The Gazette 1964/67

Comment : The fact that the direction given by the Judge in his summing up was correct seems to establish that the evidence was that W. in jured I. with a broken glass or that he did not injure him at all. But decisions of fact are for the jury and, however overwhelming the evidence that a glass was used, the Court of Criminal Appeal could hardly do other than proceed on the assumption that it was not used when some, at least, of the jury may have returned their verdict on the assumption that the damage was caused by a fist. Indeed, it might have been argued that, since the jury—or some of them— may have founded their verdict on a fact of which there was no evidence, the conviction could not stand at all. Perhaps, however, it is not true to say that there was no evidence of injury by a fist, the jury being entitled to infer this fact from the nature of the injuries. (R. v. Weston, Grim. L.R. (1966) p. 512-513). Proceedings against Receiver A company was formed to take over the assets and business of a company of insurance brokers, and shares in the new company were issued to the directors of the old company. Subsequently, by an order of the Court, by consent a motion by, inter alia, the old company, a receiver and man ager of the old company's business was appointed. Receipts by him totalling some £7,800 he de scribed as premiums received on behalf of the new company which he has paid over to that company. The old company challenged the propriety of that payment and issued a writ against the new company. On a motion by the old company for, inter alia, leave to proceed against the receiver fcr recovery of the £7,800, notwithstanding that the old company was a party to his appointment. Held, that a person at whose instance a re ceiver had been appointed could, provide that the leave of the Court was obtained bring an action against the receiver; and that, the best course of disposing of the present issue involving the receiver being for it to be tried by action, leave would be given to join the receiver as party to the action. (L.P. Arthur (Insurance) Ltd. (in Liquidation) v Sisson and Others (1966) 1 W.L.R. p. 1384). Picketing Crime — Obstruction of Police The Trade Disputes Act 1906, s.2, authorises attendance at or near a place where a person works if the purpose is merely for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communication inform ation or of peacefully persuading any person to work or absta'in from working. Accordingly, if the object of pickets is in part to seal off the 01!

highway and to cause vehicles approaching the premises to stop, they are doing something beyond what is authorised by s.2 of the 1906 Act, and the offence of obstructing a police constable in the execution of his duty is committed if they refuse to desist at the constable's request. (Tynan v. Balmer (1966) 2 W.L.R. 1181; (1966) 2 All E.R. 133). Costs The plaintiff was deprived of part of his costs under r.7 of the Supreme Court Costs Rules, 1959, where the defendant was willing to settle the case but the plaintiff's solicitors would not deliver the medical report until just before the trial. Disclosure at an earlier stage would not have harmed the plaintiff in any way. Lyell T- emphasised that he decided the case entirely on its facts. (Vose v Barr (1966) 2 All E.R. 226). Company Law : Extension of time for Registration of Charge Where there is evidence that an equitable charge has been created by a company, the Court has power, under s.101, Companies Act 1948, to extend the time for registration of the charge if satisfied, inter alia, that the omission to register was due to inadvertence. His Lordship could not see what possible explanation there could have been for not registering the charge in this case except inadvertence and therefore expressed him self as satisfied on this point and exercised his discretion to extend the time for registration, despite the fact that an action was proceeding in which the validity of the charge was in issue. The risk of injustice to the company alleged to have created the charge by allowing registration was far less than the risk of injustice to the chargee by refusing to do so. (Re Heathstar Properties, Ltd. (No. 2) (1966) 1 All E.R. 1000). Section 106 of the Companies Act, 1963 in Ireland corresponds with the provisions of section 101 of the Companies Act, 1948 of England. Planning Permission Ultra Vires Even assuming that the planning permission granted by a local authority to build a school is ultra vires, the owners and occupiers of adjoining houses are not entitled to a declaration that per mission is ultra vires. The plaintiffs have no legal rights as against the trustees who are erecting the school, and they cannot interfere by maintaining that a valid permission must be obtained from the local planning authority before the school .can be built. (Gregory and Another v London Borough of Gamden (1966) 1 W.L.R. 899; (1966) 2 All E.R. 196).