The Gazette 1958-61

shareholders in the transferee company, and they are the holders of the 90 per cent, majority shareholding, whose acceptance of that offer it is suggested binds the dissenting shareholder also to accept the offer, the onus is on them to satisfy the court that the scheme is one with which the minority shareholder ought reasonably to be compelled to fall in. Of the three shareholders in a company, the two majority shareholders promoted a transferee company of which they each held 50 of the 100 issued shares. The transferee company offered to acquire the shares of all three shareholders, but the minority shareholders refused the offer and applied for a declaration under s. 209 (i) that the transferee company was not entitled to acquire his shares. Held that, in the circumstances the onus of showing that the price was fair was on the transferee company and the company had failed to discharge that onus, accordingly, the applicant was entitled to the declaration sought: Re Bugle Press ; Application of H. C. Treby. (1960) 2 W.L.R. 658 ; 104 S.J. 289 ; (1960) i All E.R. 768, Buckley, J. (distinguishing Re Hoare & Co. (1933) 150 L.T. 374. in sanity. The law does not recognise uncontrollable impulse as a symptom of legal insanity within the M'Nalghten Rules. But in a case where evidence has been given that irresistible impulse is a symptom of the particular disease of the mind from which a prisoner is said to be suffering, its effect on his ability to know the nature and quality of his act or that his act is wrong should be dealt with by the judge in the same way as any other relevant evidence given at the trial. B. was convicted of murder by shooting, the sole defence being insanity, the medical evidence suggest ing that, at the time of the shooting B. had lapsed into a temporary state of schizophrenia in which he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. The trial judge directed the jury that " uncontrollable impulse " was no defence in law. The Australian High Court, allowing B.'s appeal, held that it was necessary to " put before the jury the true operation of incontrollable impulse as a possible symptom of insanity ". Held, that irresistible or uncontrollable impulse was not recognised as a symptom from which the jury might without evidence infer insanity within the M'Nalghten Rules : Att.-Gen. for South Australia v. Brown (1960) 2 W.L.R. 588 ; 104 S. J. 268 ; (1960) i All E.R. 734, P.C. See also s. 79. Trial—summing-up. If counsel in his address to the jury in a murder trial refers to the consequence of their verdict, it is incumbent on the judge to instruct the jury that such matters are not their Murder.—uncontrollable impulse—evidence of

concern and are completely irrelevant to any issue they have to determine. See Att.-Gen. for South Australia v. Brown, Cupra. Juries. Trial by jury, right to—action for personal injuries. (R.S.C. Ord. 36, r. i (3).) Although there may be much to be said for having a jury in an action for personal injuries where the injuries are very grave and there is judicial authority to indicate that a jury is not an improper or unreasonable mode of trial in such circumstances under R.S.C. Ord. 36, r. i (3) it is in the absolute discretion of the court or judge to decide one way or the other and in the absence of grave injustice the Court of Appeal will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion. The plaintiff claimed damages for serious personal injuries sustained in a motor-car accident. Hinchcliffe, J., on appeal by the plaintiff from the refusal of a master to order trial by jury, dismissed the appeal. Held, that the matter was one of absolute discretion and the Court of Appeal would not interfere. Pease v. George (1960) i W.L.R. 427 ; 104 S.J. 328 ; (1960) i All E.R. 709., C.A. Medicine. Restraint of trade—covenant " not to practise privately as radiologist ". (N.Z.) In Blakely and Anderson v. De Lambert (1959) N.Z.L.R. 356, the plaintiffs entered into a partnership deed with the defendant, which provided that in the event of a partner retiring or being expelled from the partner ship he would not practice privately as a radiologist within a certain radius for a certain time. The defendant withdrew from the partnership by consent to take up a hospital appointment outside the stated radius. Later, but still within the stated time, the defendant applied for and obtained a post as a full- time radiologist at a private hospital within the stated radius to conduct the radiological department. The Court of Appeal of New Zealand held, that the defendant was not in breach of his covenant in the partnership deed since the hospital appointment would not be in private practice (following Way v. Bishop (1928) Ch. 647). Practice. Discovery — Crown privilege — entries in detective's diary. A claim for Crown privilege in respect of entries in a detective's diary (sealed by order of the Home Secretary) is a claim made, not in respect of a class of documents, but in respect of each and every sealed entry, and the court has no power to go behind the certificate of the Home Secretary. Entries in the diaries of a detective, who was defendant in an action, had been sealed by order of