The Gazette 1967/71

from being heard undefended and awarded her damages amounting in all to £1,060 in respect of loss of maintenance for her son which he would probably have been awarded had she defended the divorce proceedings, loss of the chance of protec ting a future maintenance claim for herself should she cease to be able to work, and loss of the chance of successfully defending the divorce suit. The plaintiff also had claimed damages for men tal distress, resulting from the defendant solicitor's conduct of her case, but she was held not to be entitled under this head, since her claim was in contract not in tort. It was in respect of her claim to damages for mental distress which, she claimed, had brought on an anxiety state preventing her from continuing her work, that she appealed. The Court of Appeal held that, in principle, damages for nervous shock were recoverable for negligence by a solicitor in the conduct of his client's case, but that in the particular circum stances of Mrs. Cook's case the damage was too remote. The reason why Mrs. Cook did not get damages for the injury to her health was that she was peculiarly liable to nervous shock—indeed the history of her life showed one nervous breakdown after another—but she had neither her nervous breakdown as a result of his conduct of her defence was a consequence that was not reasonably foreseeable by him, and the damages were too remote to be recoverable. The solicitor who contrives to remain unaware of any abnormal mental propensity in his client may well escape liability in damages for nervous shock or anxiety state occasioned by his conduct of the client'; litigation. (Cook v. S. (1966) 1 All E.R. 248). Dance Licence not required at Wedding Reception The licensee of an hotel held a public music, singing and dancing licence with a condition that 'the house shall not be opened for . . . public dancing, singing, music or other public entertain ment during any part of Sunday' except with the prior consent of justices'. The parents of a bride desired to give to their invited guests after a Jewish wedding on a Sunday, a reception and dinner followed by a dance at the hotel, which was to make no charge specifically allocated to the dance band that would be provided. The licensee applied to the justices for an extension of the public music, singing and dancing licence. At the hearing the police present conten ded (i) that the fact that the function was for a private party was irrelevant and, since no one would be admitted unless some payment was made to the hotel by the bride's parents who would pay, members of the. pufelic would be ad­

mitted on payment of money, contrary to the provisions of the Sunday Observance Act, 1780, in respect of 'any . . . place . . . opened or used for public entertainment ... on ... Sunday, and to which persons shall be admitted by the pay ment of money'; and (ii) that, on the authority of R. v. Hereford Justices, ex parte Newton (1941) 1 K.B. 8, there was no jurisdiction under the 1890 Act to grant, or remove a restriction on, a licence for public dancing on Sundays. The Justices refused the application on the grounds that they had no jurisdiction to grant the exten sion, and the licensee appealed. Lord Parker, C..J, said that, on the assumption that the parents paid a sum of money for the use of rooms of the hotel for the function, they became occupiers of the rooms, the entertainment was theirs and run by them, and that was not public entertainment but was solely for invited guests, and, accordingly, no licence was required. Enter tainment was not private in all cases, however, merely because those who came belonged to a particular class of the public, and if an hotel began to run Sunday dances for a club or series of clubs that was not anything but public enter tainment. In no sense was the entertainment in this case provided by the hotel, and the justices had no jurisdiction, but not on the ground that the entertainment was 'public entertainment' for bidden by the Sunday Observance Act, 1780. (Roe v. Harrogate Justices (Vol. 110) Solicitors' Journal p.673). Town Planning—Material Change in Use In 1961 the site owner bought a 3-acre nursery garden with a central building from which he continued an established use of selling by retail vegetables, fruit and flowers produced in the nur sery. Within four years of 1965 he physically alte red the building to give it some attributes of a shop, and from it he sold not only the indigenous produce but also oranges, lemons and bananas which he imported, to the extent of some 10 per cent of his total sales. In 1965 the local planning authority served on him an enforcement notice reciting development without the grant of plann ing permission required under Pt. Ill of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1962, and re quiring him, inter alia, to discontinue the use of the land 'for the purposes of a retail shop'. He appealed to the Minister of Housing and Local Government who considered that the use estab lished before 1961 was a use incidental to the use of the premises as a nursery, that the introduction of the sale of imported produce had effected a change in the character of the use to that of a general greengrocer's shop, that that was a mate- 55