The Gazette 1967/71

ing, the requirements that the appeal officer should hear all the relevant evidence was not pursued. Kenny J. therefore allowed the appeal and gave a direction that the case be re-heard before a different appeals officer and medical assessor. The costs of the appeal, including the transcript, were awarded to the plaintiff. [Kiely v. Minister for Social Welfare. Kenny J. Un- reported. 16 December, 1970.] Solicitors The summary jurisdiction which the courts exercise over -solicitors under which they may be attached or committed to prison for default in undertakings given to the court or in their professional capacity is only to be invoked in clear cases for disciplinary purposes. It is quite inappropriate where there are difficult issues to be tried and where the solicitor denies liability for under takings given in the name of his firm by his clerk. [Geoffrey Solver & Drake v Baines. Court of Appeal. The Times, 11 November, 1970.] that ad valorem stamp duty was payable on an order made by Mr. Justice Pennycuick on July 19, 1965, as being a "conveyance or transfer on sale" within the meaning of Schedule 1 to the Stamp Act, 1891. His Lordship also ruled that the judge's order was "an instrument ex ecuted" for the purposes of section 14(4) of the Act, with the startling result that, if the order was un stamped, the court could not look at its own order. The sumons on which the judge was giving judgement was issued by the Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd against the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, and concerned Sun Alliance's offer to purchase the share capital of the London Assurance Company. Section 14(4) provides that ". . . an instrument executed ... in any part of the United Kingdom . . . shall not ... be given in evidence or be available for any purpose whatsoever unless it is duly stamped . . ." [Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Com missioners. Foster J. The Times, 18 November, 1970.] Tax Law In arriving at the open market price under section 7(5) of the Finance Act 1894, for the purposes of estate duty of property passing on death, the valuer should look at the property as it is at the moment after death. Thus where land owned by the deceased ceased to be subject to the Agricultural Holdings Acts on his death it fell to be valued on a vacant possession basis. [Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Graham and Others. House of Lords. The Times, 11 December, 1970.] Ribena, a product manufactured by Beecham Foods Ltd., was held to be a medicine and, as such, exempt from all purchase tax as being a preparation consisting only of vitamin C and a vehicle therefor. [Beecham Foods Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise Court of Appeal. The Times, 4 December, 1970.] 164 Stamp Duties Foster J., in a reserved judgment decided

Shipping The Admiralty jurisdiction in rem may be invoked either against the offending ship or against any other ship in the same ownership but not against both. [The Banco. Court of Appeal. The Times, 10 Decem ber, 1970.] When a ship has to call upon a tug for help a claim subsequently made by the tug against the ship con stitutes a general average loss as being a direct conse quence of a general average act. [Australian Coastal Shipping Commission v. Green and Others. Court of Appeal. The Times, 3 December, 1970.] Social Welfare Husband of plaintiff in employment of C.I.E. in June 1968 when oxyacetiline equipment, which he was using, exploded and gave him severe burns to his hand and arms. He claimed injury benefit under the Social Welfare (Ocupational Injuries) Act 1966 and medical certificates relating to his incapacity were given weekly from time of the accident until his sudden death in October 1968; most medical certificates diagnosed burns on the hands but four mentioned endogenous depression; he had had coronary heart disease and hypertension before the accident. The widow plaintiff claimed death benefit under the Act of 1966 on the ground that the accident in June produced a nervous condition in her husband, which was one of the reasons that caused his death. Her claim was rejected by the deciding officer; she then appealed to an appeals officer, who heard the claim with a medical assessor, in July 1969. In November 1969, she received the decision of the appeals officer rejecting the claim on the ground that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. This decision was arrived at as a result of correspondence between the Department and a heart specialist. The specialist stated that a psychiatrist had not diagnosed in August 1968 that as a result of this injury, the deceased had an anxiety depressive state. The heart specialist was there fore of opinion that there was nothing that could con nect the accident with injury to the heart, and that there seemed to be no sign connecting the accident with the death from coronary thrombosis. Another doctor testi fied to the contrary at the appeals hearing. Claims for benefit under the Act of 1966 are regulated by the procedural sections of the Social Welfare Act 1952. Inter alia there is an appeal from the decision of the appeals officer to the High Court as to whether an accident did in fact arise out of and in the course of employment. If there is evidence to support the findings of the appeals officer, the High Court has no juris diction to set them aside. But the High Court has a supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that proceedings con form with the principles of natural justice, and that decisions given are in accordance with the law. The law on the admission of evidence is clearly stated by Lord Diplock in R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Com missioner Ex Parte Moore—(1965) 1 A.E.R. 94. Here the plaintiff through her solicitor wished to call ad ditional evidence before the appeals officer but with drew the application, because that officer made a remark which was thought to mean that he was going to decide the case in plaintiff's favour. Through a misunderstand­