The Gazette 1955-58

claim under the Fatal Accident Act could be brought to run out without informing the plaintiff of that fact. In deciding without reference to the client that a writ should not be issued he had not exer cised the standard of care he was bound to exercise in the conduct of the affairs of a client. Mrs. Kitchen would have been awarded a maximum of £3,000 if successful. A claim by the plaintiff against the Royal Air Forces Benevolent Association was dismissed, his Lordship holding that there was no breach of duty on their part. (Kitchen v. Donald, Darlington and Nice. The Times, May 22nd, 1957). „ body. The Divisional Court (The Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Hilbery and Mr. Justice Devlin), gave judgment for the appellant in this appeal under the Architects (Registration) Act, 1931, by Mr. Thomas Hughes, F.R.I.C.S., of Boreham Wood, Hert fordshire, from a decision of the Discipline Com mittee of the Architects Registration Council of the United Kingdom disqualifying.him from practising as an architect for two years. Lord Goddard giving a reserved judgment, said that the Discipline Committee had found the appellant guilty of conduct disgraceful to him in his capacity as an architect on the ground that he combined estate agency with his practice as an architect, and had ordered that his name should be removed from the register of architects, that he should be disqualified from registration for two years and that his name should not be re-entered on the register unless he submitted himself to an examination. Considering that the appellant, who was over 60, had been in practice for 35 years without any complaint as to his professional competence, it was remarkable that the respondent council should decide that the suspension imposed should only be determined if he sat for and passed an examination. His Lordship could only suppose that the reason for imposing such a condition was that the Council in fact meant to suspend him for life, as it was inconceivable that at his age the appellant would be willing" to submit himself for examination. His Lordship doubted whether such a condition could lawfully be imposed. . The Architects (Registration) Act, 1931, had established a register of architects. Those in prac tice at the time of the passing of the Act were entitled to have their names included on the register. Disgraceful conduct—opinion of professional

The appellant who had, since 1919, been in practice as an architect, chartered surveyor, land and estate agent and valuer had availed himself of this right in 1934. The Act had also established the Archi tects' Registration Council and a Discipline Com mittee. The council had, at some time after the passing of the Act, issued a code of professional conduct which provided that estate agency should not form part of a registered architect's practice. Such a code had no statutory force of itself. It was clear that at the time the code was issued an architect who also practised as an estate agent was entitled to apply for registration. The Architects Registration Act, 1938, pro hibited anyone calling himself an architect unless he registered. In 1937 the president of the council had written to the Institute of Chartered Surveyors recognizing the fact that there was nothing in the Bill (which the council was promoting) to interfere with the activities of architects. The conduct which the discipline committee found to be " disgraceful " was that the appellant had refused to comply with the standard which the profession had set for itself. Disgraceful conduct was attributed to the appellant for doing that which the council had said legislation would not interfere with. The council seemed to have recog nized that, in spite of the provisions of the code, they ought to allow the members who had prev iously carried on their avocations to continue to do so at least for a time, but that they had fixed a date (January ist, 1956) beyond which it would be misconduct if they continued to do so. The appellant had had the right to have his name entered on the register in the years after 1931. If the decision of the Discipline Committee was right, it would have been open to the council to remove the appellant's name from the register the moment it had been entered. Such a result was plainly absurd. The appellant had openly combined his practice as an architect with his practice in other occupations for the 20 years following his registration. How could it reasonably be said that it was disgraceful for him to continue to practise his other occupations after a particular date which the council chose to appoint ? The Court was concerned with a transitional state of affairs. In his Lordship's opinion it was wrong to apply the same consideration and standard to those in practice'before 1931 as to new entrants. The appellant could not be held guilty of conduct that by any standard could be said to be " dis graceful " because he continued to practise in exactly the same way after registration as before,