The Gazette 1967/71

David Goldberg also stresses that it is peaceful protest which is an integral part of democracy, and that the Bill deals only with "forcible" entry and occupation. He goes on to imply that the occupation of Hume Street and Pembroke Road (since they made the Bill "necessary") were not peaceful. The record suggests that it was the evictions, in the small hours and with overwhelm ing physical force, which were forcible, and the occupation which was peaceful. Trespass on private property does not constitute violent protest, and it is a sign either of bias or of con fusion of thought to imply that it does. Rights of conflict Constitutional law and law generally has to deal with reconciliation of rights which may or do con flict. Modern politics have to deal with protests against injustice (the Government can hardly say that people have no right to homes if they can be provided for them) which increase in force as the strength of inertia and vested interests become apparent. The new Bill does not reconcile rights, but protects some and ignores others. It would restrict the right of effective protest against in justices and destruction which milder protests have proved ineffective to prevent. It is an undesirable extension of the philosophy of repressive "law and order" rather than social justice, and is unpleas antly reminiscent of the Criminal Justice Bill. It is unnecessary, because the existing law already provides adequate remedies. The Labour Party presumably will oppose the Bill. It will be a test of the social conscience and liberalism of Fine Gael to see whether they do. It would be a sign of the social conscience and liberalism of Fianna Fail if they withdrew it. (The Irish Times, July 1970) THE PURPOSE OF LAW REPORTS IS LEGALLY CHARITABLE Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales v. Attorney General The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales, which publishes the Law Reports and the Weekly Law Reports, was

granted a declaration that to registration as a charity under section 4 of the Charities Act, 1960. It was held in a reserved judgment, that the council's objects were charitable as being purposes beneficial to the community in enabling judge-made law to be properly developed and administered by the courts. The council had appealed, under section 5 (3) of the Charities Act, against the refusal of the Charity Commissioners for England and Wales to register it. There were two defendants to the summons—The Attorney General and the Commissioners for Inland Revenue. Mr. Justice Foster said that the question was "Is the council established for purposes which are exclusively charitable according to the law of England and Wales?" For the council it was submitted that the purposes for which it was established were either "for the advancement of education," the second of the four classifications of charity given by Lord Macnaghten in Income Tux Special Commissioners v. Pemsel ([1891] A.C. 531, 538) or, alternatively, "for other pur poses beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding heads" (Lord Macnaghlen's fourth classification). Because it was for the advancement of the administration of the law and also because it came within the spirit and intendment of the preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth (1601). The Attorney General did not support the council's submission that it was for the advance ment of education, but did support the contention that it fell within the fourth classification. For the commissioners it was submitted (1) that the court could not look outside the memorandum of association to discover the council's purposes and that the motives or aims of the council's founders were irrelevant: (2) that the purpose was to benefit members of the legal profession in the practice of that profession: (3) that the council was not established for education pur poses; and (4) that the council's purposes did not fall within the classification of "other purposes beneficial to the community since it was not analogous to any decided case and was not with in the spirit and intendment of the preamble. The council, a company limited by guarantee 214 it was entitled