The Gazette 1975

plicant to submit that he had an additional constitu- tional right of appeal from the Central Criminal Court directly to the Supreme Court. The application for extension of time is unanimously dismissed. The People (Attorney-General) v Conmey (No. 2)—Supreme Court—Majority judgment on Con- stitutional issue by O'Higgins C. J., Walsh and Doyle J.J.—Opinion reserved by Budd and Grif- fin J. J.—Separate judgments by O'Higgins C. J., Walsh J: and Griffin J.—unreported—6 Octo- ber 1975). Owing to fraudulent answers given by London solicitor agents in an application to the Land Commission, innocent Irish solicitors, who have not been paid by their clients, cannot recover a substantial deposit in a sale of land. The plaintiff has claimed specific performance of a written agreement dated 30 January 1974 for the sale to the first defendant, and to the second defendant as his nominee, of registered lands contained in Folio No. 22978 in Co. Limerick for £325,000, and for a manda- tory order that the defendants, or one of them, should pay forthwith the sum of £32,500, being 10 per cent of the deposit. The third defendants, a Dublin firm of solicitors (hereinafter called X) signed the agreement as agents for the first defendant. The first two defen- dants have not entered an appearance or defence. X entered a defence and counterclaim. X pleaded that there was an implied condition that the agreement could not be carried out, unless a consent from the Land Commission, under S. 45 of the Land Act, 1965, had first been obtained, otherwise the sale was to be deemed void. X pleaded that the Land Commission had refused consent to the vesting in this case. X fur- ther pleaded that, by direction of the Law Society, they had paid a deposit of £32,500 to plaintiff's solici- tors, and in the circumstances they counterclaimed for the return of the deposit. It follows that the only mat- ter to be considered is X's counterclaim for £32,500. The plaintiff, Mrs. Gostelloe, is the owner of a sub- stantial stud farm of 206 acres at Kilpeacon outside Limerick, containing a Georgian mansion. This stud farm was managed by her husband. The first defen- dant, Mr. Maharaj, inspected the farm, which was for sale, in January 1974, and stated he wished to purchase the lands as a stud farm, and that he had 40 thorough- bred mares boarded out at different studs, with a total value of £ l i million. He spoke of employing up to 50 stable lads, discussed the expansion of the stables, and asked that if agreement were reached, fodder and farm machinery were to be left behind. After inspection, he agreed to purchase the lands for £325,000. A standard form of the Law Society's agreement for sale for private contract was drawn up, and X signed in trust on behalf of Mr. Maharaj, on 30 January 1974. The Special Conditions of Sale, which were subsequently held not applicable, provided that the sale was subject to the consent of the Land Commission under S. 45 and for the return of the deposit, if such consent .was not forthcoming, and giving leave to the vendor at his option to rescind the contract or return of the deposit, if such consent was not made before 1 April 1974! X undertook to pay the deposit of £32,500. In applying for consent, X, on the instructions of the London solicitors acting for the plaintiff, stated that the

premises were a registered stud farm, and that the plaintiff's intention is to develop the property for stud purposes. On 8 May 1974 the Land Commission submitted to X a further questionnaire, and, as they did not know the replies, they passed it on to the London solicitor. The London solicitors replied on 22 May 1974 to the following effect: (1) At this stage, the Company has not an interest in Ireland but hopes to undertake land development in Ireland. (2) Mr. Maharaj's interest in bloodstock in Ireland is limited. We understand he has some brood-mares in the stud and one or two racehorses. (3) It is not the intention of the Company to use Kilpeacon. It is intended to apply for planning per- mission to develop the land, and, pending the determ- ination of the planning application, it is proposed to let the land on eleven month tenancies to local farmers for grazing purposes. (4) No direct employment is planned other than such employment as would be given by the building contrac- tors who would be engaged to carry out any redevel- opment. The plaintiff therefore contended that these replies were not bona fide, but a mala fide, intentional effort to prevent the granting of consent by the Land Com- mission, which was refused. A solicitor in X stated that consent would have been automatically granted, if the lands were to be used for purposes of a stud farm. The case of Rooney v. Byrne, (1933) I.R., was applied; here the plaintiff had been refused an advance by an insurance company in respect of property, and, despite an undertaking, had made no further efforts to obtain advances; the defendant could consequently recover his deposit. There is undoubtedly an obligation on the purchaser to make a bona fide application to the Land Commis- sion for consent. Consequently this application is mala fide; this automatically prevents the return of the deposit. The mention of the eleven months lettings was almost certain to produce a refusal, as was the fact that no direct employment was planned. Despite the fact that firm X had not been refunded by the Company for the amount of the deposit, and that, though acting with complete propriety, they had suffered a substantial loss, nevertheless on the basis of these legal principles, they were not entitléd to the return of their deposit of £32,500. The counterclaim must be dismissed. (Costelloe v. Maharaj, Krishna Properties (Ireland) Ltd. and X — Finlay P. — unreported — 10 July 1975.) S. 82 of the Road Traffic Act, 1961, empowers the Minister for Local Government to make regulations for the control and operation of Public Service Vehicles, duly exercised by the Public Service Vehicles (Amend- ment) Regulations 1963 (S.I. No. 191 of 1963, as amended by the 1970 Regulations—S .I. No. 200 of 1970). These regulations provide for the granting and revocation of public service vehicles, entrusted to the Commissioner of the Garda or one of his authorised officers. The plaintiff had for some years been the holder of a small public service vehicle, and of a licence to drive . 2 6 8 Revocation of public service vehicle invalid, as licensee not given opportunity to explain his case.