The Gazette 1978

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1978

GAZETTE

by both parties that the five year period referred to in the option clause would have expired at midnight on 16 August, 1976. Held: (Costello J.) applying United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Limited v. Eagle Aircraft Services Limited [1968] 1 W.L.R. 74, and United Scientific Holdings Limited v. Burnley Borough Council [1977] 2 W.L.R. 806, that the terms of the option clause must be strictly construed and that the notice of intention to exercise the option should have been given six months before midnight on 16 August, 1976. The Court then considered whether six "lunar" or six "calendar" months was the correct period. Having reviewed Bruner v. Moore [1905] 1 Ch. 305, Schiller v. Petersen and Company Limited [1924] 1 Ch. 394, and P. Phipps and Company v. Rodgers{ 1925] 1 K.B. 14, the Court held (1) that the common law rule, subject to a number of well- established exceptions, was that priniafacie the word "month" meant a lunar month when used in a legal instrument; (2) that the relationship of landlord and tenant was not one of the established exceptions to the common-law rule; and, (3) that the context of a document and the surrounding circumstances at the time it was executed may be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the construction of the word "month". The Court held that there was nothing in the agreement that would justify it in construing the option clause otherwise than in accordance with the first general common-law rule, namely, that the word meant "lunar" month. Vone Securities v. Gerard Cooke — High Court — Costello J. — unreported — 7 December, 1977. An appeal is pending in the Supreme Court. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION The expression "Northern Ireland" applies to the Six Counties of Ireland comprised in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Prosecutor, i.e. the accused, had been returned for trial to the Circuit Court on eight charges under S.33(4) of the Larceny Act, 1916. In four of these he was charged with having in his possession without lawful excuse

a motor car "knowing the said property to have been stolen in Northern Ireland". Proceedings were subsequently brought in the High Court for the purpose of quashing on Certiorari the order of the District Court returning him for trial on those charges. He was allowed a conditional order of Certiorari, but, on application to have the conditional order of Certiorari made absolute, Gannon J. allowed the cause shown by the District Justice and discharged the conditional order. The Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court on the sole ground "that there is no such geographical area known to the law of this State as Northern Ireland". Held: (Henchy J.) in rejecting this contention that although it was undoubtedly true that, since 1937, there was no general statutory interpretation or adaptation of the expression "Northern Ireland", that (1) the frequency with which it occurred in our Statutes, (2) the unambiguous way in which it had been so used to identify the six Counties over which this State does not exercise jurisdiction, and (3) the clearly displayed intention of the Legislature in such use that the Courts of this State should give judicial recognition to the identity of the territory comprised in that expression, would make it impossible for our Courts to say that "Northern Ireland" was other than an officially recognised and clear appellation for the part of this island which has remained within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In view of the fact that in England and Wales the Theft Act, 1968, had now replaced the Larceny Act, 1916, it would only be possible to bring proceedings under S.33(4) of the Larceny Act, 1916, if the property were stolen in Northern Ireland, as the definitions in the Theft Act are much wider than under the Larceny Act. Kenny J. (in a separate concurring judgment) said that the contention put forward by the applicant offended against the common usage of speech in this State and was contrary to many provisions of the Acts of the Oireachtas. "This Court would make itself ridiculous . . . if it decided that it did not know what the expression 'Northern Ireland' meant Section 1(2) of the Tr ea ty (Conf i rma t i on of Amending Agreement) Act, 1925, provided that

disturbed (even if the Court does not agree with them, for we are not re- trying the case) unless they are such that a reasonable Commissioner could not draw them or they are based on a mistaken view of the law". The criterion should be whether or not his conclusions are such "that he must be assumed to have misdirected himself as to the law or made a mistake in reasoning." The observations of Viscount Simonds and Lord Radcliffe to that effect in Edwards v. Bairstow [1956] A.C. 14, 36 T.C. 220, approved. Mara v. Hummingbird Limited. — The High Court — McWilliam J. — unreported — 7 March 1977. The Supreme Court (per Kenny, J. with Henchy and Parke JJ.) — unreported — 6 December, 1977. Option to purchase and whether "month" means "lunar" or "calendar" month. Rule of common law that "month" meant a lunar month applied. The Defendant held premises in Anglesea Street, Dublin from 16 August, 1971, for a term of ten years. The lease contained a provision "and provided always that the tenants shall at the end of each five year period have the option to purchase the entire of the premises . . . The tenant shall give notice of his intention to exercise such options six months before expiration of any of the relevant five year periods (sic)". On 16 February, 1976, the Plaintiff's Solicitor wrote to the Defendant's Solicitors "Our Clients . . . have instructed us to formally notify you of their intention to exercise the option contained in the lease to purchase the premises...". This letter was received by the Defendant's Solicitors before lunch- time on 17th February, 1976, and they acknowl edged r ece i pt immediately and advised the Plaintiff's Solicitors that they had sent a copy to the Defendant for his instructions. The Defendant received the copy on 18 February, 1976, and on 19 Feb r ua r y, 1976, the Defendant's Solicitors wrote to Plaintiff's Solicitors: "Our Client points out that the purported exercise of the option is late". It was agreed SALI OF LAND