The Gazette 1983

GAZETTE

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1983

this application they were supported by the third named Defendants. In the High Court, Mr. Justice Hamilton refused the application and the first and second named Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court Held that the onus lay on the first and second named Defendants to establish that a joint trial of the two causes of action could not conveniently take place and that these Defendants had failed to discharge that onus. The majority decision held that as both accidents occurred in Dublin where all the Defendants carry on business it could not be suggested that any particular inconvenience would be caused to any Defendant by providing for a Common Trial and that to order otherwise would make it impossible to guard against the risk that an incomplete or warped version of the sequel of the accidents or the responsibility for them might be presented to the Jury. The case of Hammerstone v. OLeary [1921] 2KB 664 showed how, with the aid of skilful advocacy one defendant, with the field to himself because of the absence of a co-defendant may distort the hearing in favour. In his dissent- ing judgement Kenny J. held that in considering Section 11 s.s.l and S. 12 s.s. 2 fo the Civil Liability Act 1961 it would be extremely difficult for a Jury to apportion damages as between the three defendants distinguishing Baker v. Willoughby [1970] AC 467, which was relied on by the Plaintiff, as not being relevant. Appeal dismissed. Patrick Byrne v. Triumph Engineering Ltd. and Ors. (Supreme Court) (O'Higgins, C.J. and Henchy J., Kenny J. Dissenting). [1982] 1 LRM, 317. David R. Pigot MATRIMONIAL Nullity — Duress — Mental Capacity. This case involved a petition for Nullity brought by the Husband against the wife. By Masters order, two specific issues were raised for decision by the court. 1. Whether the Petitioner was induced to be a party to the ceremony of marriage through pressure, fear, duress and undue influence imposed by the Respondent. 2. Whether by reason of his mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the marriage, the Petitioner was able to understand the nature,purpose

and consequences of the marriage contract. A third issue was raised by consent but without prejudice to the submission on behalf of the Respondent that even if the arguement succeeded, it was not a good ground for declaring a marriage void. 3. Was the Petitioner suffering from such disease of the mind on 21 June 1978 (the wedding day) that he was unable to maintain and sustain a normal relationship with the Respondent or any children there might be of the Proposed marriage, and was he thereby incapable of contracting a valid marriage with the Respondent. T7ie parties met in September 1976. The Petitioner was a farmer in comfortable circumstances. He had a mother and six sisters who were devoted to him. There was a history of psychiatric illness in his family, his father having spent prolonged periods in mental hospitals and his brother also having received psychiatric treatment. The Respondent was a nurse with a successful career. In February 1977 the Petitioner suffered a panic attack. He had pal- pitations of his heart and he feared that his heart would stop. He was admitted to hospital and the Respondent was informed according- ly. He told her that he had been drinking whiskey and taking pills. The results of his tests were satis- factory and the Respondent was happy that there was nothing wrong with him. In March and April 1977 the parties split up for a short period. In June 1977 the Petitioner complained of depression. The Respondent did not consider him depressed in the medical sense but nonetheless referred him to a senior psychiatrist known to her, who saw the Petitioner on a number of occasions. On a further occasion the Petitioner complained of cold sweats at night. The Respondent thought that he might be suffering from Brucellosis and referred him to a specialist. The tests proved that he did not have the illness. The Respondent may have concluded that the Petitioner was a hypochondriac, but was not seriously worried at any stage about his health. In September 1977 the Petitioner and Respondent had a discussion about their future, which the Respondent took to be a proposal of marriage. From the same discussion the Petition stated he believed that the

A legal Accountant with experience of drawing and taxation of Solicitors' costs before Taxing Masters is a person who should be in a position to keep the Taxing Master informed up to date of the standards of the reasonable, careful and prudent Solicitor in practice in relation to the fees properly charged by and payable to Counsel. (2) The Courts recognise and respect the special skills and experiences of the Taxing Master in assessing the quality and value of the work of Solicitors. However, his rulings on these matters nevertheless are subject to review by the Court whether for error in principle or not. Cases referred to in the judgment; Lavan v. Walsh (No. 2) [ 1967] IR 129, Dunne v. ONeill [ 1974] IR 180 Irish Trust Bank Limited v. The Central Bank of Ireland Limited (Parke J., unreported, 12 March 1976, summary in Gazette April 1976). Kelly v. Breen (HamiltonJ. unreported, 4 April 1978). The State (at the Prosecution of John Patrick Gleeson) v. The Minister for Defence and the Attorney General, High Court, (per Gannon, J.) 23 June 1980 - unreported. PRACTICE Single set of Proceedings — Separate causes of action — application for separate Trials — 0.18 R.8. The P l a i n t i ff i n s t i t u t ed proceedings against the first and second named Defendants for damages for personal injuries sustained in an accident in June 1977 and against the third named Defendant for damages for personal injuries sustained in an entirely separate unrelated accident in October 1977. The Plaintiff alleged that the combined effect of these two accidents was to render him totally incapacitated . for employment and issued proceedings as envisaged in Section 12 sub section 2 of the Civil Liability Act 1961. E. G. Hall

The first and second named Defendants brought a Motion undei^ the provisions of 0.18 r.8 seeking separate trials of the two causes of action maintaining they could not be conveniently disposed of together. In

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