The Gazette 1980

JULY-AUGUST

1980

GAZETTE

was (that a gift of the income of property to a person without limita- tion as to time was a gift of capital) subject to the overriding principle that the intention of the testator must first be ascertained. By his will the testator did not give the income of any particular property and it appeared from the continuity of the clause, that he intended to give his wife £1,500 per year for her life and that he intended what remained to go to the Parish of Bray after her death. (2) That the gift of the residue was a valid charitable gift and the matter would stand over until the death of the testator's widow for the consideration of the application of such funds, as would then be remain- ing, undo* the circumstances then existing in the Parish of Bray. The authority of In Re Smith, Public Trustee v. Smith (supra) (and the cases approved therein) was accepted. The only indication of the intention of the testator was that he wished to benefit the Parish of Bray. There was no indication of any parti- cular purpose in his mind, or whether he was thinking of die general public. As he wished to benefit the parish, it was reasonable to assume that if he had appreciated that he could only do this in a general way by giving the residue specifically for charitable purposes he would have adopted this course. Therefore the gift in this case had to be presumed to have been intended for general charitable purposes. Anthony Patrick Duffy v. Mary Doyle and the Attorney General — High Court (per McWilliam J.) - 9 May, 1979 - Unreported. LABOUR LAW Redundancy Payments Acts — Continuity of Employment. This was an appeal from a decision of the Redundancy Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") that the employ- ment of the Plaintiff prior to August 1962 could not be regarded as continuous with her employment after that date. The Plaintiff had commenced work for the Defendant in April 1945 and was made redundant on 13 August 1977. She claimed that she had worked continuously for the

by the Tribunal it was clear that the cause of the interruption in the Plaintiffs employment was sickness and that the Plaintiff's employment prior to August 1962 should have been regarded as continuous with her later employment. Clare Harte v. Telecord Holdings Company Limited - High Court (per McWilliam J.) - 18 May 1979 - Unreported. Summaries of judgments prepared hv: John F. Buckley

Defendant from April 1945 until August 1977 but the Defendant claimed that she had been out of its employment from July 1961 to August 1962. The Plaintiffs mother had died in February 1961 and the Plaintiff became run down and suffered from neurasthenia. Her doctor advised her to get away from her environment for a while. She decided to go to America for a time, where she had some relations, and she gave a doctor's certificate to the Defendant's representative but did not give him any details as to how long she expected to stay in America, when she intended to come back or whether she intended to come back at all. The Defendant's representative stated so far as he was concerned the Plaintiff was emigrating, that he had no recollection of receiving a medical certificate, that he did not, and had no authority to, give her leave of absence. The Plaintiff said she did not get her social insurance cards from the Defendant when she left in July 1961. The Plaintiff's doctor gave a certificate for leave of absence from work following her mother's death in February 1961. No evidence was given by the doctor but the Tribunal had accepted a further certificate from him dated 11 October 1977 which stated that the Plaintiff "took a year's sick leave — neurasthenia — August 1961 to August 1962". It appeared that neither party stated definitely in 1961 that the Plaintiff's employment had terminated or was to terminate. If the Plaintiff's condition was such as had been alleged and there appeared to be no suggestion to the contrary, this should have been apparent to the Defendant. It was as much the responsibility of the Defendant as of the Plaintiff to make the position clear. The only question in issue was as to whether the Plaintiff's employ- ment was interrupted by a period of not more than 78 consecutive weeks by reason of sickness, or whether it was interrupted by her voluntarily leaving the Defendant's employ- ment, within the meaning of para- graphs 4 and 5 of Schedule Three of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 as amended by the Redundancy Pay- ments Act 1971. Held (per McWilliam J.) that on the evidence furnished to the Court

Hugh M. Fitzpatrick Franklin J. O'Sullivan Paula Scully Michael Staines. Edited by: Michael V. O'Mahony.