The Gazette 1967/71

Department of Agriculture theory rejected and dismissed by Supreme Court. (O'Dalaigh C. J., Haugh and Budd J. J.) Falvey v. Feeley—Unreported—191x1 July, 1967. Plaintiff fell down stairs with no handrail in public house and was injured. Murnaghan J. withdrew the case from jury on ground that anyone going down those stairs must exercise reasonable care—Supreme Court ('ODalaigh C. J., O'Keeffe and Walsh J.) reversed Murnaghan J. and ordered a re-trial on grounds:— (1) That the question whether danger was usual or- unusual should be decided with reference to the know ledge and experience of the class of persons to which the invitee belonged. In the circumstances the case should not have been withdrawn from jury, as invitee had never been on premises before. (2) When an invitee has knowledge of a danger, the correct test for determining Invitor's liability is to ask the question whether the invitee, exercising reasonable care and knowledge, could adequately carry out the activity upon which he was engaged, without exposing himself to risk of injury. Unless the matter is beyond doubt, the matter should be left to the jury to determine. O'Donoghue v. Greene—(1967)—I.R. 40. Defendant found negligent by jury before O'Keeffe P. in Cork—damages £4,500—plaintiff employee injured while cleaning covers in acid sulphur tanks—plaintiff labourer had to remove acid from acid pits—No detailed instructions—plaintiff furnished with clothing, but had never done this before—right leg slipped, went down into acid pit, burnt by acid—Supreme Court (O'Dalaigh C. J. Walsh and Fitzgerald J. J.) held that President should have admitted evidence of supervisor as to usual way of doing job—on injuries question, exensive amputation of leg necessary—jury's award too much—Supreme Court on request awards £2,000. Luttrell v. Gouldings Fertiliser's Cork. Unreported, 2oth March 1969. Practice Extension of time for trial by jury granted It was held by a majority of the Supreme Court (O'Dalaigh C. J. and Walsh J., Fitzgerald J. dissenting) that, although the plenary summons of an action in respect of a cross roads collision sustained in May 1961 had only been issued in May 1964, and there had been considerable delay in taking the other steps necessary to bring the action to fruition, nevertheless the plaintiff should be entitled to an extension of time from the four days allowed by the Rules to have defendant's notice of trial of the action by a judge without a jury served on 5th December 1968 changed to a notice of trial of the action by a judge with a jury. Henchy J. and on appeal Fitzgerald J. held that, as the plaintiff's solicitor had been so dilatory in pursuing the case, the plaintiff had for feited all his rights. Appeal allowed. (Cox v. Massey — Supreme Court — Unreported — 7th March 1969). A veterinary surgeon directed an assistant of his, in connection with the Scheme for Vaccination against Brucellosis to vaccinate cattle in certain specified farms in Co. Kilkenny. The scheme Drovided that the calves to be vaccinated were to be at least 3 months old, and not more than 6 months old, and that they were to be vaccinated once only.The Minister was to pay prescribed fees to the veterinary surgeons who performed the work, in 1964—Amnesia

provided a prescribed entry was inserted for each vac cination on a blue card. The scheme called for regular accuiate, hling work and it was notorious that many professional people weie bad at this. In a number of cases, the assistant vaccinated the calves at the request of the herd owner without checking whether the animal had already been vaccinated. These were stated subsequently by the Minister to numoer 81. The assistant did not check the age of the calves, and in many cases did not get the owners to sign the prescribed i'orm, which were subse quently forged by the assistant. The principal was subsequently charged before the Veterinary Council with being guilty of conduct dis graceful in a professional respect;— 1. In that he claimed iees irom the Department under the scheme in respect 01 calves which had previously been vaccinated. 2. In that he claimed fees from the Department in respect of calves that were over age. 3. In hat he failed to supervise his assistant edequately. 4. In that he failed to keep proper records of calves vaccinated. The assistant was similarly charged in respect of (i) and (2) above and 13) tnat he failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that he did not contravene the Scheme. The Council set up a special committee of its members to consider the matter, and this committee acted with care and objectivity. Counsel for the veterinary surgeons did not give this committee any assistance by referring to reported cases on the meaning of " conduct disgraceful to him in a professional respect ". The committee duly found that the charges against the principal and the assistant had been well proved and ordered that they be suspended horn practice for six months; this was duly endorsed by the Council in November 1968. The appli cants duly appealed to the High Couit under the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1931 to have this decision of the Council cancelled. Held by Kenny J. that, having studied the documents and heard the evidence, he was convinced the Council had reached a correct decision. But Kenny J. having been satisfied that the principal and his assistant had not acted fraudulently or dishonestly, but merely recklessly and negligently in vaccinating these calves ordered that the decision of the Council be cancelled. The word " disgraceful" brings in an element of conscious wrongdoing. The conduct, being in a pro fessional respect, must relate to something which he does when carrying on his profession. This meaning, as elabo rated in Allison v. General Medical Council (1894) II Q.B. and in Felix v. General Dental Council (1960) A.C. was fully considered. There was no element of moral tur pitude, or fraud but only foolish delay in filling up forms. No costs were awarded as it was the duty of the lawyers of the applicants to make sure that the Tribunal knew the rules they had to apply and to explain fully the meaning of the term " disgraceful ". For tax purposes the valuation of stock-in-trade at the end of an accounting period at " cost or market value, whichever is the lower" means, in the retail trade, valuation at the price fairly to be expected as the retail price of the stock in due course. B. S. C. Footwer Ltd. v. Ridgway (Inspector of Taxes). Court of Appeal, 23 '1/70. Profits on realization of investments representing funds 104 Re Veterinary Surgeons Acts 1931 to 1960. Kenny J.—3oth January, 1970—unreported. Tax Law