The Gazette 1975

He was of the view that the majority of the Court when discussing rights such as freedom of the press had failed to duly consider "great and important values in our society . . . which are also fundamental and entitled to this Court's careful respect and protection". Among these was the right to Privacy. Freedom of the Press in his view should not be upheld where Privacy is assaulted "for no purpose except dramatic interest and com- mercial appeal". Freedom to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public matters was described in another United States case as a "prized American privilege" : Bridges v California 314 US 252 (1941). Again it was said that "The protection of the public requires not merely discussion but information" : Sweeney v Patterson 128 F 2d 4 5 7 /8 (1942). Other cases that would deserve discussion if consideration of this right arose in Ireland include Elmhuist v Pearson 153 F 2d 467 (1946) and Sidis v F-R Publishing Corporation 113 F 2d 806 (1940). It was remarked earlier that a further extension of the right to privacy might not be acclaimed by all in this country. United States experience provides the main grounds for hostility towards the right. There the right has been successfully pleaded in cases which struck down as ultra vires anti-obscenity laws in Geor- gia and anti-abortion laws in California. The most familiar "triumph" came in 1973 when the Supreme Court held that a foetus has no right to life and that a mother has a right to privacy which is "broad enough to encompass her decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy". ( The Jurist 1973, second issue, is de- voted entirely to United States developments in this field between 1965 and 1973.) Fears that Irish judges would so apply the right in appropriate circumstances may be unrealistic although this view would be disputed by some. (For example, Dooley : Contraception and the Irish Constitution : Social Studies 1974, 286). Possible applications of the right are however distinct from exis- tence of the right itself. That the right exists in Ireland would seem to be beyond dispute : "While the 'personal rights' are not set out specifically nevertheless in our society the right to privacy including that of marital relationship is uni- versally accepted". (Per Budd J. in McGee's case, ante.) It is likely that a right to freedom from un- wanted publicity could be found as one of the "personal rights" in Article 40.3.1 of the Constitution. Much of the dicta in Kenny J.'s judgment in Ryan v A-G [1965] I.R. 294 could be cited in favour of this right Obituary Mr. Rowland Healy, solicitor, formerly of the Indian Civil Service, and a former High Court Judge in Burma, died on 2 June, 1975, at his residence, Ballymorris, Bray, Co. Wick- low. Mr. Healy was admitted in Easter Term, 1948. He practised under the style of L. J. O'Neill & Co. at 21, Molesworth Street, Dub- lin, until 1965 when he retired.

together with the dicta of various Supreme Court judges in McGeé s case. Freedom of the press as recognised in Article 40.6. l(i) must also be considered. Investigative journalism performs a useful democratic service: many recent examples can be drawn to illustrate the point from the United States and Britain. It was recognised by Warren and Brandeis at the end of the last century that a right to privacy would be subordinate to the right to investi- gate and comment on matters of proper public interest and concern. Freedom of the press does not however confer unlimited freedom. (If it did, it would be Roy Jenkins' "garden without weeds, desirable but un- natural" as he recently described such freedom in The Listener.) Possibly it would be unwise to attempt to de- termine what are matters of proper public interest and concern. There is a general assumption that for example, government ministers, elected representatives of one sort or another, forfeit their claim to privacy. Even in such cases however forfeiture of privacy need not be complete: again it would be unwise to try to draw the boundaries of forfeiture for these categories. Restric- tions already exist under Statute and at Common Law in Ireland in relation to the Press. The case of A-G v (TKelly (1974) 108 I.L.T.R. 97 is evidence of the fact that journalists do not enjoy privilege and cannot hin- der the course of justice by refusing to disclose their sources of information if requested to do so by an appropriate court. Journalists are treated as other human beings for purposes of the law and if, say, policemen are constitutionally restrained from intruding upon one's privacy (Article 40.5) there is no reason why journalists might not likewise be constitutionally fet- tered. This is yet another area where the Constitution could affect the civil law in Ireland. Recognition of a right in relation to non-disclosure of private and personal information, where disclosure would not be in the public interest, would alter the law of defamation. It would no longer necessarily be a defence to argue that a published statement, though defamatory, was true. For this to be so in any significant way, it would be essential for Irish judges to interpret in a restrictive way the meaning of matters within the public interest. The result would render more convincing the declara- tion in Article 40.3.2 that "The State shall, in parti- cular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citizen".

Mr. John F. CMahony, solicitor, Deputy Supreme Knight of the Knights of St. Oolumbanus, died in St- Stephen's Hospital, Glanmire, Cork, on 2 September, 1975. Mr. O'Mahony was admitted in Hilary Term, 1942, and practised at 70, South Mall, Cork; he also acquired the firm of J. Hodnett & Son in Youghal. .226