The Gazette 1967/71

that the appeal was incompetent in that (a) the word "decision" in Section 7 did not include sentence, and that (b) the Law Society was not a person aggrieved. It was held that the sentence pronounced by the committee was an operative part of the decision. The matter was put beyond all doubt by the terms of the Act which provided that the committee should set forth in their de cision, in the case of a conviction particulars of the conviction and sentence. The Council might well be a person aggrieved by the decision of the committee. The legislature had made the Law Society the'guardian of the public interest so far as concerned the maintenance of the standard of the profession of solicitors. The present peti tioners therefore qualified as persons aggrieved within the meaning of Section 7 of the 1958 Act. Reference was made to Attorney General of Gambia v. N'Tie (1961) AC 617. The fine of £25 was quite out of proportion to the gravity of the offence. A censure, even if coupled with a fine of the maximum sum of £250 would not be adequate punishment for the breach of rule established. The Court accordingly ordered that the respondent should be suspended from prac tice for a period of five years and reaffirmed the finding of expenses made against him by the Discipline Committee. (Council of Law Society of Scotland v. Doc- herty, 112, S.J. p. 312). Contract—Liability of Builder to re-do work. The plaintiffs, Builders, contracted with the de fendants for the conversion of premises into a shop with upper living accommodation reached by an outside staircase; the contract contained provisions for the plaintiff's to provide all mate rials, labour and plant for the proper and efficient execution, prosecution and completion of the works, and to allow for covering up and protecting the works 'during frosty and inclement weather or from damage from any other cause and reinstating any work so damaged', at a price of some £4,000 for the whole of the works shown or implied on a drawing, to be completed within a specified number of weeks, payment to be made in stages on certificates, with a balance payable on completion 'less 5 per cent, contract retention for 3 months'. The work inside and outside the shop (but not the living accommo dation and staircase) was virtually finished, the defendants' equipment was inside, the intention was to open the shop on the following day, and some £3,250 of the contract price had been paid, when vandals broke into the shop and did wilful

damage which cost (it was later stated) £450 to make good. At the request of the defendants the plaintiffs made good the damage; they brought an action for the cost on a quantum meruit claiming inter alia the existence of a fresh contract separate from the original by reason of the request. The defendants contended inter alia that the original contract was an entire contract which had not been performed (since the work had not been completed) and that in order to fulfil their obligations, the plaintiffs had to make good the damage even though it was wilful. Nield J. said that doubt had been thrown on the extent to which the principle relating to a fresh contract and quantum meruit applied. His lord ship, concluded that, in the circumstances, in cluding the allowing of a retention period, the contract was an entire contract to be completed before full payment was made. Since the con tract works were admittedly not completed, the contract itself was not completed at the time when the damage was done; if the obligation on the plaintiffs to complete the contract involved doing over again work which had been wilfully damaged, the harsh liability was one they had to shoulder. Judgment for the defendants. (Charon [Finchley] Ltd. v. Singer Sewing Machine Co. Ltd. 112. S.J. 536). Submissions of no case The Divisional Court of the High Court in England on June 26th said that when faced at the end of the prosecution's case with a sub mission by an accused person there was no case for him to answer, Justices before passing judg ment must ascertain whether what was sub mitted was part of the final speech by the accused or whether he made the submission while reserving the right to call evidence there after. Their Lordships allowed an application by Sheldon, for an order of certiorari to quash his conviction by Gravesend Justices in February, 1967, for driving a motor vehicle without due care and attention, contrary to Section 3(i) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, as amended. No order as to costs was made. The Justices did not appear and were not represented on the appli cation which was ex parte. . The Lord Chief Justice said that the ground of the application was that the justices had con victed the applicant on a submission of no case, whereas he had every intention of calling evidence if the submission was not upheld. It appeared that the applicant had in his mind was that in the event of the submission being rejected, he 29