The Gazette 1973

(A.-G.) v Justice Mangan (1961) Ir. Jur. 71, that where a Justice has properly acted within his jurisdiction, his decision will not be interfered with. There it was held that the Justice had jurisdiction to grant an adjourn- ment—but he also has jurisdiction to refuse it. As Murnaghan J. stated, it would be acting outside his jurisdiction, if he were to reverse the practice that has been previously adhered to. Accordingly the conditional order was discharged, and the cause shown allowed. Per Murnaghan J. : "There are some indications that the Bar generally for some time past do not regard judg- ments of the High Court with the respect which they deserve. There is not a presumption that a judgment of the High Court is wrong. A District Justice being made aware that there is a decision of the High Court should not assume that such decision will be reversed by the Supreme Court." [The State (Llewellyn) v District Justice Ua Donn- chada; Murnaghan J.; unreported; 3 May 1973.] There is no power in the Local Government (Planning and Development) Act 1965 to acquire land com- pulsorily for the purpose of development or for the provision of amenities. On 27 June 1968, defendant County Council made a compulsory purchase order in respect of a tiny piece of land consisting of seashore above high water mark near Spiddal. The order making this effective referred to the Housing Act 1966 and the Planning and Development Act 1965. The defendants sent this order to the Minister for Local Government for confirmation on 22 July 1968. On 25 July 1968 the plaintiffs, who owned the land adjoining, lodged objections. The main ground was that the defendants were not authorised, by law, to acquire the lands compulsorily for the purpose of "development as an open space, and for use in connection with the amenities of the area". The Minister, having held a public inquiry, duly confirmed the order on 23 December 1969. The plaintiffs then brought proceedings under Section 78 of the Housing Act 1966 for the purpose of having the order quashed. The plaintiff alleges that the order was not made bona fide by defendants in the exercise of their powers of compulsory acquisition, but no evidence was adduced to sustain this. The issue, therefore, is whether a local authority, who are also the planning authority, are authorised to acquire lands compulsorily for the pur- pose of development or for the provision of amenities under the Planning and Development Act 1965. In that Act, "development" is fully defined in Section 3. As there is nothing specifically in the fact which auth- orises such compulsory acquisition, it follows that the procedure adopted was incorrect. Powers of compulsory acquisition must be created by clear language, and are not to be implied. Accordingly the plaintiffs contention is correct, and the Compulsory Purchase Order will be quashed. [Movie News Ltd. v Galway County Council; Kenny J.; unreported; 30 March 1973.] Dublin Corporation lose appeal against £302,433 judg- ment—malicious injuries. Mr. Justice Pringle, in a reserved judgment, delivered in the High Court yesterday, dismissed an appeal from a Circuit Court judgment, by the Dublin Corporation, 211

"In the last resort the decision lies with the courts so long as they have seisin of the case. The exercise of the judicial power carries with it the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence and, a fortiori the answering of questions by witnesses. This is the ultimate safeguard of justice in the State, whether it be in pursuit of the guilty or the vindication of the innocent. "The judgment or the wishes of the witness shall not prevail. This is the law which governs claims for privi- lege made by the executive organs of the State or by their officials or servants and journalists cannot claim any greater privilege. "The obligation of all citizens, including journalists, to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct does not constitute a haras ment of journalists or other newsmen. In the present state of the criminal law, a journalist concealing knowledge of criminal facts like any other person in a similar position, might well find himself guilty of misprision of felony where a felony was concerned. Even if the question of confidence arose here, which it did not because, for the reasons already stated, the identity of the person being interviewed was an essen- tial part of the publication, the claim of privilege to refuse to answer the question was unsustainable in law although made in good faith. However, Mr. O'Kelly persisted in his attitude when the Court had very patiently explained the position to him. He wa^, in the opinion of this Court, rightly convicted of contempt of Court and in fact has not appealed against that convic- tion. "The views expressed by the Court may be of assis- tance to journalists and Courts dealing with this mat- ter in the future. In reviewing the sentence the Court has regard, of course, to the fact that Mr. O'Kelly sought to be as helpful as he could, subject to the privilege which he claimed, but must also bear in mind the fact that he persisted in maintaining this attitude when the position had been fully explained to him and he had been given every opportunity to reconsider the position. "In all the circumstances the Court thinks that the sentence of imprisonment should be quashed and in lieu thereof a fine should be imposed. "The order of the Court, therefore, will be that Mr. O'Kelly will pay a fine of £250 and in default of pay- ment of this fine by Mr. O'Kelly into the office of this Court on or before the 30th day of September he will serve a sentence of three months imprisonment but in such event the time already spent by Mr. O'Kelly in serving the sentence imposed on him by the Special Criminal Court will be taken into account. The order of the Court will therefore be that the appeal is allowed in the terms already stated." Mr. Justice Murnaghan and Mr. Justice Gannon were the other members of the Court. [Attorney-General v O'Kelly; The Irish Times, 31 July 1973.] District Justice has jurisdiction to say whether proceed- ings should continue if told that some point is going to be decided by the Supreme Court. This was an application to make absolute a condi- tional order of certiorari granted against the defendant Justice, on the ground that the Justice must exercise his discretion, by granting the adjournment requested. As was decided by the Supreme Court in The State