The Gazette 1967/71

contained in the policy; therefore the Zurich Com pany were not liable to indemnify the first defen dant; but the Zurich Company were one of the insurers concerned in a domestic agreement made between the Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland (henceforth called M.I.B.) and the insurance com panies made on 30 November 1955. Various terms of this agreement are cited, including clause 2A which provides that if a judgment is obtained against anyone in respect of road traffic liability, the insurer will satisfy the plaintiffs judgment creditor to the extent that the judgment has not been satisfied within twenty-eight days of its enforceability. The annexed memorandum of agree ment of November 1955 made between the Minister for Local Government and the M.I.B. provides that if any judgment is not satisfied within twenty-eight days of its enforceability, then the M.I.B. will pay to the judgment creditor the sum payable under such judgment and costs, provided preliminary notice is given by registered post (1) to the insurer, and (2) to M.I.B. and provided that the plaintiff has before then taken all reasonable steps to recover the sum due. Any dispute as to the reasonableness of any requirement by M.I.B. shall be referred to the Minister, whose decision shall be final. M.I.B. were made aware : (1) That the Zurich Company disputed its liability to indemnify the plaintiff. (2) That in July 1965 the plaintiff's solicitors notified the M.I.B. of their intention to issue proceedings. (3) In May 1966 M.I.B. and the Zurich were notified by the second defendant that he would claim contribution in respect of damages and costs against the first defendant. (4) In November 1966 the Zurich Company's solicitors, on behalf of M.I.B., wrote to the plaintiff formally requiring him, in the event of his obtain ing judgment against the defendants jointly, to bring execution against the second defendant only for the entire amount of the judgment. (5) In December 1966 the Zurich Company's solicitors wrote to the plaintiff to the effect that, if he could not recover against the first defendant, he was entitled under Section 38 of the Civil Liability Act, 1961, to mark a secondary judgment against the second defendant, and they required him to do so. (6) In October 1968 the Zurich Company repeated this request, and made it clear they were acting on behalf of M.I.B. (7) In November 1968 the plaintiff replied that

he had taken all reasonable steps to recover from the two defendants the damages and costs awarded to him. The question whether in the particular circumstances the requirement that an application for a secondary judgment should be made by the plaintiff was reserved to the Minister. Murnaghan J. therefore put the plaintiff on terms to obtain the decision of the Minister on this matter. [Gillespie v Fitzpatrick and McCartney (No. 2) 1970; Murnaghan J.; Unreported; 27 April 1970.] CRIME Blackmail Case for the House of Lords A person who wrote a letter in England demand ing money with menaces from a person abroad was held to have committed the offence of blackmail once he posted the letter and accordingly the offence was triable in this country. The court dismissed an appeal by Eugene Treacy, who was convicted last December at the Central Criminal Court (Judge King-Hamilton) of blackmailing a Mrs. X in West Germany by posting in the Isle of Wight a letter to her demanding £175 with menaces, contrary to Section 21 (1) of the Theft Act, 1968. The appellant had pleaded guilty on the fifth day of the trial but preserved his objections that the offence was committed out side the jurisdiction. He was sentenced to three and a half years' imprisonment. Mr. Justice John Stephenson, reading the judg ment of the court, said that the question was whether the court of trial had jurisdiction as the judge found, or whether the offence had been committed outside the jurisdiction, in Germany, as the appellant contended. When the demand was by letter the demand was made, unless there were exceptional circumstances, when the letter was posted. If the intended victim was blind or illiterate the demand was made, not when it reached him but when it left the demander beyond recall on its way to the intended victim in the ordinary course of events. The demand could be regarded as continuing until it was regarded as received. Leave to appeal to House of Lords. [Regina v Treacy; Court of Appeal; 29 July 1970.] EASEMENT Claim to Damp Proof Adjoining Wall Rejected On appeal from the County Court, who awarded 79