The Gazette 1955-58

had been brought. On taxation of the costs of the motion as between the applicants and the respondents the taxing master disallowed two-thirds of the brief fees of the applicants' leading and junior counsel on the grounds that the order for taxation entitled the applicants to what was in substance a party and party taxation but on more generous lines, and that the fees allowed were adequate having regard to R.S.C., Ord. 65 r. 27 (29). HELD by Danckwerts, J., the full brief fees of leading and junior counsel would be allowed in the costs of the applicants because the order for costs, being made on a motion to commit for contempt, was of a punitive nature, and the inten tion of the order was that the applicants should be indemnified for the costs of the motion. Dictum of Buckley, L.J., in Giles v. Randall (1915) i K.B. at p. 295) considered and not applied. (Editorial Note. This case provides a further illustration of the difficulty that results from using the description " as between solicitor and client" to import different measures of generosity on taxation of costs (compare, for a further instance, Re Adelphi Hotel, Ltd., (1953) 2 All E.R. 498). A clear distinction may be drawn between taxation as between a solicitor and his own client on the one hand and taxation between different parties to litigation on the other hand. In the latter instance, however, there are at any rate two possible variants, vi2., (i) where a party to litigation is to receive indemnity for his costs and (ii) where the costs are to be borne by a fund (e.g., a trust fund) rather than to be paid by a party. The recommendation made by the Evershed Committee in their final report (July, 1953 ; Cmd. 8878, paras. 720, 721) was that the term " solicitor and client" costs should be replaced by " full action " costs.) (Morgan v. Carmarthen Corporation—(1957) i. All E.R. 437.) If a sale of registered land is rescinded because the purchaser fails to complete, and the property is sold to another purchaser who does not sign a contract nor require an investigation of title, the second pur chaser is nevertheless liable to the solicitor for the scale fee. THE plaintiff and the defendant were entitled absolutely as joint tenants to a freehold dwelling- house which they occupied. They were registered as proprietors with an absolute title. The plaintiff having obtained an order of the court for the sale of the property, the conduct of the sale was given to S., the solicitor for mortgagees, who prepared particulars and conditions of sale. The property

was first sold to the defendant, but, after the pre paration of a transfer and the obtaining of copies of the entries on the register and the plan, she failed to complete. The sale to the defendant was rescinded, and the property was sold to the plaintiff. S. returned the defendant's deposit to her and collected a deposit from the plaintiff. All the work done by S. up to this point was (quite pro perly) charged for in detail and allowed in his bill of costs which was later delivered. The plaintiff did not sign a contract, nor require an abstract of title, and there was no deducing or investigation of title. The transfer to the plaintiff was ultimately executed by the defendant by order of the court. S. included in his bill of costs £25 representing the appropriate scale fee by virtue of the Solicitors' Remuneration (Registered Land) Order, 1925, art. i (D) (i) and Schedule. The taxing master dis allowed the item. On a summons to review taxation, HELD by Vaisey J. that the scale fee of £25 ought to have been allowed notwithstanding that some of the work which the fee was stated in para. (H) of art. i of the Order of 1925 to cover, e.g., the preparation or perusal of a contract or conditions of sale, had not been done for the purpose of the sale to the defendant, since art. i (D) (i) of the Order of 1925 contained a clear direction that the remuneration should be the scale fee prescribed. Per Vaisey J. :—I think that the transfer of regis tered land stands on a very different footing to the conveyance of land under the old regime where there had to be abstracts and various steps taken which are not necessary in the case of land registered with an absolute title. It seems to me on the par ticular facts of this case that this scale fee of £25 ought to have been allowed, and I will so declare. (Broughton v. Thorne—(1957) i All E.R. 87). An action against undenvriters under a " Q.C. Clause " (subsequently defined) that a claim made in an action against accountants that their clerk had converted client's money was covered by this clause was held unsustainable. THE plaintiffs, a firm of accountants, were insured by the defendant underwriter " against loss for any claim or claims which may be made against them ... in respect of any act of neglect, default or error on the part of the assured ... or their partners on their servants in the conduct of their business as accountants." The underwriters (in a clause called for convenience the " Q.C. clause ") further agreed " to pay any such claim or claims which may arise without requiring the assured to dispute any claim, unless a King's Counsel . . .