The Gazette 1961 - 64

Costs incurred by- him before the receipt of notice of payment into court. In other words, the plaintiff could still get his costs up to the time of payment into court; but the sanction was that thereafter he was liable to be ordered to pay all the defendants' costs from that date. On that interpretation of the rules the plaintiff here would be entitled to his costs up to the date of the payment in which he accepted and the defendants should have their costs thereafter. If that interpretation was not correct, this would be a case where as the rules did not specifically provide for what should be done about costs, Order 47, rule i, would apply, and the Court in the exercise of its discretion as to costs should make the same order in favour of the plaintiff. The appeal should be allowed and the Court would order that there should be paid out to the plaintiff the sum of £83 is. 3d. from the moneys held in court, that the plaintiff's costs of the action up to October 2, 1962, be paid by the defendants, and that the defendants' costs from October 2 to the date of the County Court hearing should be paid by the plaintiff. (Gold v. Introductions Ltd., The Times, March 19) 1963. Solicitors Journal, March 29, page 253.) Wrongful dismissal—breach of principles of natural justice The House of Lords has allowed the appeal by Charles Ridge, formerly Chief Constable of Brighton, from the dismissal by the Court of Appeal of his appeal against the judgment of the High Court dismissing his action against the Brighton Watch Committee in which action he asked for a declaration that their termination of his appointment as Chief Constable was illegal and for payment of his salary from that date or, alternatively, payment of pension and damages. The House of Lords declared that the purported termination by the Watch Committee of the appellant's appointment was null and void as having been effected contrary to the principles of natural justice and it was ordered that the matter be remitted to the Queen's Bench Division to do as should be just and consistent with the decision of the House. It was stated that Mr. Ridge did not now seek re-instatement but sought to assert his rights to a pension. The appellant was appointed Chief Constable of Brighton Police Force in 1956, the appointment being subject to the Police Acts and Regulations- On October 27th, 1957, he was arrested and charged with other persons with conspiracy to obstruct the course of justice and on October 28th was suspended from duty by the Borough Watch Committee. On February 8th, 1958, he was acquitted by the jury of

the criminal charge preferred against him but was subjected to some judicial criticism by the trial judge who was passing sentence on the other persons prosecuted with him. Mr. Ridge applied for re instatement and on March 7th, 1958, the Watch Committee decided that he had been negligent in the discharge of his duties as Chief Constable and in E urported exercise of the powers conferred on them y section 191 (4) of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, they dismissed him. No specific charges were formulated against Mr. Ridge and the committee in arriving at their decision considered among other things his statements in evidence at his trial and the observations of the trial judge. An appeal by him to the Home Secretary was dismissed. Section 191 (4) of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, provides that a Watch Committee may at any time suspend and dismiss any borough constable whom they think negligent in the discharge of his duty or otherwise unfit for the same. Lord Reid giving the judgment of the court said that the authorities establish clearly that in a case of this nature a man could not be dismissed on the grounds of negligence without being first informed of the nature of the charges against him and given an opportunity to reply to them. The appellant had also maintained that the Watch Committee should have proceeded under the regulations made under the Police Act, 1919. It was held that a dismissal under the section already referred to came within the ambit of these regulations and the Watch Committee in dismissing the appellant had not acted under them. (The Times, March I5th, 1963.) The plaintiff in this case was an American citizen and the defendant a Canadian barrister and solicitor. The defendant acted on behalf of a client, a Mr. Kerwin, president of Shannon Falls Ltd. who carried on the business of a trout farm and fishery. The company wished to develop the property as a motel and restaurant and generally as a tourist resort and the plaintiff became interested in investing money for that purpose in the company. The plaintiff met the defendant who was the company's solicitor and he gave to her particulars of the lands and properties which would be given as security for the proposed mortgage. The plaintiff eventually agreed to take a mortgage on the company's property for the sum of $25,000 on the security of the parcels of land described as parcel B and H and the defendant was instructed by the plaintiff to act on her behalf in the transaction. The court was satisfied that the 93 Solicitor acting for both mortgagor and mortgagee in receipt of confidential information affecting security