The Gazette 1967/71

partnient of Local Government. When appear ances were being taken a chartered surveyor inti mated that he was appearing on behalf of some objectors. The law agent did not object to the appearance but made known his views that he considered only legal representatives or an objec tor in person could appear on behalf of an objec tor. No ruling was made but the law agent again raised the matter when the chartered surveyor was about to cross-examine a witness. It was sub mitted to the inspector that the inquiry was a quasi judicial inquiry established by an act of the Oireachtas with powers to issue sub poena call for the production of documents and to deal with such matters as contempt. The inquiry was adjourned to enable the inspector to consult the legal advisor of the Department of Local Government. On the resumption of the inquiry it was held that it was a quasi judicial inquiry which only solicitors and counsel instructed by solicitors or people actually interested themselves could appear. The inspector stated inter alia, "The rules of court must apply in this case, because this is a quasi judicial inquiry at which sworn evidence is taken". LEGAL COSTS "Again, it is said the conveyance of land ought to be easier than it is. In other countries you can buy a piece of land as easily as a yard of calico. In England the process is so expensive as to put a few acres beyond a poor man's reach. You may cheapen conveyancing, yet the poor man will still not get his acres. The moree asy the transfer, the faster the land will flow in the channels which it tends of itself to follow. "But the less obstruction the better. Let us have free trade in land by all means, as in everything else. There is but one serious objection that I know of. I cannot tell how it may suit the lawyers. When the Reformation began in England, the House of Commons complained to the Crown of the enormous expenses of the ecclesiastical courts. The Archbishop of Canterbury said in reply, that no doubt the proceedings in the courts were costly, but the costs went to maintain a very excellent class of persons, without whom the country would be exceedingly ill off, the learned gentlemen of the long robe. There is force in this answer. I should be sorry to say anything against it. One of the most valuable lessons which I have learnt in life is the prudence of keeping on good terms with the lawyers."—J. A. Froude. From a lecture delivered to the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution in November 1876.

CASES OF THE MONTH Road Traffic Act: Dangerous Driving

The defendant failed to stop at traffic lights which were red against him and collided with a van crossing on the green light. After the accident he had said to witnesses that he did not know what happened; he had felt dizzy and that he knew the lights were red but either "I couldn't stop" or "I didn't stop". He had an incomplete recollection and was of opinion that he suffered a mild blackout. No medical evidence was given. The Justices being of opinion that on the balance of probabilities he had been overcome by a sudden disabling illness of short duration which had dis abled him from applying the brakes they dismissed the information. 1'he prosecutor appealed. It was held on appeal that there was no burden on a defendant in a dangerous driving case. The burden was always on the prosecution to negative any defence, such as latent defect which was not the driver's fault, but before that burden arose it was for the defendant to raise it. An excuse was not sufficient. Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Ireland [(1963) A.C. 386] was a true case of automation as a defence to a charge of murder. In all these cases, the question was whether the driver was in control and whether what he did or did not do was voluntary or involuntary. The mere fact that the Justices thought that the respondent's evi dence was apparently credible was not a sufficient foundation for the defence and they had come to the wrong conclusion. The case should be sent back with a direction to convict. [Cooke v Atchinson; S.J., Vol. 112, No. 12, p. 235]. Husband and Wife: Jurisdiction where applicant is domiciled and resident in Ireland; respondent resident in England The parties were married in Ireland in 1942 both being Roman Catholics. In 1944 the wife left Ireland and finally settled in England where she now resided. The husband was born and domi ciled in Ireland and still resided there. The hv.s- band sought a decree of nullity in the English Court on the ground of the wife's incapacity or, alternatively, wilful refusal to consummate the marriage. The petition was not defended. It was held that a marriage wherever celebrated could be declared null and void if the resident in the country where the relief was sought was the party against whom the charge was made. The residence of the wife could be established by proof of service.