The Gazette 1967/71

action for wrongful dismissal, damages are intended to compensate the plaintiff, because he has been allowed to earn it. It follows that, as the damages in this case consist of a sum calculated by reference to salary, commission. and director's fees that are only taxable in Mr. Glover's' hands to the extent of £3,OOO, under Sections 8 and 9 of the Finance Act 1964. Although the Gourley case had only been applied to damages awarded for loss of remuneration in accident cases, the contention that it did not apply to damages given for wrongful dismissal was rejected. Held that the decision in Gourley accords with reason and should be applied to the first £3,000 of the damages for loss as previously stated. The amount of income tax payable in this respect has been agreed at £1,050. Judgment was accordingly given for plaintiff for £9,694. Glover v. B.L.N. Ltd. and others—Kenny J. — 31st July 1968 and 25th November 1968. COPYRIGHT Damages for Infringement of Copyright Publishing Contract made out on Typed Sheet with blanks filled in in black ink by plaintiff and red ink by defendant. The plaintiff published 10 books for defendant before this contract. It was agreed that it would be unnecessary to enter into a further specific agreement in respect of the publishing of future books, unless different terms were subsequently agreed upon. This left it open to the defendant to publish books elsewhere prior to this contract. It was held that the terms of this contract would apply to defendant's Irish History and European History for the Intermediate Examination and the royalties provided were paid. In 1966 the defendant wrote a new Intermediate First Year Course which was not submitted for publication to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's claim is for infringement of copyright on the ground that a substantial material contained in the former history books was incorporated in the New Intermediate First Year Course, which was held to be proved. The question of fair dealing was next considered. In view of a change in the history course by the Depart ment of Education, undoubtedly the books formerly published by the plaintiff were going to become dated —therefore there was not much competition with the new book. But it was held that the infringement was flagrant, as the defendant, instead of re-writing the work had copied verbatim more than 30 ^ages from the previous book. Effective relief was not available to the plaintiff because damages cannot adequately be pre- estimated; nevertheless an injunction would not be suit able. In view of the copying which the defendant perpetrated, damages were assessed at £250. (Folens v. O'Dubhaghail—Unreported—Murnaghan J—22nd October 1969)'. PRACTICE Bar Council Order Halts Trial The Ruling of the Bar Council forbidding any counsel to appear in a criminal case in which ? certificate of legal aid has been granted to an accused person, except where the accused person is in custody awaiting trial, was referred to in the Supreme Court yesterday. The court was told that seven counsel on the legal aid

panel had declined, because of the Bar Council ruling, to appear for two men whose trial had been fixed by the President of the High Court, Mr. Justice O'Keeffe, to begin in the Central Criminal Court. The men are Jeremiah O'Leary of Upper Drumcondra. Dublin, and Patrick O'Brien, manager of Blanchardstown, Co. Dublin. O'Leary is charged that on last December 28th, being armed with a gun he robbed Marie O'Loughlin of £33/10s. in cash and cheques to the value of £911. O'Brien is charged with aiding and abetting. Both are also charged with having a pistol and machine gun in their possession on the same day with intent to endanger life. They are also charged with conspiring to rob Marie O'Loughlin of cash and cheques in Wynn's Hotel, Lower Abbey Street, Dublin. Mr. T. J. Conollv. S.C., who, with Mr. Donal Barrington S.C., appeared for the men, told the court that the President of the High Court had made on order on June 24th refusing an application by Mr. Patrick F- O'Donnell, solicitor, on behalf of the men, for an adjournment of their trial which the President had fixed for Monday, June 29. The motion now before the court was for an order adjourning the trial until such date as might appear proper to the court. The Supreme Court directed that the trial fixed be adjourned, pending the determination of the question as to the right of the two accused men to have the trial adjourned in view of the fact that counsel on the legal aid panel had declined to act because they felt bound by the Bar Counsel ruling. The motion was adjourned pending the service of notice on the Attorney-General of an application for a further adjournment of the trial. Mr. Conoolly explained that the men had been returned for trial on the charges mentioned and the motion now before the court was on the ground that the President, in refusing an application for an adjourn ment of the trial, had done so in the wrongful exercise of his discretion. He read an affidavit by Mr. O'Donnell in which he stated that he had been informed on June 24th that he had been assigned as solicitor of the accused men, who had been granted a certificate of legal aid on May 14th. Each accused had been assigned a solicitor and one counsel. The men had been admitted to bail on Mav 14th. On the following day he was told bv a counsel whom he had approached that he could not apnear for either accused because of the Bar Council ruling. He subsequently approached the secretary of the Bar Council, who confirmed that the ruling applied to all members of the Bar. Mr. O'Donnell said he had been instructed bv both men that they required counsel to conduct their defence and that they themselves felt that counsel was necessary in order to have their defence proper!" conducted. "I say and believe, from the attempts I have made to instruct counsel, that it will not be possible to retain counsel on behalf of either of the accused, or in the immediately foreseeable future." Mr. O'Donnell said that on June 24th he applied to the President of the Hieh Court in the Central Criminal Court for an adjournment on the grounds that counsel could not be retained for the defence and pointed out that both accused men wished to be represented by counsel in order that full justice might be done in their case. The President refused the application _ on the grounds that he considered it his duty to dispose of 59