The Gazette 1955-58

everything to the State arid-particularly where law reform becomes the prerogative of persons -who preen themselves more on their powers for impro vising temporary expedients than for resolving juristic issues in the light of generally-accepted principles. Accordingly while the law is undergoing multiple changes—changes very often effected without much philosophic reflection or prior consultation with those who could oifer valuable guidance— lawmakers have a grave responsibility to withold measures until an evaluation has been made as to the probable effect on the common good. To shun that responsibility means only that confusion and injustice will arise. The recent statute—The Fatal Injuries Act, 1956 (No. 2 of 1956) is an example of the type of in completeness which irritates the legal mind. Section 7 creates a right to damages where through the negligent driving of a state-owned mechanically propelled vehicle, a person is injured and dies from the injuries. The wording of the section corresponds with that of section 170 of the Road Traffic Act, 1933 (No. ii of 1933) where the right was given for a non-fatal injury. The two Acts dispense with the fiat of the Attorney General which was formerly necessary before proceeding against a Minister of State. But why is the new right limited to the negligent driving of a State-owned mechanically propelled vehicle? The person who meets with personal injury through the negligent driving of a pedal cycle or a vehicle drawn by a horse owned by the State, has not a corresponding right. That confusion exists through this anomalous state of the law is apparent from a statement made by a lawyer in the service of the State, namely that before proceeding against the Minister for Finance for damages arising out of the negligent driving of a State-owned vehicle the fiat of the Attorney General was no longer necessary. (Cf. Public Adminis tration, Vol. II, pp. 20, 21, Civics Institute, Ireland). Some features in the Road Traffic Act (Northern Ireland) 1955, are likely to be of interest to solicitors practising in the Republic. The expression " motor vehicle" in the Northern Ireland Act comprises what in the Republic is contained in the expression " mechanically propelled vehicle." But the expression " vehicle " does not include a " pedal cycle " or a "vehicle drawn by a horse or other animal," as it does in the Republic. Hence some of the incongruous situations which arise in the Republic are avoided in Northern Ireland. A manifest in justice for example is to be seen in the provisions contained in over-lapping sections of the Road Traffic Act, 1933—e.g., Sects. 173 and 175, whereby

a pedal cyclist becomes amenable to a wider range of offences in respect of the act of driving or riding a pedal cycle than those applicable to the driver of a mechanically propelled vehicle; also the penalties applicable to the pedal cyclist are of the same order as these applicable to the driving of a mechanically propelled vehicle notwithstanding that the power of a pedal cyclist to cause serious injury or damage is not nearly as great as that of the driver of a motor vehicle. Whether our legislature intended that a " pedal cycle" or a "horse drawn vehicle" should be included in the expression "vehicle" as used in sections 50 and 51 of the Road Traffic Act, 1933, is a debatable point. It is significant, that the part of the Act which contains sections 50 and 51 is entitled " Speed Limits for mechanically-propelled Vehicles " but this is unavailing because it is not permissible to use the title of a part of an Act for the purpose of construing the intention of the legislature in regard to ensuing sections (cf. Interpretation Act, 1937, sec. 11). Another interesting feature of the Northern Ireland Act is the use of the expression "driving dangerously " to comprise both driving at a speed or in a manner which was dangerous to the public. . . . Also a pedal cyclist or driver of a horse-drawn vehicle can be convicted of " driving carelessly" (as can the driver of a motor vehicle) but only a motor driver can be convicted of driving dangerously. The approach in Northern Ireland to the " notice of intention to prosecute" is more realistic than in the Republic, as the onus is placed on the " person prosecuted " to prove not only that he did not get a notice but that he was prejudiced in his defence through not receiving it. In Northern Ireland the penalty for " riding " or " being in charge of" a pedal cycle or of a horse- drawn vehicle while drunk, is less than for a corres ponding offence committed by the driver of a "motor vehicle." (£50 fine as against 12 month's imprisonment and £200 fine on summary conviction) When in Northern Ireland the driver of a motor vehicle is convicted for being " drunk in charge " the law provides that the Court may modify the disqualification according to the circumstances as defined. While propaganda for furthering road safety is best left to voluntary bodies, such as the Safety First Association of Ireland, the co-operation of local authorities is necessary for an effective in doctrination of the public. In Northern Ireland the Government has recognised this by permitting local authorities to expend money towards advancing measures for accident-prevention. In addition precautions are kept to the fore by requiring an