The Gazette 1961 - 64

should as far as possible be regarded as impartial and therefore equally available to both sides. Altogether apart from leading to protracted litigation of which medical witnesses not infrequently com plain, the task of judge, jury, counsel and solicitors is made more difficult, where the application of a little common sense ought not to be above the high standard of the profession. Summons heard in absence of defendant A husband left his wife in July, 1956 and in October 1956, she applied to the High Court, for maintenance on the ground of his wilful neglect to maintain her. By November, 1957, affidavits were filed, but the proceedings were then left in abeyance. In March, 1963, the wife complained to justices that her husband had deserted and wilfully neglected to maintain her. The husband's solicitors informed the justices' clerk of the High Court proceedings which were still pending and asked for an adjourn ment of the hearing. The clerk wrote back granting an adjournment for four weeks but the husband's solicitors had no record of its receipt and it was possible that it went astray in their office. Accor dingly only the wife and her solicitors appeared at the adjourned hearing, when the justices found that the husband had deserted and wilfully neglected to maintain the wife a maintenance order was made against him. The husband appealed on the grounds that the justices should not have heard the complaint since (i) High Court proceedings on the same issue were pending, (2) he was not present or represented at the hearing :— Held, (i) that the issues were the same in the proceedings before the High Court as they were in the maintenance proceedings before the magistrates since, although the High Court would have to determine whether the husband was guilty of wilfully neglecting to maintain his wife in 1956, whereas the magistrates would have to determine whether he was so guilty in 1963, once liability had been established, in either case the quantum would have to be ascertained on the basis of the present circumstances of the party. (2) That, where High Court proceedings were pending on the same issue, justices had a discretion to proceed or to adjourn; and that in all other than exceptional cases they should, as a matter of obvious convenience and public policy, exercise their discretion to adjourn the proceedings until the High Court proceedings were disposed of that, since they had not considered whether the present case was one of those exceptional cases where they could nevertheless proceed, they had failed

to exercise their discretion; and that, therefore, a rehearing would be ordered. An application was made by the husband for an order that the costs falling on him should be paid by his former solicitor. Sir Jocelyn Simon P. dealing with this matter stated that the court would make no order on this aspect of the matter in view of the fact that the husband had rights at common law should he choose to test them and enforce them. (Kaye v. Kaye, 1964, 2 W.L.R. 672.) Trade Unions—trade dispute—conspiracy (Trade Dispute Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 47), ss. i, 3.) Defendant trade union officials, whose union was in dispute with an associate of the plaintiff company, " blacked" the plaintiffs' barges by prohibiting union members from working them. Marshall, J. held that the defendants were prima facie guilty of conspiracy, and granted an inter locutory injunction against them ((1964) 2 C.L. 387). Held, allowing the defendants' appeal, (i) that the defendants were primafacie not guilty of conspiracy ; (2) that their conduct was in contemplation of furtherance of a trade dispute and, since they had merely threatened to induce their members to break their contracts of employment (as opposed to threatening to break such contracts) they were protected by the provisions of ss. i and 3 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 ; (3) that there was in any event no prima facie case of intimidation ; and (4) that the defendants -were primafacie not guilty of inducing the breach of contracts other than contracts of employment—J. T. Stratford & Son v. Lindley. (1964) 3 C.L. Backing of Warrants In view of the passing of the Extradition Bill 1963 through the Houses of the Oireachtas, the question raised therein regarding the backing of warrants and the case of R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Hammond may be of interest to members.—(1964) 2 W.L.R. 777. The applicant, an Englishman domiciled in England, was arrested in London on a warrant issued in £ire reciting that a complaint had been made on oath and in writing that the applicant, within six months, at an address in Dublin, had wilfully neglected two children of whom he had custody in such a manner likely to cause them unnecessary suffering or injury to their health contrary to s. 12 of the Children Act, 1908, as amended by an Irish statute of 1957. It was signed by a justice of a District Court in County Dublin, and authorised the execution of the warrant by a con stable of the metropolitan police force; the signature 100