The Gazette 1955-58

failure to use reasonable skill and diligence as her solicitor. HELD by Ashworth J. that:—(i) the defendant had been negligent in failing to point out to the plaintiff in 1949, when the wills were made and the question of her marriage with Mr. H. was raised, that the marriage would revoke the wills. Griffiths v. Evans ((1953) 2 All E.R. 1364). distinguished. (ii) the damage was not too remote because, the plaintiff's claim was for breach of con tract (Groom v. Crocker (1938) z All E.R. 394, applied), and (a) if the damage to the plaintiff were viewed as her lack of know ledge of her need to persuade Mr. H. to make a new will, that was a natural con sequence of the defendant's negligence within the first rule in Hadley v. Baxendale ((1854), 9 Exch. 341) or (b) if the remoteness of the damage were tested by what might reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the defendant (in accordance with the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale supra) it was not unreasonable to impute to him realisation that he was depriving the plaintiff of a chance of re covering for herself the benefits that she would, but for her marriage, have gained from Mr. H.'s will of December, 1949. (iii) although the existence of contingencies that had to be satisfied before the plaintiff would have realised the benefits to be conferred by Mr. H.'s will did not render the damage too remote, since there was reasonable pros pect of them being satisfied (dictum of Fletcher Moulton, L.J., in Chaplin v. Hicks (1911) 2. K.B. at P. 793, applied), yet their existence reduced the amount at which the damages should be assessed, and in view of this, the damages awarded would be £1.250. (iv) the defendant, being separately instructed by the plaintiff, was under no duty to inform her either in September, 1950 (when he learned of her marriage), or in 1952 (when he drew a new will for her), that her marriage had revoked Mr. H.'s will. Note:— The result of this case and of Griffiths ". Evans may perhaps be summed up as follows :— (i) The duty of reasonable care owed by a solicitor to his client required the solicitor not merely to obey his instructions, but to exercise reasonable foresight, at the time

when he receives those instructions, as to to likely effect of any change of circumstances which ought then to be within his contem plation, and to warn his client accordingly. (ii) If something occurs after the particular transaction has been completed, which he was not bound to foresee when originally consulted, he is not generally bound to re open the matter with his client. (iii) He is not bound to refer to matters which do not directly affect the subject of the retainer. (Hall v. Meyrick—(1957) i All E.R. 208). Inquiry into previous arrangement by successful respondent that be should not be liable for his counsel's fees refused by Privy Council. A petition of a most unusual type in connection with the costs of an appeal came before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on 22nd January last, when counsel for the petitioner, an appellant who had been unsuccessful on the merits in a recent appeal to the Board and had been ordered to pay two-thirds of the respondent's costs of the appeal, stated that the petitioner believed that an arrange ment had been entered into before the hearing of the appeal between the respondent company, its solicitors and a third party which was a stranger to the proceedings but was concerned to maintain the judgment appealed from, whereby the respondent should not be liable for fees of counsel. What the petitioner wanted to know, said counsel, was whether any such agreement had been entered into, for if it had, there were authorities to show that there was no liability on the party ordered to pay costs for that particular item of costs. Those auth orities—Grundy v. Sainsbury (1910) i K.B. 645 and Adams v. London Improved Motor, etc. (1921) i K.B. 495—supported the following pro positions : (i) Party and party costs were awarded in the nature of an indemnity to the successful party. (2) If, for any reason, the successful party was under no liability to pay his solicitor any costs, he could not recover any costs from his opponent. (3) That principle applied equally to a particular item of costs as it did to the whole costs. (4) In particular, if the solicitor agreed not to charge the client with counsel's fees or to look only to some third party for payment of those fees, and the opponent in the litigation was ordered to pay costs generally, he could not be charged with that item. He was not suggesting, said counsel, that there was anything improper in the fact, if it were the