The Gazette 1978
DECEMBER 1978
GAZETTE
position rather baldly. Does this mean the lender is not entitled to anything but a reasonable sum? Suppose the infant purchases necessaries and pays an unreasonably high price. Is the moneylender only entitled to a sum of money consistent with a reasonable price for the goods actually purchased? This leads to another point. Suppose the terms of the loan provide for interest to be paid, which it usually will. What is the position then? A relevant authority on this point is the Irish case of Bateman v Kingston (1880) L.R. (Ir.) Vol. 4, 3 28, a case not cited by the Law Reform Commission. This was an action brought on promissory notes executed by a minor and his mother in order to obtain £80 to be spent on necessaries. The notes carried interest of 20 per cent. The money was advanced and spent on necessaries. The plaintiffs, in an action, effectively pleaded the proposition set out in paragraph 3.13 above. Lawson J. rejected the view that a promissory note bearing interest is actionable simply because the money advanced on the security was spent on necessaries: "There is no authority in the books in favour of such a case, and it seems contrary to sound principle." The learned judge did, however, leave open whether an infant going into a shop and buying necessaries and giving a bill of exchange not bearing interest may be liable. It is suggested that in the light Bateman v Kingston, the Law Reform Commission will have to re- examine the question of the liability of an infant when he has received necessaries by using funds advanced by another for this purpose. The Law Reform Commission also examine contracts which bind an infant unless they are set aside during their minority or a reasonable time thereafter. Such contracts are known, as voidable contracts and are comprehended by situations where an infant acquires an interest of a permanent nature. Such situations include contracts to purchase shares: see Dublin and Wicklow Ry. v Black, (1852) 8 Ex. 180; contracts relating to land: Slator v Trimble (1861) I.R.C.L. 3 and contracts of Insurance; Stapleton v Prudential Insurance (1928) 62 ILTR 56. The Law Reform Commission take the view that when a minor repudiates such a contract, "he appears to be liable for debts which accrued before repudiation." Para 3.20. Authority for this view is attributed to Blake v Concannon (1870) IR 4 C.L. 323. This case is discussed by Cheshire and Fifoot, a work which seems to have provided the Commission with authority for several propositions of law. In fact Blake v Concannon does not go as far as to constitute support for what can be termed the "accrued rights" theory of Infants liability. In Blake v Concannon an infant took a lease. Rent was to be payable at 6 monthly intervals. The infant entered into possession and enjoyed the land until 20th April 1867 when he repudiated the agreement and left the property. Rent had accrued on the 1st November 1866. Pigot C. B. found that notwithstanding repudiation the portion of rent due in November 1866 was recoverable. Nevertheless it was not recoverable simply because the obligation had accrued before termination. Pigot C. B. held in Blake v Concannon that the infants liability" arises from his occupation and enjoyment of the land, under the tenancy so created". It is clear from this and other parts of the judgment, especially at pages 330-331, that liability was imposed because to otherwise hold would result in facilitating unjust enrichment by the infant. In other words, Blake v Concannon does not fully support the
proposition advanced in Para 3:20 of the Law Reform Commission's paper. This view can be tested in the following way. Suppose the infant had not moved into possession. According to the reasoning in Pigot C. B.'s judgment liability would not have been imposed on him because he neither occupied or enjoyed the property obtained under the contract. The Law Reform Commission do acknowledge that their analysis is brief and the Commission state their intention to examine the question of contractual liability in greater detail. This is to be welcomed. It is my view, however, that the second working paper is deficient and that it would not be wise for the Oireachtas to lower the age of majority without considering in some detail the consequences in areas other than the age at which a minor may contract a valid marriage. If legislation is to follow along the lines of the draft Bill set out in the working paper, Clause 3 (1) should be amended to provide that a person should simply attain the free age for marriage when he or she becomes 18 years of age. Whether "a consent age for marriage" should also be included will have to be determined by the Oireachtas as the authors of the working paper acknowledged in the summary paragraph 6 (3). To recommend a change in the age of majority after examining only one consequence of such a change strikes the present author as precipitous and fraught with danger. We await the working paper on the contractual and delictual liability of an infant and suggest it be presented before the age of majority is changed! Solicitor Forward Trust (Ireland) Limited, a Member of the Northern Bank Group, offers a challenging career for a Solicitor at its Head Office at Griffin House, 7 Wilton Terrace, Dublin 2
Preferably, the successful applicant will have at least four or five years experience, either in a commercial legal department or in private practice, and will be keen to take part in commercial activities. The company is concerned with a wide range of banking, credit finance and leasing activities. The successful applicant will be asked to set up a department to provide all the advice and legal work of the company, which will involve implementing consumer legislation, advising on leasing and industrial business relating to plant and machinery and the taking of security in relation to advances. Advice will also be required for the company's own Litigation and Personnel Departments. In return for hard work and ability there,is a g
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