The Gazette 1981

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1981

GAZETTE

authorising the Corporation to carry out the works. On 15 July 1976 the District Justice of Dun Laoghaire made an Order directing T. & J. Nolan to carry out the specified works within seven days and author- ising the Corporation to carry out the works in default. On 1 December 1977 notice of application for an Order under Section 3 (8) (a) of the 1964 Act was sent to T. & J. Nolan. A further application to the same effect was sent to T. & J. Nolan on 13 January 1978. On 26 January 1978 the District Justice made an Order pursuant to Section 3 (8) (a) of the 1964 Act prohibiting the repair or letting of the premises (i.e. "struc- ture") in question or the carrying out of any works on the site until pay- ment to the Corporation of the sum of £1,289. Although that Order was apparently made on 26 January 1978 it was not signed by the District Justice until 8 May 1978 and it was directed to T. & J. Nolan. The parti- culars of the Order were entered in the Register maintained by the Corporation (pursuant to Section 8 (3) (c) of the 1964 Act) on 31 January 1978 and on 15 May 1978 a copy of the Order was served on the registered office of T. & J. Nolan. The Prosecutors had a full planning permission for certain works on the premises and in August 1978 they commenced the construc- tion of foundations for those works. On or about 25 August 1978 the Corporation engineer produced to the Prosecutors a copy of the Order of the District Justice dated 8 May 1978 (but apparently made on 26 January 1978) and intimated that if work continued the persons respon- sible would be liable to imprison- ment. It was established to the Court that Rochford, from whom the Prose- cutors purchased the premises, had the same registered office and had identity of directors with T. & J. Nolan but no evidence was forth- coming that T. & J. Nolan had at any time any interest in the premises. The Prosecutors contended that the Order of the District Justicc made on 26 January 1978 was bad, firstly because it was made in the absence of the Prosecutors and without their having an opportunity to be heard and, secondly, because the Corpora- tion had at the time of obtaining of the Order failed to serve the then owner of the premises, Rochford.

were not the true owners of the prem- ises) the said directors were mislead- ing the Corporation, and, to a certain extent, the Court, into the belief that the true owner was before the Court. Notwithstanding that the service of the Notice of disrepair on the owner was a clear condition precedent to the exercise by the Sanitary Authority of its powers under the 1964 Act the Court refused to set aside the Order. (3) That the Order was an Order good upon its fact and that all that was really asserted before the Court and to a certain extent proved was that the District Justice probably came to an incorrect conclusion as to who had then been the owner of the premises in question. The incorrect conclusion of fact by an inferior Court was not subject to review by way of certiorari. Conditional Order of certiorari discharged. F. & C. Limited v. District Justice Hubert Wine - High Court (per Finlay P.) - 23 July 1979 - unreported. Whether customs duty was payable by a receiver of a company on certain goods sold by him on the home market which had been imported by the company without payment of duty with the authority of the Revenue Commissioners, because the goods had been imported merely for processing in Ireland before exporting them, when processed, for sale abroad. The Plaintiff was appointed by the Northern Bank Limited on 2 February 1976 to be receiver of the property of Vecta International Limited. Vecta had imported certain goods without payment of customs duty, with the authority of the Revenue Commissioners pursuant to Section 38 of the Finance Act, 1932, as amended by Regulation No. 11 of the European Communities (Customs) Regulations, 1972, subject to conditions contained in Notice No. 1181 and an appendix thereto, as it had imported the goods merely for processing in Ireland before exporting them, when processed, for sale abroad. The Plaintiff realised such of those goods as came into his possession by selling them on the home market. Under Clause 9 (2) of the said CUSTOMS DUTY—SALE OF GOODS BY RECEIVER

The Corporation contended that on the information available to them the apparent owners were T. & J. Nolan and that the identity of address of T. & J. Nolan and Roch- ford raised a presumption that Roch- ford were aware of the making of the Order of 26 January 1978 and that the Prosecutors could either by inspecting the Register (maintained under Section 8 (3) (c) of the 1964 Act) or by raising ordinary requisi- tions on title, have obtained infor- mation in regard to the making of the Order and that they could not now challenge the Order because at a time when they had no interest in the lands they were not served with the notice of application to have it made. HELD (per Finlay P.) (1) That the prohibition provided for in Section 3 (8) (a) of the 1964 Act applied to the premises and site and not only to the then owner of the premises and site, even if it was the default of the owner which gave rise to the prohibition. The provision for a Register of such orders to be kept open for public inspection was incon- sistent with any other interpretation. (2) That the mere fact that the person who at a particular time owned premises ("structure") was not represented atlhe District Court hearing on which an application for an Order pursuant to Section 3 (8) of the 1964 Act was made would not be a ground for invalidating the Order. A person subsequently purchasing the premises or site in respect of which an Order under Section 3 (8) (a) of the 1964 Act had been made took the premises or site subject to and affected by the Order. The Court had not before it any information as to what evidence had been adduced before the District Justice at the hearing of 26 January 1978. If the facts deposed by the Corporation were as adduced to the District Justice they appeared to the Court to provide ample prima facie evidence of proof of ownership by T. & J. Nolan. The Court considered that there was an almost inevitable presumption from the facts proved that the directors of the true owners, Rochford, who were also the direc- tors of T. & J. Nolan, must have been aware of the District Court proceedings and of the Orders made and that by failing or refusing to assert the true position on behalf of T. & J. Nolan (that T. & J. Nolan

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