The Gazette 1977

GAZE1TE

DECEMBER 1977

in many cases, merely leave the legal determination of the issue to "the familiar calculus of negligence" — an approach, which because of its familiarity, should hold no terror for us. It would reintroduce flexibility into a branch of the law that has become all too rigid and this flexibility would also restore to the factual plane matters which under the special rules have wrongly been treated as questions of law. Finally, such an approach would make the law clearer and more understandable to the lay person, although determination of the rights of parties would not be made appreciably easier in particular cases as can be seen from the amount of litigation that, at present, surrounds motor car accidents determined by Negligence rules. Against such a solution it could be argued that such a proposal would be a solution which favours the "fault" basis of liability, at a time when modem trends in the law of Torts seem to favour principles of strict liability. See e.g. Draft EEC Directive on Products' Liability, No Fault Automobile Insurance Schemes in U.S.A. and Canada, New Zealand Accident Compensation Act 1972, etc. To suggest the abolition of scienter and cattle trespass at a time when the general trend is towards strict forms of liability is therefore regressive. Second, at the other extreme, one could take the strict liability imposed in the scienter action and in cattle trespass as the norm and introduce legislation which would make the keeper of any animal strictly liable for injuries caused by that animal. This strict approach could be supported nowadays by arguments based on the risk theory of liability and by economic arguments which would regard injuries committed by animals which form part of a business (a farmer's cow, etc.) as part of the producer's costs which should be borne by the producer, and lastly, by arguments which suggest in all cases that the owner of the animal is the person best positioned to control the animal and to insure against the risk of injury which such an animal may represent to other persons in society. Other arguments in favour of a strict liability approach may be mentioned. First, much of the existing law relating to animals is strict in its present form. Under the general principles of law if the plaintiff succeeds in showing that there was a trespass to land or to chattels, damage under Rylands v. Fletcher or damage under some forms of Nuisance, the defendant's liability is strict. If the defendant keeps a wild animal or a domestic animal known to have a mischievous propensity, liability is strict. If it is a case of cattle trespass, liability is strict and if it is a case of dogs injuring cattle, liability is strict under the Dogs Act 1906. In all these cases, under the existing law, the defendant is liable even though he was not at fault. Second, strict liability is not absolute liability. This means that as well as Act of God, the plaintiffs own act of omission could cause, in the appropriate circumstances, the damages for such wrong to be reduced in accordance with the apportionment provisions of the Civil Liability Act 1961. Moreover, even a regime of strict liability should contemplate an exception in the case of a trespasser being injured by an animal. In such circumstances reasonable care would seem to be a more satisfactory standard than strict liability. Third, strict liability regimes for injuries caused by animals already exist in many other countries — France, Germany, Italy, etc. — without any great legal or social difficulty. Indeed in Canada, the Province of Quebec, following a civil law tradition, has a strict regime and no

great difficulties are experienced even though all the other Provinces are in the common law tradition. Fourth, such a system would provide a clear and simple legal rule which would undoubtedly reduce litigation in this area. The attractions of legal certainty and reduced litigation are powerful arguments in favour of such a strict regime. It must be admitted that many people in our society might show an initial hesitancy in contemplating such a rule of strict liability, but is is submitted that this reaction is an emotional rather than a rational response to the problem. It stems from the fact that many people personalise the problem and view it from the limited vantage of their own personal circumstances. This conclusion, of course, although, as already noted, very understandable, is itself wrong. It springs from an incorrect assumption made 'by the layman that legal liability should be co-extensive with moral culpability. There are many cases, even within the existing rules relating to liability for animals, where this is not so. In these circumstances it could hardly be called unjust to impose liability on the owner of the dog. Third between these two approaches, the negligence approach or the strict liability approach one could take up an intermediate stance such as that adopted by the Law Commission in England (Law Com. No. 13) and enacted by Parliament in England in the Animals Act 1971. The view of the Law Commission was that the scienter principle and the cattle trespass rule have much to recommend them and should be retained. It felt that although these rules should be tidied up and reduced to a statutory form they should not be abolished. Strict liability would remain, therefore, in these cases only; in all other cases, whether the plaintiff had an action or not would depend on the general principles of tort, and in particular on Negligence and Nuisance. The position which the Lsw Commission takes about these special rules — scienter and cattle trespass — could also, of course, be taken as regards any one of them alone. One could suggest, for example, that strict liability should be retained in cattle trespass only, but not in scienter, or vice versa. The English approach has been criticised (Roberts, (1968) 31 M.L.R. 683; Powell-Smith, (1971) 121 N.L.J. 584; Samuels, (1971) 34 M.L.R. 550) and the difficulties which such legislation can produce are amply illustrated in the recent Court of Appeals decision in Cummings v. Grainger [1976] 3 W.L.R. 842, [1977] 1 All E.R. 104. Noted in 40 M.L.R. 590-596. This was a case where the plaintiff was savaged by the defendant's Alsatian dog while trespassing on the defendant's premises at night. Whatever one may say about the outcome of the case (the plaintiff failed to recover) it is very clear that legislation even in the nature of a reforming measure (The Animals Act 1971 in this case) does not always make the law on a particular topic less complicated or more easily understood. Indeed, after reading this decision one is convinced that the retention of a statutory form of scienter (Section 2 of Animals Act 1971) is misconceived and unhelpful.

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