The Gazette 1967/71

dence as to the conspiracy depended almost en tirely on the evidence of Mrs. C, whose character was attacked in cross-examination. Counsel for L sought to discredit Mrs. C's evidence by calling the witness to establish that her evidence could not be relied upon. He asked the witness, whether in the light of Mr s.G's general reputation for veracity he would be prepared to believe her on oath. The witness was not allowed to complete or qualify his reply. Counsel sought to ask witness the question : "From your personal knowledge of Mrs. C would you believe her on oath?" The question was not allowed. The defendants were convicted and sentenced. The appeals were dis missed. During the course of the judgment on the Court of Appeal the cases of R. v. Gune- wardene (1951) 2 KB 600 and Toohey v. Metro politan Police Commissioner (1965) A.C. 595 were cited. The method resorted to by Counsel for L when it sought to discredit Mrs. C's vital evidence, though little known and rarely used, was of considerable antiquity. The situation arose so rarely that none of the Lords who decided Toohey's case had ever experienced it. (R. v. Longman, R. v. Richardson, Solicitors' Journal Vol. 112, p. 353). A conspiracy to defraud A conspiracy to cheat and defraud in relation to the assets of a company is to act with deliberate dishonesty to the prejudice of another person's proprietary right and the question for a jury is whether the defendants could have thought that a board of directors acting honestly would have agreed to the course taken. (Reg. v. Sinclair; R. v. Queenswood [Holdings] Ltd. R. v. Smithson Court of Appeal June, 29th, 1968). Rights of defendant An unrepresented defendant should be warned of the risk of attacking prosecution witnesses but the warning should not be given in open court : the proper practice is for the prosecution's represen tative to ask for an adjournment and, after the justices have retired, for him to enlist the help of the justice's clerk to explain the risk to the de fendant. (Reg. v. Weston-super-Mare Justices, Ex parte Townsend-Q.B.D., June, 24th, 1968). Defendant's intention On a charge of attempt, the defendant's intention expressed at the time and afterwards is irrelevant

to see what an equivocal actus reus is directed; but the prosecution must then show that the act itself is sufficiently proximate to an amount to attempt to commit the specific crime which it was the defendant's intention to commit. (Jones v. Brooks. Q.B.D., June 25, 1968). Plea of Guilty The following practice direction was given by Lord Parker, C. J. at the Court of Appeal in England on April 1st 1968. "In the opinion of this court it would be regrettable if, as a result of the Criminal Pro cedure Act, 1967, the press and the public were deprived of the right inherent in our system of the administration of criminal justice, to know the circumstances of the crime for which an ac cused is convicted and sentenced. This can only occur in cases in which under that Act, either there have been no committal proceedings or committal proceedings which can not be fully reported, and in which in either event the accused pleads guilty at the trial. How ever, even in such cases the prosecution state the facts in open court at the trial and this they should continue to do though in somewhat more detail than heretofore. The only exception is the comparatively rare case when an accused pleads guilty at the trial to murder, in which case there is only one sen tence, life imprisonment, which can be imposed. There is then, so far as the judge is concerned, no need for any reference to the circumstances of the crime, since whatever the circumstances the sentence must be the same. The judge will have read the depositions; the accused will inevitably be advised and represented by counsel, and often by leading counsel, and the accused will have chosen to plead guilty. Moreover, so far as the public was concerned until the changes effected by the Criminal Justice Act, 1967 the committal proceedings were held in public. This court however recognises that if this should be the practice for the future there may be rare cases in which the circumstances of the murder are never publicly revealed*. That is clearly- wrong. Accordingly, this court directs that the prosecution, following a plea of guilty to murder should, as in cases of pleas of guilty to other offences, state the facts in open court before sentence is imposed. *This practice Direction is a sequal to the lack of publicity exemplified in R. V. Sokol, The Times, March 29th, 1968. The Practice Direction is to be found in [1968] 2 All E.R. 144. 49