The Gazette 1975

No longer any justification for exempting women from jury service He said that at the beginning of the century women's place was generally regarded as being in the home. At that time it was unthinkable to most men and to many women that women should vote or, with rare exceptions, engage in business or industry or join the professions. Nowadays, women were progressively taking their right- ful place in the Community and engaging in professions that were regarded until comparatively recently as the sole preserve of men. It seemed to him that, if ever there was, there could no longer be any justification for exempting women from the duty or privilege of jury service. Mr. Justice Griffin said that, human nature being what it was, and in the light of experience to date, it was to be expected that unless jury service was com- pulsory for women, no women would, in fact, serve on juries. Juries drawn from a panel which would not include women would not, in his opinion, be truly representative of the community. It must be remem- bered, however, that the right to a jury did not entitle an accused person to a jury tailored to the circum- stances of the particular case. It might very well happen that a jury drawn by lot might include no women, or indeed no men, but that would not in- validate the jury- He allowed the appeal on both grounds and a short judgment by Mr. Justice Budd also allowed the appeal on the same grounds. The Chief Justice, in his minority judgment, said there was a recognition of the woman's right to serve on a jury but there was also a recognition that in the case of many women, jury service could be a severe

function in so far as jury service was concerned. However, the provision made in the Juries Act was undisguisedly discriminatory on the ground of sex only. It would not be competent for the Oireachtas to legis- late on the basis that women, by reason only of their sex, were physically or morally incapable of serving and acting as jurors. He was of opinion that this discrimination in respect of women, in favour or against women, depending on one's point of view, was not consistent with the Con- stitution, and was not carried over as part of the law since the coming into force of the Constitution. Mr. Justice Walsh dismissed the submissions which had been made to the Court concerning the validity of all the verdicts and acts of juries empanelled and acting under the provisions of the 1927 Act. It had been suggested that the verdicts of all such juries could be impugned. If those juries were empanelled in accord- ance with the Act, however, it meant that nobody served on those juries who was not entitled by law to do so and the acts and verdicts of those juries were those of juries composed of properly qualified jurors. Mr. Justice Henchy, in the course of his judgment, said that the plaintiffs came before the Court as accused persons, not as would-be jurors. For that reason he thought it proper to deal with their case as one founded on their rights as accused persons awaiting trial by jury, and not on the rights of persons who were not before the Court and were not represented before the Court. He said that a rating qualification shut the door on all citizens who were not liable to pay rates. Such a jury excluded a range of mental attitudes which, be- cause they would be absent from the jury box and jury room, would leave an accused with no hope of the contribution they might make in the determination of guilt or innocence. This was particularly so in the trial of offences involving damage to property and, more particularly, in the trial of offences involving damage for which ratepayers were liable to make compensa- tion. A jury so selective and exclusionary was not stamped with the genuine community representative- ness necessary to classify it as the jury guaranteed by Article 38 (5). It was, therefore, unconstitutional. All male jury constitutionally unacceptable There was no doubt that a consequence of the ex- emption of women, unless they claimed eligibility, was that women hardly ever served on juries. For practical purposes jury service was a male preserve and the plaintiffs were correct in saying that the operation of the statutory exemption of women virtually ensures that the jury before whom they would stand trial would be entirely male. If the all-male jury was constitutionally unacceptable, the statutory exemption of women could not stand. While the plaintiffs had not shown that their chances of a fair trial would be diminished because the jury would be all male, and while it was not possible to ensure a mixed jury, nevertheless the statutory pro- visions which operated to make an all-male jury vir- tually certain could not be reconciled with the choice of jurors necessarily comprehended by Article 38 (5). Mr. Ju tice Griffin said that the purpose of a jury was to interpose bfetween the State and the accused person an impartial body of the accused's fellow citizens to try the issue. The jury should, therefore, be a body truly representative of and a fair cross-section of the community.

TAXATION SEMINAR

THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY OF IRELAND — and — THE SOCIETY OF YOUNG SOLICITORS will be holding a 2 day Seminar on CAPITAL TAXATION in the Great Southern Hotel, Galway, on Friday 27th and Saturday 28th February, 1976.

Programme and Application Forms will be available shortly.

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