The Gazette 1972

UNREPORTED IRISH CASES Resolution assigning State grants to defendants and subsequent assignment on foot of debts due valid. An order had been made by the Supreme Court on 16th March 1962 declaring that the defendants, builders providers in Athlone, were creditors of the plaintiff Society in the sum of £8,615 under an oral agreement of December 1951 and that the plaintiffs did validly assign to the defendants the Society's right to specified housing grants by the Department of Local Govern- ment, but Lavery J. and Kingsmill-Moore J. only gave reasons for this decision, nearly three years later, on 19th February 1965.

the contract, it was unenforceable. A representation, however, had been made that such a resolution had passed. The principle of the Rule in Turquands Case has been well stated in Gower's Company Law. Duplock J.'s judgment in Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park (Mangal) Ltd. (1964) 1 A.E.R. 630, was approved. It folows that the representations and undertakings made by the secretary established that such a contract was binding upon the Society and that there had been a valid equitable assignment of the grants. It followed that the plaintiffs had agreed to pay for the materials supplied. Appeal allowed. [The State Officials Housing Society v P. Lyster & Sons Ltd.; unreported; Supreme Court (Lavery, Kings- mill-Moore and Haugh J.J.); 19th February 1965.] The National Union of Vehicle Builders (N.U.V.B.) a British-based trade union, is the holder of a negotiation licence under the Trade Union Act, and became affili- ated to the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (I.C.T.U.)- Plaintiff became a member of the N.U.V.B. in 1956; and worked for Motor Manufacturers Ltd. Plaintiff became dissatisfied with N.U.V.B. in 1970, although this union represented practically all workmen in the motor assembly. However, the plaintiff and 111 other workers applied to the Marine Port and General Work- ers Union (M.P.G.W.U.) for membership. This union wrote to N.U.V.B. in April 1970 asking whether they objected to the transfer, and the answer was affirmative. In May 1970 the plaintiff and 145 others applied for a transfer to the Irish Transport and General Workers Union (I.T.G.W.U.), and N.U.V.B. still objected. There was a lengthy correspondence, but the plaintiff and the others alleged they wished to join an Irish-based union- Finally N.U.V.B. asked I.C.T.U. to intervene in June 1970, which referred the matter to its Disputes Com- mittee, which duly declared that it was contrary to good tradp union practice for the I.T.G.W.U. to enrol work- ers against an objection by N.U.V.B. In November 1970 the I.T.G.W.U. wrote to N.U.V.B. requesting that they should take back the transferred members and N.U.V.B. replied that no member employed by Motor Manufacturers will be released to join any other union- The plaintiff was still anxious to transfer to I.T.G.W.U- but N.U.V.B. officials objected to it in present circum- stances. The plaintiff contended that the N.U.V.B- were wrongfully preventing him from joining I.T.G.W.L- The defendants contended that the plaintiff undertook to abide by the rules and that he had surrendered his constitutional right to join another union. It was held that a person over age may agree to surrender or to waive all or part of his constitutional right under Article 40 (6) (3) of the Constitution, but the plaintiff would require to be acquainted with the Constitution oi I.G.T.U. which he was not. It is the objection by N.U.V.B. which activates and supports all that has followed upon it, and which now prevents the plaintiff from joining I.T.G.W.U. It was held that the plaintiff did not at any time either expressly or impliedly agree with the N.U.V.B. that in the circumstances giving rise 144 Declaration made that plaintiff is entitled to join the union of his choice.

The plaintiffs were in voluntary liquidation, and Mr. Haughey, and subsequently Mr. Boland (accountant) were appointed liquidators. The liquidator issued a summons for the determination of certain questions, and Budd J. directed an issue by order of 14th January 1957. Lysters accordingly claimed a declaration that they were creditors of the Society in the sum of £8,615, and that the Society had validly assigned their rights to payment of housing grants due on the Arcadia Housing Scheme in Athlone. The plaintiff Society arranged to build many houses in Athlone, and made contracts with two contractors, Murrays and Waldrons. The defendants supplied large quantities of goods to the contractors for the building works and continued to do so after the contractors had defaulted in payment. The Court found, that in consideration of Lysters continuing to supply the materials, there was an under- taking by the plaintiff to pay for the materials supplied, and to assign the requisite housing grants in part pay- ment. The defence of the plaintiffs was that the Society was an incorporated association and cannot conse- quently be made liable for engagements undertaken by their officers which were not formally authorised by the Court. Budd J. had rejected Lysters' claim, but the Supreme Court allowed the appeal on this point. At the end of 1951, the two contractors were in finan- cial difficulties and unable to pay for further materials. Waldrons owed Lysters £2,235, and Murrays owed £189. In November 1951 the Society had agreed to assign the housing grants to the defendants. In May 1953 the Department of Local Government required formal authority for payment of these grants to the defendants. The Secretary of the Society sent a letter to the Department of Local Government stating that the Committee had passed a resolution authorising these payments, but Budd J. had found that no such resolu- tion was passed; all outward factors tend to show that the resolution had been passed. In fact the Department acknowledged this letter on May 19th. The defendants, in a letter to the plaintiffs in January 1952 wrote that the contractors owed them £9,000 and requesting an initial payment of £5,000. In June 1952 the plaintiffs paid a first instalment of £1,600. The Court finds that there was an agreement plainly stated in the documents and confirmed by the course of conduct between the parties. Whether it was an express or an implied agree- ment, the parties were ad idem, and each performed their part until the liquidation proceedings. The liquidator submitted that, because there was no resolution passed at a meeting of directors authorising