The Gazette 1967/71

the travel and living expenses of the partner for the air flights and the six days of the conference only. Cross, J., held that the expenses claimed were properly allowable as a deduction under Ccction 137 (a) of the Income Tax Act, 1952. [Edwards v Wornsley Henshall and Co. (1968) 1 All E.R. 1089]. Limitation of Action, Property, Adverse Possession In 1947 G, then aged fifty, married JG, then seventy-four, and went to live with him in a bungalow. G had been told that some time she would "come into the bungalow when he was gone" but in 1951 AG executed a conveyance of the property in favour of H, his nephew, in con sideration of £1,500. He did not tell H about the conveyance until some later. In 1959 he gave H the title deeds telling him the property was his and that he should have the deeds and later he said that he was only in the house by H's leave and offered to give up possession. H told him that he could stay as long as he liked. AG died in November 1965 and in his will forgave H any money owing on the property. H demanded the property but G continued to live there and an action for possession was brought. H claimed that he had given AG oral permission or licence to occupy the bungalow and G claimed to be in un disturbed and exclusive possession thereof since November 1947 jointly with her husband until his death and solely thereafter and claimed a posses- sery title. In the first instance it was held that AG did not any time intend to deny H's right to the property and had never been in adverse pos session and an order for possession was given to H. On appeal it was held that at common law adverse possession was in the nature of an ouster and was very difficult to prove. Under the 1939 Act a person was in adverse possession if he was a person in whose favour time could run. Time could not run in favour of a licensee and therefore he could not have adverse possession. It could run in favour of a tenant at will if he remained in possession for twelve years after its expiry without acknowledgment. It was held in Moses v Love- grove (1952) 2 QB that where the right to occupy was derived from the owner in the form of per mission or grant it was not adverse; if it was not, . it was adverse. In this case there had been a licence to occupy; there was no intention to create any interest in AG. Appeal dismissed. [Hughes v Griffin and Another, 112 S.J. 907]. 102

in respect of work and so if the selection of mater ial is left to the contractor he must exercise due skill an.d care in choosing the material. In this case the appellants maintained there was no war ranty as to fitness or quality as the material and the supplier were chosen by the respondents. The respondents admit that if it is held that the choice of this type of tile was theirs and theirs alone there can be no implied warrnty as to its fitness for the contract purpose. But they say that there still was a warranty that the tiles would be of good quality and that the warranty must be implied notwithstanding the fac thatt they left no choice to the appellants in selecting the person who was to supply the tiles. They argued that in the cir cumstances of this particular case, the loss was not caused by the particular tiles selected being unsuitable for the contract purpose but was caused by the tiles which were supplied being of defec tive quality. It was held that the fact the builder had speci fied tiles made by only one manufacturer did not preclude the ordinary implied warranty of quality. In this particular case it was known to the employer and the contractor when the contract was made that the sole manufacturer of the speci fied materials was only willing to sell on terms excluding liability under Section 14 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 and in these circumstances it would be unreasonable to put on the contractor a liability for latent defects. [Young and Marten Ltd. v McManus Childs Ltd. (1968), 3 W.L.R. 635]. Income Tax, Expenses of Attending Professional Conference In an appropriate case expenses incurred in at tending an international conference may be allow able as a deduction for tax purposes. In this case the defendants were a firm of prac tising accountants with clients in many parts of the world. One of their partners attended a six- day international accountancy conference in New York. He travelled by the cheapest flight available and came back at the earliest opportunity. One and a half days were spent in business sessions and the remainder of the six days in formal dis cussion, visits on businesses and sight-seeing excur sions. The partner visited a firm with which his own firm had had professional dealings and he saw a new business method which was claimed could be adopted with advantage by his firm. In calculating their profits his firm sought to deduct