The Gazette 1961 - 64

convict the accused if they were satisfied that the accused were voluntarily present at the fight and might have joined in at a later stage. The appeals were accordingly allowed. (R. v. Allan and others, The Guardian, June i9th, 1963). Duty of an umpire in taxing and settling costs of an arbitration award The English Arbitration Act 1950 gives power, in certain circumstances, to have the remuneration of umpires and arbitrators taxed. Section 18 (i) gives to the arbitrator or umpire a discretion as to the costs of the reference and of the award. Where he awards costs he may either leave them to be taxed by the taxing machinery of the court in whole or in part or he may himself " tax or settle the amount of costs to be paid." A common practice is for the umpire to separate the costs of the award from the costs of the reference. The costs of the award are the arbitrator's and umpire's fees and any expenses which they may have incurred and the costs of the reference are the costs incurred by the party to whom costs are awarded other than the costs of the award. The costs of the award are " taxed or settled " by the umpire and the costs of the reference are frequently left to the taxing machinery of the court. In a motion by a ship owner to set aside or remit the award of an umpire made in the form of a special case under section 21 (i) (b) of the Arbitration Act 1950 the facts were as follows : On May 3ist 1953 the owner entered into a charter party with the charterers whereby a vessel was chartered to them for a voyage and the agreement provided for arbitration in the event of a dispute arising. Each side was to nominate an arbitrator. A dispute did arise and the arbitrators appointed being unable to agree after a meeting of two hours appointed an umpire. In making his award the umpire ordered that the costs of the award amounting to £612 33. be paid by the owner. He further ordered that the owner pay to the charterers the costs of the reference. The fees of the two arbitrators were £183 155. and £157 IDS. respectively. The owner brought a motion to set aside the award on the grounds that the umpire had misconducted himself by settling his own and the arbitrators' remuneration at a figure which was wholly excessive. The court held that the umpire's jurisdiction to tax and settle costs involved the application by him of his own independent mind and judgment to the fees demanded and the work done in order to be satisfied that the fees were fair and reasonable, bearing in mind the interests of the party who have to pay them as well as the legitimate

interests of the arbitrators. It appeared from an affidavit sworn by the umpire that he did not regard it in any way his business to consider and assess the value of the service of the arbitrators or the remunera tion which they could fairly claim to be paid. He simply included in the award the amounts which they asked him to include. The words in the section gave a power to " tax or settle " and the umpire had now done this and accordingly was guilty of technical misconduct. It was ordered that the award be remitted for reconsideration of the provision as to costs of the award. (Government of Ceylon v. Chandris, 1963 2 All England Reports, page i). The mother of two infant children applied by originating summons that the infants be made wards of court and for custody, care and control and access. The father was a respondent to the application, there being conflict between the parties as to custody, etc. On the issue of the summons, the infants became wards of court and the master subsequently ordered that they be joined as respondents, and that the official solicitor be their guardian ad /item. In due course, the official solicitor lodged a statement of facts in which he submitted that the mother should take the infants to be seen by a named medical specialist, and at the same time he lodged a confi dential repor*-. The master ordered that the mother take the infants to the specialist and subsequently the official solicitor lodged a further statement accompanied by a further confidential report annexed to which were reports of the specialist. Both statements but neither of the confidential reports were disclosed to the parties. The mother contended, on a preliminary point, that she was entitled as of right to see the whole of the reports of the official solicitor, including the confidential reports and medical reports annexed thereto. The High Court rejected the mother's contention and on appeal it was held that it was a fundamental concept of justice and fundamental to any judical inquiry that a properly interested party must have the right to see all information put before a judge which he takes into account and to comment on it and, if needs be, to combat it. Accordingly before a judge took into account a confidential report submitted by the official solicitor it must be dis closed to the parties if they so desired. (In re K. (Infants) L,R. Ch. 1963, page 382), Confidential report on a minor not disclosed to one of the parties in a wardship matter