The Gazette 1967/71

CASES OF THE MONTH

Assizes on 5th April, 1965, when one 0 was prosecuted for embracery and the charge was dismissed, Hinchcliffe, J., was asked by counsel for the prosecution to make an order for costs for the prosecution. He refused the order and said: 'The application is refused and I direct that the papers be sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions so that con sideration may be given to a prosecution of Neville Glick (the plantiff, then a solicitor) for malicious prosecution and contempt of Court, and I also direct that the papers be sent to the Law Society so that they may consider whether or not to strike his name off the rolls.' The plaintiff, who was later struck off, began an action against the judge for alleged slander. Time for service of the defence was due to expire on 16th October, 1967, and arrangements were being made on behalf of the judge to apply to strike out the statement of claim and dismiss the action; but before the summons was heard, the plaintiff had signed judgment in default of defence. On a summons to set aside the judgment signed and the statement of claim as vexatious, Master Diamond set it aside, and Mocatta, J., on appeal affirmed the order. The plaintiff appealed. Lord Denning, M.R., said that the judge's words were clearly the subject of absolute privilege, being spoken in the course of his judicial function. Although they were spoken at the end of the proceedings, they were part of the proceedings, and therefore the action would not lie. Leave to appeal should be re fused. Diplock and Salmon, L.JJ., agreed. Appeal dismissed. (Glick v. Hinchcliffe — C.A. 20/11/67 — Solicitors' Journal (Vol. Ill), p. 927). Stay of Execution of Possession Orders Where a mortgagor was in default of re payments under a legal mortgage and the legal mortgagee, under the provisions of the mortgage obtained an order for possession of the property the subject of the legal charge the Court has no jurisdiction to grant a stay of execution of the possession order on an application under Order 45, rule 11, of the Rules of the Supreme Court unless some thing has occurred which, had it occurred before the making of the order, would have prevented its making. This was the reserve judgment of Mr. Justice Plowman when he dismissed a sum-

Immunity of Advocates The House of Lords unanimously held that barristers who have for centuries been im mune from actions for negligence brought by clients in respect of their conduct of litigation should, for reasons of public policy, continue to be immune so far as concerns their professional work in conducting litiga tion; but, with the exception of Lord Pearce, their Lordships were of opinion that the immunity should not extend to a barrister's non-litigious advisory work. The majority also thought that the immunity attaching to the barrister as advocate should be extended to solicitors performing the functions of an advocate in Court. Their Lordships dismissed the inter locutory appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal dismissing Mr. Rondel's proposed action for "damages for professional neglig ence" against the defendant, Mr. Michael Worsley, barrister, in relation to his conduct of Mr. Rondel's defence on a "dock brief" at the Central Criminal Court. There had been a powerful argument for the appellant; if it was unnecessary to pro tect solicitors by giving them immunity from action by their clients, it could not be neces sary to protect barristers in that way? Their Lordships would turn the argument the other way, according to Lord Justice Salmon. If it was in the public interest to protect counsel, what good reason was there for withholding similar protection from solicitors? The matter had never been fully considered; and hither to, in England at least, cases conducted by solicitors had generally been of comparatively minor importance. There were differences between the position of barristers and solic itors. But the case for the immunity of counsel appeared to be so strong that Lord Morris, concurring that the public interest required that an advocate should have immunity in the conduct or management of a case in court, said that in that, as in the other aspects of the present case, he found himself in general accord with the judgment of Lord Justice Salmon in the Court of Appeal. (Rondel v. Worsley—The Times, Novem ber 23, 1967). Solicitor alleges slander by Judge At the conclusion of proceedings at Leeds