The Gazette 1961 - 64

the court hid permitted the wife arid two further witnesses to be called and in the opinion of the court the wife's evidence was utterly incredible. The court had come to the conclusion early in Mrs. Gatt's cross-examination that no jury would have believed her. The court was of the opinion that the appellant's counsel had used his discretion wisely at the hearing before the jury. In the circumstances the appeal would be dismissed. (R. v. Gatt, The Times, 5th April, 1963.) Meaning of the word " solicitor"—appeal from the Disciplinary Committee of the Law Society The appellant, who was admitted a solicitor in 1949, practised first with a firm of solicitors and then on his own account, both addresses appearing on the practising roll. In August, 1961, he became bankrupt and could not hold a practising certificate, but a month later, H, a firm of solicitors, were given permission by the Law Society to employ the appellant while still an undischarged bankrupt. In April, 1962, allegations concerning the appellant while he was in practice on his own account were made and a hearing by the Disciplinary Committee of the Law Society was fixed for 28th June, 1962. Notices were sent to the two addresses appearing on the roll and to his private address, from which he had moved, but none was sent to him at the address of H. The appellant's trustee in bankruptcy informed him by telephone of the date of the hearing but the appellant misheard it. The com mittee found that the appellant had been in arrears with his accounts and had misappropriated clients' money, and ordered his name to be struck off the roll. He appealed to the court on the ground, inter alia, that he had not been properly served with the notices under r. 30 of the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules, 1957. Lord Parker, C.J., said that if the appellant was a solicitor then the Law Society had complied with r. 30, but it had been argued that for the purposes of the rules a solicitor was a person who held a practising certificate. The appellant had no such certificate and it was argued that the notices should have been sent to his last known business address, which was the address of H. Rule 37 provided that expressions used in the rules should have the same meaning as in the Solicitors Act, 1957. By s. 86 of the Act, a solicitor was defined as " solicitor of the Supreme Court", but it had been argued that the definition should be read with s. i, and it would then be seen that a person had to have a practising certificate to be a solicitor. That construction was wrong and a person could be a solicitor without having a certificate.

Astiworfh and Winn, jj., agreed. dismissed. (In re A solicitor, Solicitors' Journal, March i5th, 1963, page 216.) Private prosecutor represented by counsel—costs The applicants carried on business as a self- service store, where they suffered loss from a number of shoplifters. On 2oth August, 1962, private prosecutions were instituted against three women for shoplifting. Upon their conviction, counsel represen ting the applicants applied to the justices for an order for costs against each of the three women, but the justices refused the application. The applicants thereupon applied for an order of certiorari to quash the refusal of the justices to grant the applicants an order for costs, and for an order of mandamus requiring the justices to hear and determine an application for such an order under s. 5 of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act, 1952. Lord Parker, C.J., said that any increases in cases of shoplifting added to the work of a magistrates' court. On behalf of the applicants it was stated that the justices had not made an order for costs under s. 5 of the 1952 Act since April, 1962, and that some members of the bench had expressed strong views about the prosecutions. The time came when the applicants felt that they ought to be represented by counsel in every prosecution for shoplifting. In respect of the three cases, the justices refused the application for costs because the trivial nature of the cases did not warrant representation by counsel. There was no suggestion of any improper motive on the part of the justices in exercising their dis cretion. Under s. 5 of the 1952 Act, justices had a discretion to award costs occasioned by the appear ance of counsel and solicitors, and also to meet the expenses incurred by the prosecutor and witnesses. It might well be that in all three cases there ought to have been an order for some costs, to meet solicitors' costs and expenses incurred by the prosecutor and witnesses. The court was satisfied, however, that the matter, as presented to the justices, related only to costs of counsel rather than to any other costs. The justices were entitled to say that representation by counsel was unnecessary because of the trivial nature of the cases, and that they would make no order for payment of the costs thereof. Ashworth and Winn, JJ., agreed. Application refused. (R. v. Feltham Justices ; ex parts Waitrose Ltd., Solicitors' journal, March 29th, 1963, page 256.) Search warrant for solicitors' office The Divisional Court, on an application by the partners in Messrs. Bull & Bull, solicitors, of Stone 96 Appeal