1978. The second charged him with failing or

Recent Irish Cases

EXTRADITION — POLITICAL OFFENCE Onus of proof that offence is a political ofTence not discharged by Plaintiff. Dominic McGlinchey had been arrested in the State on foot of a Northern Ireland warrant alleging that he had com- mitted murder in that jurisdiction. An Extradition Order was duly made in the District Court. McGlinchey then applied to the High Court under the provisions of Section 50 of the Extradition Act 1965 seeking a discharge of that Order. He claimed as follows: 1. That the offence was a political offence, or an offence connected with a political offence. 2. That if removed to Northern Ireland, he would be prosecuted or detained for a political offence or an offence con- nected with a political offence. Either of these grounds, if accepted by the High Court, would have been sufficient to discharge the District Court Order. 'McGlinchey claimed that at the time of the murder, he was engaged in activities in Northern Ireland on behalf of the Irish Republican Army, and that responsibility for the murder had been claimed by that organisation. His application was refused in the High Court, and he appealed to the Supreme Court against this refusal. In the Supreme Court, it was held as follows: 1. The Extradition Act 1965 does not define the term "political offence". The Court, therefore, must form an opinion on the facts of each particular case. In this case, the victim of the murder was an elderly grandmother, who was shot dead in her own home.In the Supreme Court, McGlinchey had conceded that the murder could not be regarded as a political offence, or an offence connected with a political offence. The Court therefore found it unnecessary to demarcate between an ordinary offence and a "political offence". O'Higgins C. J. in delivering the Judgement did state, however ... "... it should not be deduced that if the victim were someone other than a civilian who was killed or injured as a