The Gazette 1981

GAZETTE

DECE M BE R 1981

bringing the proceedings and the con- siderable doubt that an injunction would serve any useful purpose for the Plaintiffs the application was refused. The Court, however, commented on the inadvisability of imposing a penalty on a person without giving that person notice of the likelihood of a penalty being imposed and also commented that it was unsatis- factory for any person hearing an appeal with his discretion fettered. Cotter and another v. 0*Sullivan & Others — High Court (per McWilliam J.) - 23 April 1980 - unreported. LEASE OR LICENCE An agreement in respect of land for seasonal use as a playing field was terminated for breach of various covenants. Agreement found to be a licence validly revoked, but equitable relief against forfeiture was granted. Under the agreement of 14 July 1956, the trustees at that time of the Defendants (a cricket club) for the consideration of £1,000 and an annual payment of £60 agreed "to lease" to the then trustees of the Plaintiffs (a rugby club), "ALL THAT the field and the pavilion thereon known as the Merrion Cricket Club grounds situate at Anglesea Road, in the City of Dublin from the 1st day of October 1956 to the following 1st day of March (which period from the 1st day of October to the 1st day of March is therein and hereinafter referred to as "the season") and for the same period on a further 89 consecutive occasions subject to the said annual rent and the conditions and covenants in the said Lease." It was alleged by the Plaintiffs that on two occasions goal posts on the field had been dismantled by the Defendants and that in late 1975 the Defendants had caused the goal posts to be destroyed so that the Plaintiffs were unable to use the field for the purpose of playing rugby football and then obstructed the Plaintiffs in their efforts to erect new goal posts. The Plaintiffs claimed: (a) An injunction to prevent the Defendants from using the field and pavilion; (b) A declaration that the Plaintiffs were entitled to use the field and the pavilion for the purposes of

barred by Section 5 (2) of the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976 from making a maintenance order for her separate support. He also ruled that it would not be appropriate to make an order pursuant to Section 22 of the said Act of 1976 debarring the husband from the family home. However, as both parties agreed that the wife was the proper person to have custody of the child, and that the wife could not therefore work for some years to come, the maintenance of the child should be provided by the husband and should include a sufficient sum to enable the mother to look after the child, and the Court fixed maintenance for the child pending further Order at the sum of £30 per week. As far as the family home was concerned, it appeared that the husband had expressed a desire to buy out the wife's interest at a fair valuation and it was decided that the parties should be given an opportunity to negotiate on this proposition but failing agreement the family home would have to be sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties. In summary, therefore, it was — Held (per Barrington J.): (i) That the husband must have reasonable access to the child; (ii) That the wife did not have 'just cause' for leaving the family home and was not therefore entitled to maintenance under the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976, although the maintenance of the child should be provided by the husband; (iii) That the husband should not be debarred from the family home under Section 22 of the said Act of 1976; and (iv) That, failing agreement between the parties, the family home was to be sold and the proceeds divided P.V.P. - High Court (per Barring- ton J.) - 12 March 1980 - un- reported. INJUNCTION — LACHES Suspension of members of commit- tee of Hurling and Football Club — no notification to committee of charges being preferred against them personally — natural justice — delay in taking proceedings.

The plaintiffs were the President and Chairman of Nemo Rangers Hurling and Football Club, and as such were members of the G.A.A., and the Defendants comprised officers of the Cork County Board of the G.A.A. and the Munster Council of the G.A.A. Nemo Rangers won the Cork Senior Football Championship on 17 August 1978. The captain of the team was instructed not to accept the cup, because of differences between Nemo Rangers and the County Board, which placed the prize awarding official in an embar- rassing position in public. Certain Nemo Rangers' supporters engaged in an unsportsmanlike demonstration. The Cork County Board wrote to the secretary of Nemo Rangers to ask them to show cause why the Club should not be suspended for the con- duct which had taken place, but the Board did not refer to the possibility of action being taken against the Plaintiffs personally. At a meeting on 31 October 1978, in the absence of the Plaintiffs, the County Board de- cided to suspend and disqualify the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs appealed to the Munster Council and on 16 December 1978 the decision of the County Board was upheld. The Plaintiffs alleged that they did not breach any rule and they claim the County Board acted 'ultra vires,' contrary to the principles of natural justice and in breach of the con- stitutional rights of the Plaintiffs and in breach of the G.A.A.'s Rules. The complaints against the Munster Council were similar, with the ad- dition that on appeal the Council should have investigated the conduct of the County Board and directed the County Board to reconsider the matter 'ab initio.' The Plaintiffs also claimed that two members of the County Board on the Munster Council had no discretion at the appeal, as under the Rules of the County Board they were obliged to uphold the County Board's decision and that hence this invalidated the appeal. Proceedings were issued (more than one year later) on 7 January 1980 for an injunction to reinstate the Plaintiffs. The statement of claim and the motion in the application were dated 31 January 1980. Held (per McWilliam J.): that there was a case to be argued in the pro- ceedings but in view of the delay in

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