The Gazette 1973

the same as those in the 1895 lease, and undoubtedly the map shows the garage opening directly on Leeson Lane at the back, and the buildings over the original right of way. In 1971 the Sisters of Charity put the premises up for sale as part of the old St. Vincent's Hospital. In the conditions of sale, it was stated that the purchaser was bound to admit that the map attached to the 1946 lease showing that a small portion of the premises at the back of the Leeson Lane was attached to 60 St. Stephen's Green was erroneous : this was incorrect, as the pur- pose was to pretend that the Sisters of Charity held these particular premises under a 10,000 year lease from the Pembroke Estate. A vigorous protest relating to this exclusion was made by plaintiff's solicitors in September 1971 pointing out the grave deterioration in his property contained in this statement, and that he would only give his consent to the sale if it comprised the whole property. The defendant's solicitor with blustering arrogance combined vain threats of an action for substantial damages for delay with an unwarranted threat that the plaintiff was deliberately putting for- ward a false claim. The plaintiff then took ejectment proceedings on the title based on the plaintiff's right to forfeit the lease for the defendant's breach of condition in denying the plaintiff's title. The question to be determined is, was the plaintiff entitled to forfeit the lease and re-enter the premises. At Common Law, as stated in Bacon's Abridgment, a denial or disclaimer of the title of him of whom land was held gave rise to a forfeiture of the tenant's interest in the land. A tenant may thus incur forfeiture of his estate by a matter of record, where, in an action by his lessor grounded upon the lease, he resists the demand —under the grant of a higher interest of land. The written disclaimer accordingly had to go further than mere denial of the title—the tenant had to prove a title which would adversely affect the landlord's interest. The historical position is admirably stated by Lord Denning in Warner v. Sampson (1959) 1 All E.R. 120. It is clear that forfeiture by record has always existed through the centuries. From the authorities it is clear that where a tenant, on or off the record, clearly and unambiguously denies his landlord's title in a manner which may adversely affect the landlord's estate or reversion, the landlord is entitled to forfeit the lease in respect of the property to which the denial extends. In this case Butler J . held that the defendant had clearly and unambiguously and in writing denied the plaintiff's title as lessor in respect of the portion of the demised premises coloured blue marked on the plan. The fact that she seeks to bind the purchaser to admit that the map on the plaintiff's lease is erroneous denies the plaintiff's title and sets up an adverse title. The plain- tiff is accordingly entitled to forfeit the defendant's interest in the premises and is entitled to possession : this forfeiture only extends to the portion of the prem- ises coloured blue on the map. [O'Reilly v. Gleeson; Butler J.; unreported; 19 Feb- ruary 1973] Claim for contribution and indemnity amongst defen- dants in sea accident to vessel rejected. The plaintiff is the father of the deceased, and claims damages for negligence, and break of statutory duty against the defendant. The plaintiff's daughter was one of the passengers who died by drowning on 7 June 1969

while on the Motor Vessel "Redbank" near New Quay, Go. Clare. The plaintiff settled the action with the defendants for £1,000 damages, and £666 costs. The first defendant is the Redbank Oyster Co. Ltd., and its director, Stassen, and it is claiming contribution or indemnity under the Civil Liability Act 1961 against the second defendant, Fairway Fabrications, an English company who built the vessel, for defective construc- tion. Fairway Fabrications for their part are claiming contribution against the third defendant, Bord Iascaigh Mhara (hereinafter called BIM) for having insisted upon some details in the erection of the vessel which made it unseaworthy. The contract between the first defendant and Fairways was specifically subject to the acceptance of the vessel by BIM. In the Summer of 1968 the first defendants gave Fairways an order to construct a new oyster and lobster vessel, and agreement was reached as to the terms. The lengthy negotiations are fully described. Finally a contract in writing dated 19 February 1969 was made between the parties, and it specifically pro- vided that this contract was subject to acceptance by BIM for grant purposes. On inspection the BIM inspec- tor insisted on certain changes in the structure which were eventually the cause of the accident. On June 27 there was a further inspection after delivery of the vessel, and everything looked satisfactory. On Sunday, June 29, the vessel was named and blessed, and it was taken out without incident on four occasions, but on the last trip, the vessel had sustained much water. The Fairways representatives was then asked to take out some girls—but the boat was overloaded. The engines stopped half a mile from the shore, the boat was turned over, and everyone was thrown into the sea. Nine per- sons including the plaintiff's daughter, were drowned. The first defendant's claim against Fairways, and Fair- ways' claim against BIM, both arise by virtue of Sec- tions 21, 27 (1) (b), and 29 (1) of the Civil Liability Act 1961. Pringle J. was not satisfied that it was reasonably foreseeable by Fairways that the vessel would not be used for oyster or lobster fishing, but for pleasure trips. Therefore Fairways were neither liable to the plaintiff nor to the first defendants in respect of the accident as they were not "concurrent wrongdoers" within the Civil Liability Act: it follows that the first defendants cannot succeed in their claim for indemnity or contribution against Fairways, and therefore the question of a claim by Fairways against BIM does not arise. Undoubtedly the vessel as delivered was defective for the purposes for which it was being used, and even for the purposes for which it was intended to be used. But the effective cause of the accident was not any defect in the boat but the negligence of the defendant's in allowing the boat to be grossly overloaded. [Conole v. (1 Redband Oyster Co. Ltd. and Stassen, (2) Fairway Fabrications Ltd., and (3) An Bord Ias- caigh Mhara; Pringle J .; unreported; 2 October 1972] Supreme CoiUrt quashes conviction for murder, and directs a new trial, as, following an Australian case, it is now possible to leave a verdict of manslaughter to the jury. The appellant was convicted of the murder in January 1969 of Smith and Ney in Ormond Square, Dublin, held before Henchy J. in the Central Criminal Court in November 1969 and sentenced to imprisonment for life. His defence was that he had acted in self-defence. The 88