The Gazette 1967/71

residue and be split among all the testator's chil– dren equally. The farm lands had potential devel– opment value. There being disagreement on the price for the farms, the executors petitioned the court to declare whether the options were valid, and if so, on what basis the properties should be valued. It was held (C.A. : Harman, Davies and Russell L.JJ., 16th March 1967), that an option to pur– chase "at a reasonable valuation" was an enforce– able option, and if the parties could not arrive at such a valuation, the court could determine the reasonable value by ordering an inquiry into the matter; the valuation should be made as at the death of the testator, but taking into consideration subsequent developments. Per Russell L.J. : the option need not be exercised until the reasonable value was ascertained. [Talbot v Talbot (1967) 3 W.L.R. 438]. Company Dissolution In re Cornish Manures Ltd., a company went into liquidation and transferred its undertaking to a new company. The old company owed £8,701 to the new company, but the directors of the new company waived the debt. The new company went into liquidation, and the £8,701 was divided among the only two shareholders of the old com– pany. The liquidator of the old company retained a sum of money to meet surtax. The final general meeting of the old company was held on 18th July 1964, and a day or so later the liquidator received a surtax demand which had been delayed in the post. The liquidator appended a note to his return on the final winding up and explained the position. The account and return was registered by the Registrar of Companies on 21st July 1964. The surtax was paid on 9th October 1964. On 18th November 1966, the liquidator of the new company applied for a declaration under Section 352 of the Companies Act, 1948, that the disso– lution of the old company was void. It was held (Ch.D. : Pennycuick J. : 26th April 1967), that the declaration could not be granted; it was out of time under Section 352 (1) because the old company had been dissolved more than two years previously. Section 290 (1) of the Act stated that the affairs of the company should be "fully wound up" before the account was made up. In the present case, when the liquidator had made up his account before the final general meeting, he had fully dealt with the affairs of the company so far as he was aware. By Section 249 (4) the company was deemed to be dissolved on the expiration of three months from the regis–

tration of the return, i.e. it was dissolved on 21st October 1964. Since he had applied for the declaration on 18th November 1966, the liquidator was out of time, and the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion. [Re Cornish Manures Ltd. (1967) 1 W.L.R. 807]. Larceny Act, 1916, Section 8 (1) It is an offence contrary to Section 8 (1) of the Larceny Act, 1916, if any person "steals or with intent to steal, rips, cuts, severs or breaks (a) any glass or woodwork belonging to any building . . ." This offence is not committed where there is no intent to steal the glass or woodwork ripped, cut, severed or broken. It is not sufficient that there is an intent to steal something else, access to which is gained by the ripping or cutting of woodwork. The appellants had ripped up floorboards in a derelict house to get at the copper pipes under– neath, when they were interrupted by a police officer. As they had no intention of stealing the floorboards their conviction under Section 8 (1) was quashed. [R. v Harlow and Winstanley (1967), 2 W.L.R. 702; (1967), 1 A.E.R. 683. Court of Appeal, Criminal Division (Lord Parker, C.J.. Winn L.J., and James J.]. No Case to Answer The accused was charged on an indictment con– taining (inter alia) count five, larceny of a driving licence and count six, an alternative count charg– ing receiving the licence knowing it to have been stolen. Counsel for the accused submitted that there was no case to answer on counts five and six. The judge held it would not be proper to leave count five to the jury, and they need not concern themselves with it, but count six must stand. Subsequently the recall of a prosecution witness was permitted, and in view of his answers the judge reversed his ruling in respect of count five and the accused was convicted on that count among others. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that where there are two alternative counts of larceny and receiving, it is only if there is, at the end of the prosecution case, no evidence to support either count that it can be right to withdraw the matter from the jury. However, as count five had in fact been withdrawn, a verdict of guilty should not have been taken on it, nor should a witness have been recalled to give evi– dence on count five, which was by that stage dead and finished. The accused's conviction on count five was therefore quashed. [R. v Plain (1967), 1 W.L.R. 565; (1967), 1 A.E.R. 614. Court of 34