The Gazette 1964/67

stantial amount of the deficiencies were caused by Bertram Hall. It might be that, as the Law Society .said, while he had to allow a measure of independence to a very skilled conveyancing clerk, aged 60, yet Mr. Lincoln failed to exercise even a rneasure of supervision, but it was unnecessary to go into, that matter and his Lordship would treat this as a case where no effective supervision could possibly, have disclosed what was occurring. His Lordship was content to deal with the matter in regard to the delay in the keeping of the accounts and the fact that a very considerable deficiency was disclosed quite apart from any that resulted from Hall's actions. It had been said more than once in this court that where professional misconduct was concerned —that is, misconduct in the profession—this court would not readily interfere with the penalty which the Disciplinary Committee thought appropriate. Having considered all the matters, and, in par ticular, the strong mitigation put forward, his Lordship was constrained to say that not only would he not readily interfere but that he entirely agreed with what the Disciplinary Committee had ordered. Mr. Justice Ashworth and Mr. Justice James agreed. [Re/A Solicitor (Ellis Lincoln); The Times, Friday, 29 July 1966.] Termination of Solicitors Retainer Negotiations being in progress between the de fendants and others with a view to developing a London building site through the medium of a building agreement and subsequent lease, a part ner in a firm of solicitors concerned, who had long acted for B., one of the parties to the negotiations, wrote to. the defendants on 11/3/1959, a letter confirming the basis of the agreement between the defendants and .B The letter included the follow ing paragraph! 'May we please take this oppor tunity of placing on record the understanding that all the legal work of and incidental to the com pletion of the development and the grant of the leases shall be carried out by us." At the time of the letter there was no existing agreement, so the court found, between the solici tors and the prospective client (the defendants) for employment in legal business. The solicitors in fact transacted some legal work in connection with the development and with fringe properties. In 1962 the solicitors enquired of the defendants whether they should call for a lease in pursuance of the building agreement and as to the method of disposing of flats built on the site, and the defendants replied that they had by then their

own legal department, and that they were unable to instruct the solicitors. By further letter, dated 5/11/1962 the defen dants wrote to the solicitors saying that they had acquired B's interests in 1959 and had established their own legal department and that it was de sirable that their legal work should be carried out by their own solicitor. The solicitors brought an action against the defendants claiming damages for breach of contract tq employ them. Held : the claim for damages failed because : (1) The letters of March 1959 did ,not amount to a legal binding contract, but at most produced confirmation on behalf of the defendants of a present intention to instruct .the solicitors to do legal work as and when it arose; : (2) Even if, however, there were a binding contract of retainer, it was a retainer for non- contentious business and was not an entire con tract; the defendants were entitled to terminate the retainer at any time on giving no^ipe^ to the solicitors, and had terminated it .by |heirf, letters in 1962. ,. ,!•(,,••. .,- [ J. H. Milner & Son v. Percy^ $jlton. Ltd. (1966), 2 All E.R. 894.] " ; : Legal Aid in Criminal Cases The accused was convicted of the offence of rape. An application was made on his behalf to the Circuit Judge pursuant to the Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act, 1962, s. 4, for the purpose of obtaining a legal aid (appeal) certificate in rela tion to an intended appeal against the sentence of seven years' imprisonment imposed on the accused by the Circuit Judge. His application was refused. The accused served notice of intention to apply to the Court of Criminal Appeal for liberty to appeal against the sentence imposed. An applica tion for a legal aid (appeal) certificate was then made to the Court of Criminal Appeal seeking legal aid for the hearing of the application for leave to appeal against sentence. On hearing of the application it was agreed that the accused had no means. It was contended on behalf of the Attorney General that the provisions of section 4 (3) of the Courts of Jsutice (Legal Aid) Act, 1962, only applied to cases where the appeal was against conviction, but did not apply when the appeal was against sentence and no more. The Chief Justice delivering the judgment of the court stated that the court was satisfied that, under the powers of the Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Act, 1962, the court had power to assign counsel to a solicitor where an accused person who wished to appeal against the sentence im- 49