The Gazette 1955-58

final on the facts, but not final on the law. Not withstanding that the decision is by » statute made " final," certiorari can still issue for excess of jurisdiction or for error of law on the face of the record. I venture, therefore, to use in this case the words which I used recently, in Taylor v. National Assist ance Board (1957) i. All E.R. 183) with suitable variations to certiorari: " The remedy is not excluded by the fact that the determination of the board is by statute made ' final.' Parliament gives the impress of finality to the decisions of the board only on the condition that they are reached in accordance with the law. . ." In my opinion, therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the statute says that the decision of the medical appeal tribunal is to be final, it is open to this court to issue a certiorari to quash it for error of law on the face of the record. I am glad to notice that modern statutes never take away in express words the right to certiorari without substituting an analogous remedy. This is probably because the courts no longer use it to quash for technical defects, but only use it in case of a sub stantial miscarriage of justice. Parliament nowadays more often uses the word " final," or " final and conclusive" or some such words, which leave intact the control of the courts by certiorari. Romer, L.J. : I agree. In my judgment, it would be deplorable if we were constrained to hold that the decision of a medical appeal tribunal however wrong in law, and however obviously wrong, was immune from review by Her Majesty's courts. I cast no reflection whatever on tribunals such as that in the present case, and they do their work conscientiously and with efficiency. In the nature of things, however, these and similar inferior tribunals (and there are many of them nowadays) are bound to go wrong from time to time in matters of law. Their members consist, in the main, of people who have devoted their lives to activities far removed from the study and practice of the law; and neither by training nor by experience can they be expected to have that knowledge of principles of construction which is so necessary for the proper understanding and application of the various statutes and regulations which often come before them. Injustice may well result, and a sense of injustice is a grievous thing. I, therefore, think (and I have said as much before) that it is not in the public interest that inferior tribunals of any kind should be ultimate arbiters on questions of law. Parliament, of course, can make them so . 93

an industrial accident and became entitled to dis ablement benefit under the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946. Under reg. 2 (5) of the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) (Benefit) Regulations, 1948, his disablement was to be assessed as if the injury to his right eye was incurred as a result of losing the sight of his left eye; and, under Sch. i to the regulations, the disablement for blindness in one remaining eye was to be assessed in such circumstances at a hundred per cent. A medical appeal tribunal, failing to apply reg. 2 (5), assessed the applicant's disablement at twenty per cent. The facts on which the tribunal based their decision did not appear on the face of their written adjudication, but the adjudication contained an extract from the report of a specialist who had examined the applicant and had set out in his report the full facts in regard to the previous injury and to the injury in 1955. Section 36 (3) of the Act of 1946 provides that any decision of a medical appeal tribunal of a question arising under the Act " shall be final." On an application by the applicant for an order of certiorari to remove the decision of the medical appeal tribunal into the High Court to be quashed, it was conceded that the decision was erroneous in point of law. HELD : the order of certiorari would be granted as the court had jurisdiction for the following reasons— (i) the tribunal, by giving an extract from the specialist's report, had made the report a part of the record, and, as the tribunal came to a conclusion which could not reasonably have been entertained by them if they had had proper regard to reg. 2 (5) of the Regu lations of 1948, they had fallen into error in point of law, which was thus apparent on the face of the record. (ii) the provision in s. 36 (3) of the Act of 1946 that the tribunal's decision should be " final " merely meant that the decision should be final on the facts and should not be the subject of appeal, and the sub-section did uot exclude jurisdiction by certiorari. Per Denning, L.J. :—On looking again into the old books I find it very well settled that the remedy by certiorari is never to be taken away by any statute except by the most clear and explicit words. The word " final " is not enough. That only means " without appeal." It does not mean " without recourse to certiorari." It makes the decision