The Gazette 1972

(2) The trial of the accused was held in Dublin Circuit Criminal Court before Judge McGivern in April 1968. He pleaded not guilty to shop-breaking in Pre- mier Tailors, and to having stolen £250 in cash and diamond earrings and brooch on 3 /4 December 1967. (3) The accuscd was in custody at Store Street Station on 9tii January 1968, in connection with other matters, when Detective Inspector Lalor said to the accused : "What about Premier Tailors? I believe you did it". The accused replied : "We did it, and we got £225 in an envelope in the safe". The Inspector then cautioned the accused, and asked him to make a state- ment, which the accused refused to do. The admissions of the accused were repeated in more detail to Sergeant Ryan two hours later. (4) Judge McGivern held that all the evidence in paragraph 3 was inadmissable as this was not a volun- tary confession as there appeared to be evidence by the Guards which would convict him. As the prosecution was unable to adduce any further evidence, the Judge directed the jury to enter a finding of not guilty by direction. (5) The Attorney-General referred the matter to the Supreme Court on the ground that the accused had freely admitted his guilt. The application would be grounded upon a "Book of Evidence", which are the documents which the prosecutor is obliged to serve to the accused under the Act. (6 When a question of law is thus referred to the Supreme Court, it must be decided, on the basis of factual evidence given at the trial, and not upon any statements of evidence before the preliminary hearing. A trial judge however has no discretion to admit an inculpatory or exculpatory confession made by an accused which is in law inadmissable because it was not voluntary. If the accused's statement arises under the "Judges Rules", the trial judge has a discretion to admit or not voluntary admissions, as held in McCarrick v. Leary (1964) I.R. 225. But this did not arise in the present case. (7) If, as may have happened here, the confession was induced by a false pretence, a trick or a fraud, this does not of itself exclude the confession if the trick is not illegal, nor a breach of accused's constitu- tional rights. (8) The trial judge in excluding the evidence did not exercise his discretion at all, as no reference was made to the Judges Rules. The judge wrongly rejected the evidence, because he did not consider the question whether the confession was involuntary. If an accused, who is in fact guilty, believes that it might in the long run be advantageous to him to admit his guilt rather than conceal, any resulting confession is not to be impugned. The Court should not consider the state- ments made to Sergearn Ryan. Accordingly the full Supreme Court held that the Trial Judge had no grounds for holding that the answers to the reference to Premier Tailors was not voluntary. [People v. Cummins; Reference under Criminal Procedure Act 1967; Supreme Court per Walsh J.; unreported; 26th July 1972.] Breach of Union rules does no entitle the Executive Committee of the Union to declare an illegal strike and place pickets unsupported by the members. (1) All plaintiffs and defendants are members of the Automobile and General Engineering and Mechanical Operators Union.

(2) One of the defendants, Reilly, was formerly em- ployed by Ballsbridge Motors Ltd., but was dismissed in February 1972 following allegations that he had taken spare parts worth 20p for his own use from the store. The engineering committee of this section was not satisfied that Reilly was guilty, but the employers re- fused to reinstate Reilly. (3) On 2nd March 1972, the committee sent a letter to the employers stating they were in dispute with them. On 3rd March, the Labour Court investigated, and recommended that Reilly's dismissal be regarded as a suspension with pay, pending recommendations by a Rights Commissioner but this was not accepted by the Union. (4) On 5th March, the members of the Executive Committee of the Union informed the workers at Balls- bridge Motors that they had taken a decision to strike. The workers present were prevented by the Chairman of the Executive from discussing this. Pickets were accordingly placed on the premises on 6th March. (5) None of the members of the union were in favour of the strike, nor did they wish to picket. The only lawful person who can picket is Reilly. (6) The plaintiffs claim that the Executive Committee has called a strike in breach of the rules of the union, and seek a declaration that it was ultra vires for the Union to direct the withdrawal of labour or the placing of pickets contrary to the wishes of the members, and that the notices concerning this was invalid. On 10th March, Kenny J. granting an interim injunction ordered each of the defendants to be restrained until further order, from picketing the premises. On 22nd March, Pringle J. refused an interlocutory injunction, because the declaration was unlikely to be successful, and that no irreparable damage can be proved. (7) The Supreme Court held that the Executive Committee had directed its members to refuse to work and thereby create a strike with the employers. The members have not refused to work, and, there cannot therefore be any strike. It would be contrary to the meaning of the rules that the Executive Committee should circumvent them. The protection afforded by the Trade Disputes Act 1906 does not permit the defen- dants to sit in breach of the rules of their union. The activities of the defendants constitute a clear inter- ference with the employment of the plaintiffs. There should accordingly be an order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from picketing, according to the full Supreme Court. [Darby and others v. Leonard and others; full Sup- reme Court per Walsh J.; unreported; 26th July 1972.] The plaintiff, Mary Lavin, the writer (now Mrs. Scott) was awarded £1,700 damages by Teevan, J. on 31st July 1968, for diminution of access to light to her premises, caused by a building erected near her pre- mises by the defendants. These premises are new, and were converted into a residence by the plaintiff. The defendant's premises, opposite the plaintiff's comprises a substantial building erected in three sections; the centre section is 124 feet high; these premises cost £600,000 to build. While the defendant's premises were being built, there was a preliminary letter, from plaintiff's solicitor in May 1967 advising them that the building would diminish the light, and seeking an assurance that no buildings would be put up which Right to Ancient Lights does not include right to 1 Modern Lights.

- 2 7 2