The Gazette 1964/67

ants, two young solicitors, set up in practice in the West End of London, the same area as the plaintiff's practice under the firm name of 'David Leigh & Co.' On 26th January, 1967, the plain tiff issued a writ claiming an injunction to re strain the defendants from continuing to practise under that style, or under any other style or name which included the names 'David Leigh' or 'David Lee' or so nearly resembled the same as lo be calculated to deceive the public or induce the belief that the practice carried on by the defend ants was the same as that carried on by the plaintiff, or was in any way connected therewith. By this motion the plaintiff sought an interim injunction in similar terms. The defendants, in their affidavits, stated, inter alia, that they had originally contemplated using their respective Christian names, adopting the style 'David Loon & Co.', but had finally decided against it, because they felt that the style was 'more suggestive of a ladies' hairdressing salon than of a firm of solic itors' and that before registering the name which they eventually chose they had checked inter alia, the 'Law List' and had concluded that the name chosen could not be confused with other firms, but that they had not checked the names of individual solicitors in practice. Ungoed-Thomas, J., said that there seemed to be no overwhelming urgency, and therefore de spite the strong prima jade case made out, on balance of convenience it was not right to grant an interim injunction, but every facility should be given for a speedy trial. Order accordingly. By consent the motion was treated as the trail of the action, the action being dismissed on the defendants' undertaking to change their name to 'Leigh David & Co.' or such other name as the plaintiff should agree so as not to be likely to deceive. (Lee v Popeck and Another— The Solicitors' Journal, Vol. Ill, p. 114. Restraint of Trade The council of a society founded by royal charter, the objects of which included maintaining the honour and safeguarding and promoting the interests of the members 'in exercise of the pro fession of pharmacy,' proposed by motion in special general meeting a new rule binding on members as part of their code of ethics. The effect of the rule would be that, except with the approval of the council, new pharmacies would have to be situated in physically distinct premises and their trading activities confined to pharma ceutical and traditional goods as defined by the council; and that existing pharmacies selling 'non-

traditional' goods, as defined, would not be able to extend the range of those goods. Registered pharmacists had to be members of the society under Acts of Parliament the disciplinary body was a statutory committee with power to strike off the register any member guilty of 'misconduct'; and in considering misconduct the committee had regard to the code of ethics laid down by the society. There were 29,000 members, but only 6,000 attended the meeting which passed the motion by 5,026 to 1,346. The plaintiff, a mem ber of the society, brought an action against the society and its president asking for a declaration that the proposed new rule was outside the society's powers and would operate as a restraint of trade contrary to public interests. The society claimed that the matter was not justiciable in the courts save on appeal by a member from a decision of the statutory committees and that the rule was within the society's objects. They did not plead that if a restraint of trade the rule would be reasonalbe as between the parties. Pennycuick, J., held that though the rule was within the society's powers it would operate as an unreasonable re straint of trade; and he granted the plaintiff an injunction. The Society and President appealed. The Court of Appeal consisted of Denning, M.R., and Danckwerts, and Sachs, J. J. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. (Dickson v Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain and Another— Solicitor's Journal (Vol. Ill), p. 116). Hire Purchase Option Clause 'An Absolute Trap' A waterman who put down a deposit of £219 on a Jaguar car he was buying on hire purchase and then took it back after less than two months when he could not pay the first instalment be cause of a dockers' strike, was held not to be liable to the finance company for an additional £709-10-8 under the minimum payment clause in the agreement. The court held that a hirer could not exercise an option which had the result of making him liable for a tremendous additional payment unless he knew what the option involved. The Master of the Rolls said it was another case of a minimum payment clause in a hire purchase agreement, providing for a two-thirds payment by way of "agreed compensation for depreciation." The County Court Judge had de cided that the finance company were entitled to sue on the clause. Lord Justice Salmon concurring with Denning M.R., and Mr. Justice Harman, siad that the option clause purported to confer a benefit on the hirer. It was a snare and a delusion, for if 126